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his book is a compilation of papers presented at the International 
Transformation Conference in Stockholm, Sweden on June 2–3, 
2009. The conference was hosted by the Swedish Defence 
Research Agency at their Division of Information Systems in Kista. 
The papers are organized according to the categories of culture, 
interagency, transformation initiatives, leadership, and adaptive 
organizations. This sequence was chosen to group papers with common 
themes so that readers could follow the logic and findings of each paper 
more easily.  
The book represents the views of the authors, most of whom are 
members of the International Transformation Chairs Network that was 
founded in the United States in 2004 by retired Vice Admiral Arthur K. 
Cebrowski, who then served as the Director of the U.S. Department of 
Defense Office of Force Transformation. Since that time, the 
organization has added members from the United Kingdom, Sweden, 
Australia, Singapore, and NATO. 
The mission of the International Chairs Network is to provide a 
forum to challenge thinking, leverage shared knowledge, and inform 
the debate about the international security implications of global 
transformation. The vision of the group is that the efforts of these types 
of activities will ultimately result in a group of national security leaders 
who are prepared for a future filled with complexity, chaos, and 
surprise. Publication of this book is one step in the process of reaching 
this goal. 
We hope that this book is valuable to you as you seek to transform 
your part of the world. 
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he International Transformation Chairs recognize the 
contributions of Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski to the 
transformation process and pay tribute to him for his role in 
creating the International Transformation Network.  
Vice Admiral (ret.) Arthur K. Cebrowski (August 13, 1942–
November 12, 2005) served from October 2001 to January 2005 as 
Director of the Office of Force Transformation in the U.S. Department 
of Defense. In this position, he reported directly to the Secretary and 
Deputy Secretary of Defense and was responsible for serving as an 
advocate, focal point, and catalyst for the transformation of the U.S. 
military. 
The Secretary of Defense called for the creation of the Office of 
Force Transformation in support of President George W. Bush’s broad 
mandate to transform the Nation’s military capabilities. The 
transformation process challenges the status quo with new concepts for 
American defense to promote an overwhelming and continuing 
competitive advantage for America’s military. 
As Director of the Office of Force Transformation, Admiral 
Cebrowski worked to link transformation to strategic functions, 
evaluated the transformation efforts of the military departments, and 
promoted synergy by recommending steps to integrate ongoing 
transformation activities. Among his primary responsibilities, Admiral 
Cebrowski monitored service and joint experimentation programs and 





We are indebted to Admiral Cebrowski for his vision and his 
initiatives to institutionalize effective transformation in the U.S. 
military. His contributions live on through the International 










Transformation Chairs meeting, U.S. Air Force Academy, fall 2008 
he International Transformation Chairs Network has evolved 
from the Transformation Chair system set up by the U.S. Office 
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) through the Office of Force 
Transformation under the tutelage of Vice Admiral Cebrowski. The 
mission of the network is to “provide a forum to challenge thinking, 
leverage shared knowledge and inform the debate about the national 
and international security implications of global transformation.” 
The organization’s vision is to “assist national security leaders and 





The complexities of the task make definitions of transformation a 
challenge and often open to debate. The unpredictable nature of the 
future international security environment defies a tightly bounded 
definition so the International Transformation Chairs have adopted an 
inclusive description: “Transformation is a process that shapes the 
changing nature of competition and cooperation through new 
combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations.” 
The Transformation Chairs Network was created by the Secretary of 
Defense in 2004 to support the transformation of American defense 
concepts that was being implemented through the Office of Force 
Transformation (OFT). The underlying precept that drove the concept 
was the need to move transformational thinking down into the heart of 
the military organizations, principally through the education system, to 
kick-start a bottom-up push for change. 
The Transformation Chairs Network has gone through several 
“transformational changes” of its own. OFT’s original approach was to 
seed the major educational institutions within the Department of 
Defense (DOD) with experts who would then facilitate curriculum 
changes supportive of transformational thinking. To create incentives 
for the various schools, DOD provided funding for 3 years to cover the 
experts’ costs and support student research. After the 3-year period, 
each institution was to decide on the worth of the chair position and 
whether to continue funding it. Under this program, 13 chair positions 
were formed that covered most of the intermediate and senior 
educational institutions within DOD, as well as the Service academies. 
The group met quarterly, and most meetings revolved around the 
challenges in establishing the legitimacy of the chair position, creating 
viable curricula for the schools, and pressing the fundamental concepts 
of transformational change.  The program was vibrant, and the network 
quickly coalesced into a strong, collaborative organization. 
The first serious challenge, and the opening of the second phase for 
the transformation chairs, was bridging the funding gap when DOD 
funding ended and the individual institutions had to assume the cost of 
the program. The group did shrink but stayed surprisingly strong and 
larger than many had expected. In addition, international players, 
recognizing the importance of transformation and interested in tapping 
into the U.S. initiative, started joining the group. By mid-2009 
Australia, Singapore, Sweden, and the UK were represented. The 
quarterly meetings changed in character and substance, moving away 
from the more mundane administrative and curricula issues and into 
 xi 
substantive debate over the critical challenges rapid change was 
creating for the military. Introduction of international views greatly 
expanded the discussions and broadened the expertise within the group. 
Quarterly meetings were now combined with a lead-in conference that 
brought in many outside players interested in critical issues of 
challenge and change. Following the conference, the network would 
meet and continue the debates and plan activities for the future. Efforts 
moved from concepts to action with the addition of conferences, the 
publication of monographs, and direct support of DOD initiatives. For 
example, during 2008–2009, efforts by network members were 
instrumental in increasing the emphasis placed on the teaching of 
cyber-related issues in the Officer Professional Military Education 
Policy issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
The third phase for the Transformation Chairs Network started with 
the first International Transformation Conference held in Stockholm, 
Sweden in June 2009. The theme of the conference was Crosscutting 
issues in Transformation: Interactions and Innovations among People, 
Organizations, Process, and Technology. Thirteen papers were 
presented and are published in this volume. Following the conference, 
the transformation chairs agreed on an expanded venue for the network, 
solidifying the international nature of the program and formally 
adopting a new direction for the group captured by the mission and 
vision statements cited above. Links also were tightened with NATO’s 
Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation. 
The goals of the International Transformation Chairs Network are 
to: 
• inform ongoing debate with forward-thinking concepts on 
major transformational issues, 
• conduct research that identifies crosscutting issues, opens new 
vistas, and validates (or challenges) current initiatives,, and 
• shape and share curricula to help educate and prepare future 







By Grant Hammond 
 
Introduction 
or over 15 years now, the U.S. military and numerous North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and other nations in 
the West have been committed to a process called 
“transformation.” Born of the “Military Technological Revolution” of 
Marshall Ogarkov,1 morphed into the Revolution in Military Affairs 
forecast by the U.S. Joint Vision 2010,2 and institutionalized in the 
formation of the Office of Transformation in the Pentagon and Allied 
Command Transformation in NATO, it is a complex process more 
evolutionary than revolutionary. As Andrew Marshall of the Office of 
Net Assessment in the Pentagon explained, there really is no revolution 
in military affairs—no transformation—until the new technologies have 
been incorporated into changed processes, organization, and doctrine, 
and this takes time.3 There were two main schools of thought regarding 
transformation. One saw it as the Revolution in Military Affairs, 
another saw it as the challenge to cope with the changing security 
environment of the 21st century.4 The meaning of the term 
transformation, other than as a substitute for change, has been unclear. 
The term has meant different things to different countries, services, 
                                                     
1 See Dale Herspring, “Nikolay Ogarkov and the Scientific-Technical 
Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs,” Comparative Strategy, 1987;6(1):29–
59. 
2 Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
1996). 
3 One of the better articles is by Ian Roxborough, “From Revolution to 
Transformation: the State of the Field,” Joint Force Quarterly, 2002; 
Autumn:68–75. 
4 See Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free 
Press, 1991). 
F
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organizations, and individuals. This has been understandable, given the 
different circumstances of all those who have embraced the concept 
and enshrined the process. As we have been reminded many times, 
“transformation is a journey, not a destination,” and so it may be—but 
this means there may be no agreed-on vision, explicit goals, or 
consistent definition in the effort. 
There are at least three different meanings contained in the term 
transform. One is change in the outward form or appearance of 
something or someone. In acquiring new equipment, many a nation has 
“transformed” and has modernized the force and acquired new 
capabilities. A second meaning is a deeper, more complex notion 
implying a change in the condition, nature, or function—a conversion 
into something else. In “transforming,” many NATO allies hoped to be 
able to participate in, if not genuinely become, a modern, net-enabled 
force that could be interoperable with the United States and other major 
NATO allies. A third meaning is to change the personality or character 
of an entity. This is a much more complex process, but an essential one 
if we are to cope with the challenges of the 21st century. 
Most militaries have focused on the first meaning and equated it 
essentially with modernization, particularly of communications, 
command and control, and various improvements in hardware. They 
have focused on the technological aspect of transformation. Others 
have seized on the term and the process to rationalize (in both senses of 
the term) the need to downsize their militaries and reorganize them into 
smaller, supposedly more capable, forces. For many, transformation 
meant changing from a conscript to a professional military. Great effort 
has been expended in changing organizations, processes, and military 
doctrine for a transformed force. Far less attention has been paid to the 
third meaning of the term—the change in personality or character of 
those who constitute the military. I contend that the essence of a 
successful transformation requires a fundamental change in the attitude, 
as well as aptitude, of those who make up the uniformed military and 
their political masters. We must learn to think differently and to 
educate and train ourselves to adapt. One of NATO’s two strategic 
commands is Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, 
Virginia. Its vision statement is, “ACT will be NATO's leading agent 
for change; enabling, facilitating and advocating continuous 
improvement of military capabilities to enhance the military 
interoperability, relevance and effectiveness of the Alliance." Its 
strategic objectives are to provide appropriate support to NATO 
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missions and operations; lead NATO military transformation; and 
improve relationships, interaction, and practical cooperation with 
partners, nations, and international organizations.5 As a major effort of 
the world’s most successful collective defense organization, these are 
worthy goals and vision, but they are not very specific in content. 
Change and continuous improvement are important, but accomplishing 
their implementation is difficult. 
Transformation and the Transformed World 
There are several reasons that this implementation is challenging. 
The first is that the world in which we live has been transformed in all 
three of ways discussed above—outward form and appearance, 
condition and nature, and the character of those who act in it. 
Monolithic, state-centric, conventional military threats of the 20th 
century have largely given way to a world of insurgencies in failed and 
failing states and the rise of non-state actors in a globalized world of 
complex interdependencies in an expanded contest of irregular warfare. 
States no longer have a monopoly on knowledge, resources, and power; 
these are now obtainable to some degree on the Internet and accessible 
with a laptop and a credit card—both of which can be stolen. Second, 
the very nature of security has been transformed, certainly after 9/11, if 
not before. Security—protecting citizens and territory—now is no 
longer solely the province of the state and the uniformed military. It has 
become personal, municipal, corporate, and cyber, as well as national, 
regional, and international. It is economic and social, not merely 
political and military, and the number of private military companies, 
the instances of piracy (both naval and intellectual), and the tens of 
thousands of gated communities in which many well-to-do people now 
live all testify to the declining capability of the state to provide security. 
Third, the actors and what motivates them are no longer groups of 
citizens of states but, rather, Internet-connected groups of “netizens”—
those who owe allegiance to or are committed to serving not states but 
innumerable causes of all kinds, particularly religious, social, and 
political. Individuals now have the ability to do significant harm to 
large numbers of people in a world in which the democratization of 
technology has empowered anyone or any group who seeks to combine 
the ability, intent, and opportunity to do harm. 
                                                     
5 Allied Command Transformation homepage at http://www.act.nato.int/ 
content.asp?pageid=200 [Accessed April 17, 2009]. 
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In using the term transformation, a more imposing term for the more 
pedestrian word “change,” we are right in suggesting that this is a 
complex process and ultimately something more than replacing one 
thing with another. However, we also miss some of the implications of 
the process of change. Rolf Smith wrote an interesting little book6 a 
number of years ago in which he suggested there were seven levels of 
change. These were: 
1. Do things right—being efficient. 
2. Do the right things—being effective. 
3. Copy what others have done—being smart. 
4. Do what nobody has done—being novel. 
5. Do things differently—being creative. 
6. Do what should be done—being moral. 
7. Do what cannot be done—being truly successful. 
Each level increases in difficulty, but true change, a genuine 
transformation, is only achieved at level seven. We need to pay 
attention to all levels but accept that we may only accomplish one at a 
time. In attempting to change—to transform—we must keep the totality 
of the effort in focus and accept that priorities may change through time 
and circumstance. That said, ultimately it is peoples’ perceptions that 
matter most, and how individuals come to view the process, support the 
vision, and nurture the process is the key to success. In embracing the 
process of transformation, we have done well at levels one through 
three and made reasonable progress in levels four and five. We have 
done less well on the heart of the matter—levels six and seven.  
In short, transformation ought to be about not just how we do 
things—which has been the bulk of the emphasis to date—but what we 
do and why. Chris Coker’s new book, War in an Age of Risk,7 argues 
forcefully that war is no longer about a battle of wills but is instead an 
exercise in risk management. We live in an era in which it is far more 
difficult to protect the citizen than to protect the state, but in democratic 
societies, the citizens are the state, and public opinion constitutes the 
ultimate center of gravity. This is true in any conflict in which 
democratic societies contend—economic competition in the 
marketplace, political debates in the corridors of power, or war, 
                                                     
6 Rolf Smith, The Seven Levels of Change (Houston, TX: Tapestry, 2009). 
The book was originally published in 1997; a third edition has just been 
published. 
7 Christopher Coker, War in an Age of Risk (Cambridge: Polity, 2009). 
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whether conventional or irregular. It becomes even more important in 
unrestricted warfare, such as that described by the Chinese colonels a 
decade ago.8 They saw a world in which there was a contest in several 
arenas, as illustrated in the table below defining three groups of 
warfare. 

























Looking at war in this manner redefines the battle space and the 
time, the matter, and the energy required to compete successfully. If, as 
Coker suggests, war is now an exercise in risk management, managing 
the totality of these risks is hugely complex, and much of it is not the 
responsibility of the uniformed military. Instead, it is a task incumbent 
on us all in our various roles—as parent, citizen, consumer, or investor. 
It is also an example of the sort of transformation that is most 
important—transformation in how one thinks and perceives the security 
challenges and the environment in which one competes. Perception 
informs behavior, and thinking changes one’s perceptions. How we 
identify, define, and think we must respond to the security environment 
around us is crucial if we are to survive and prosper in it. 
                                                     
8 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, (Beijing: PLA 
Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999). The table is in chapter 
5, “New Methodology of War Games,” in the section entitled “Using Addition 
to Win the Game.” This is translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service and is available zipped at http://cryptome.org/cuw.zip [Accessed May 
20, 2009]. 
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Future Studies 
The U.S. military in particular has specialized in the last decade and 
a half in trying to envision the world of the future. It was a necessary 
task to think about how the world might evolve in the aftermath of the 
Cold War. The planning that has taken place has been necessary, and 
the futures the military has explored have been useful, but the planning 
has provided only instrumental goals. These goals are vehicles to help 
us learn to think about the future, not necessarily blueprints for it. If 
done well, they can narrow the aperture of risk, or at least help get a 
sense of the balance or imbalance of risks and responsibilities. The 
latest example of a major effort of this sort is the ACT study, the 
Multiple Futures Project.9 A year-long study on the future and its 
implications for NATO, the project is a broadly gauged comprehensive 
look at the possible emerging security landscapes of the future and the 
organizational, technological, and procedural implications for the 
Alliance as a result of these trends and their implications. It was an 
ambitious study and a major accomplishment for ACT that will serve to 
educate the member nations regarding the challenges they will likely 
face in the future and the large list of things the Alliance will have to do 
to cope effectively with them. 
Such studies, valuable as they are in attempting to anticipate, 
prepare for, and shape the future, are of limited use as plans for the 
future. This is because the future is a world populated by the likes of 
Ambrose Bierce, Yogi Berra, and black swans. Ambrose Bierce 
defined a plan as the best means of accomplishing an accidental 
result.10 Yogi Berra’s famous remark that “it’s tough to make 
predictions, especially about the future”11 rings true, despite the 
unintended humor. Nassim Taleb has written about the occurrence of 
the highly improbable “black swan” event, which is unpredictable, has 
                                                     
9 Allied Command Transformation, Multiple Futures Project: Navigating 
Towards 2030, May 2009, available at http://www.act.nato.int/ 
MultipleFutures/ [Accessed May 8, 2009]. 
10 Ambrose Bierce, The Devil’s Dictionary. These cynical definitions were 
collected and published by Bierce (but never copyrighted) in 1906 and 1911. 
A compilation of these definitions is available at 
http://www.thedevilsdictionary.com/?P [Accessed April 20, 2009]. 
11 Quotation available at http://www.dictionary-quotes.com/it-s-tough-to-
make-predictions-especially-about-the-future-yogi-berra/ [Accessed April 20, 
2009]. 
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a massive effect, and for which we concoct an explanation that makes it 
seem less random after the fact.12 All swans were thought to be white 
until Australia was discovered and found to have black swans. History 
moves not as a smoothly flowing river but resembles more what 
paleontologists call “punctuated equilibrium,”13 in which random 
occurrences move evolution along a different path. Constantine’s 
conversion to Christianity, the Black Death in medieval Europe, the 
Great Depression, and the events of 9/11 were all “black swans” of 
immense impact for the world. Though seen as possible and plausible 
in hindsight, they were not predicted, and their consequences and how 
to deal with them were largely unplanned.  
Things get even worse. As Antulio Echevarria explains in his 
discussion of the proper use of history in professional military 
education, even though we have a record of things said and done in the 
past, it is only a partial record.14 There is no such thing as objective 
history, for we do not have the full account from all perspectives of any 
event. The motivation for human action and interaction is so 
multifaceted that interpreting the past, however stringent the attempt at 
objectivity, is fraught with difficulty. There are, in effect, as many 
interpretations of the past as there are historians to interpret it. 
Although some are “better” than others, according to a particular 
standard or bias, there is no such thing as a perfect history of the past. 
We use history properly, not as vicarious experience but as an 
instrumental means to learn how to think better about our present and 
our future. Now, if this is true about the past—a string of events about 
which we have some, and in many cases a great deal, of certainty, if not 
perfect knowledge—what of the even more difficult task of interpreting 
                                                     
12 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly 
Improbable (New York: Random House, 2008). 
13 The concept of punctuated equilibrium was a seemingly radical new idea 
when it was first proposed by Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldridge in 1972. 
Now it is seen as a useful model for one kind of evolutionary change. The 
relative importance of punctuated and gradual patterns of evolution is a subject 
of debate, but the concept serves as a useful metaphor in looking at the course 
of human history in which large-scale change appears seemingly randomly 
amid a slower pace of change. However improbable some of these mutations 
may have been, some have had an enormous effect on the evolutionary 
process. 
14 Antulio J. Echevarria II, “The Trouble with History,” Parameters, 
Summer 2005, 78–90. 
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the future? Here we have no record of things said or done, yet we 
attempt to tell the story of our future. It is immensely difficult. Broad 
brush strokes can be placed on the canvas of the future, but the image 
resembles at most an exercise in impressionist painting, not 
photorealism. We should not imbue such efforts with more precision 
than they deserve. 
The implications of this reality were captured by Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld when addressing a group of airmen at Andrews Air 
Force Base in 2001 (before the events of 9/11). He stated, "Your task is 
to defend your nation against the unknown, the uncertain, the unseen 
and the unexpected.”15 This of course is both absolutely correct on one 
level and impossible on another. It is the nature of the future that it is a 
landscape populated with unknowns. It is also the case that we must 
attempt to meet the challenges that these unknowns may present, and 
although we may think about what may transpire and how we might 
better cope with certain eventualities, we are unlikely to consider all the 
possibilities or prepare adequately for them. We can, however, try to 
shape things as best we can and prepare ourselves to be innovative and 
adaptive as the need arises. 
Tradition versus Adaptation 
The American military (and one suspects a great many others that 
have emulated it and its practices, as well as those from whom we 
inherited these practices) is ill prepared to contend with these 
challenges. The reasons—and remedies—have been explained by 
Donald Vandergriff in a number of books and studies he has 
conducted.16 The military decision-making process was created in 1897 
                                                     
15 American Forces Press Service, “Rumsfeld Says US Forces Building 
21st Century Military,” speech given at Andrews AFB, MAY 21, 2001, 
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45841 
[Accessed May 20, 2009]. 
16 Donald E. Vandergriff was known as “the most influential Major in the 
Army” before his retirement in 2005. These ideas were first presented in 
unpublished forms as “From Swift to Swiss: Tactical Decision Games and 
Their Place in a Reformed Military Education,” January 2005, and “Military 
Education—We Are Stuck in the Past,” January 13, 2005. He has developed 
an approach to education and training called the Adaptive Leadership 
Methodology that has been very favorably received. He is the author of three 
books: Path to Victory: America’s Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs 
(Novato, CA: Presidio, 2002); Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing 
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and is based on a misreading of German military training in the 19th 
century wedded to the ideas of Frederick Taylor to create a systematic, 
checklist approach to problem solving that has evolved but is largely 
the same today. As Vandergriff explains it, both the French and the 
Americans misinterpreted what the Germans had done and why they 
had done it in educating and training their officer corps. The Germans, 
he maintains, were teaching their officers how to think, not what to 
think, through the use of tactical decision games. The Prussians, and 
later the Germans, used these games to confront officers with the 
unknown and improve their decision-making skills. However, America 
adopted what it thought were the rules and procedures of the German 
training process and molded them as a tool for military planning. Both 
the five-paragraph field order and the task, condition, and standard 
approach to task training were based on a mistaken appreciation for 
German training techniques. These techniques served America well in 
the past because they were developed for a mass conscript Army that 
would need to be mobilized and trained quickly, not the all-volunteer 
professional force that we have today. What is required now is the 
much deeper and better education and training of military professionals 
who will execute the missions, not train others to do so in large 
numbers. What emerged was a near catechetical approach to doctrine 
with little room for the need for adaptability. Vandergriff has done 
much to champion the adaptive learning method and promote a review 
of the personnel system for the U.S. military in general and the U.S. 
Army in particular. 
It is in the mental preparation for how to cope with ambiguity that 
we can address mental transformation and invest in teaching people 
how to cope with unexpected change. People can be taught to think 
conceptually, critically, and creatively and to cope with the unknown, 
uncertain, unseen, and unexpected, but doing so requires mental 
preparation. There are many suggestions for how to do this.17 Most 
                                                                                                                    
Adaptability to Deal with the Changing Face of War (Washington, DC: Center 
for Defense Information, 2006); and Military Recruiting: Finding and 
Preparing Future Soldiers (Greenwood, CT: Praeger, 2008). 
17 Among many possibilities are Michael Michalko, Thinkertoys: A 
Handbook for Creative Thinking Techniques (New York: Ten Speed Press, 
2004); Peter Senge’s Fifth Discipline and Fifth Discipline Fieldbook (New 
York: Doubleday, 1990 and 1994, respectively), and his notion of a learning 
organization and its requirements; and works on decision-making by Gary 
Klein: Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
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important, however, is the development of a cast of mind—a habit of 
thought that sees the uncertain and unknown as an opportunity, not a 
threat. One learns to be comfortable with ambiguity, which is a 
requirement for living in an era of exponential change on a variety of 
levels. Yet nowhere in the Multiple Futures Project or most other 
future studies will you find anything about the central element of the 
problem—learning how to think about how to live in a world of 
increasingly fast-paced, complex, uncertain, and largely unknowable 
change. We can surround ourselves with all kinds of technological 
advances to accomplish numerous tasks faster, better, and cheaper than 
we do now, and we can organize to take advantage of these capabilities 
and processes to maximize efficiency and effectiveness, but if we do 
not prepare ourselves for how to think and cope in this world, we will 
not have made the fundamental transformation that is required.  
So, how should we come to think about the future? Is a change in 
outlook, attitude, and how we perceive change necessary to coping with 
our headlong rush into the future? I think it is, and it begins with a dose 
of humility. For all our accomplishments as human beings, and the 
imprint we have made on the planet for good and ill, we still know little 
about many of the basics of life and life-forms, of climate and climate 
change, of the interconnected nature of the species of flora and fauna 
with whom we share the earth, or the vagaries of chance and the twists 
and turns of human nature. Nor are we omnicompetent in our 
knowledge of other people, cultures, histories, and places. However 
much we do know, it is dwarfed by the immense amount of things that 
we do not know and those things that, at the moment at least, we cannot 
know. In this sense, ignorance is bliss, for we do not know what we do 
not know, and how important it might be. All this is true of our present 
reality. It becomes much more abstract and complex in contemplating 
the future and the essential nonlinearity of our predicaments. The only 
way to cope effectively is to learn to cope with ambiguity, to coevolve 
with a constantly changing environment and adapt effectively with 
changing circumstances as best we can. Being able to do this should not 
be left to chance. Rather, we should engage in the mental preparation 
that will help us do this.  
Adaptation is essentially the process of changing in structure, 
function, or form to improve chances for survival within a given 
                                                                                                                    
Press, 1999), and The Power of Intuition: How to Use Your Gut Feelings to 
Make Better Decisions at Work, (New York: Broadway Business, 2004). 
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environment. As the environment changes, one must continue to adapt 
to survive. If the world described by many books and future studies 
proves to be anywhere near the reality we will encounter, asymmetric 
threats, unrestricted warfare, non-state actors, global interdependence 
(both positive and negative), and a host of other novelties in a rapidly 
evolving security landscape will be the norm, and the pace of change—
the number and type of “black swans” that we might encounter—could 
very well be different than what we have told ourselves to expect. We 
can and will adapt to some elements of our future, for we have a greater 
degree of certainty about some of them,18 but we have less 
understanding of their potential consequences, processes, or events that 
we cannot foresee.  
The U.S. Military and Planning for the Future 
Consider a military planner thinking about the future in 1913. War 
among the great powers is to him a possibility, but not very likely 
because of the complex web of alliances that contributes to a balance of 
power, because the world is in the midst of an unprecedented era of 
globalization and the interdependency that implies, and because no one 
seems to want a war, despite some outstanding disputes. However, he 
could well have predicted that, should war occur, there would be a 
number of critical products and technologies that would play a role. 
Barbed wire and trench warfare, machine guns and large amounts of 
artillery, the use of the submarine and the airplane—all were 
predictable, but they were less important than the consequences that 
flowed from their use and the outcome of the war that followed: the 
Russian Revolution, the collapse of four empires, the League of 
Nations, the rise of communism and fascism, the Great Depression, and 
another war after what E. H. Carr called “the twenty year crisis.”19 
Although we may do well at predicting technologies and weapons 
systems that may come to pass, the social, political, and economic 
                                                     
18 Among recent reports and Web sites dealing with how to learn how to 
adapt and educate and train others to do so are William R. Burns, Jr., and 
Waldo D. Freeman, “Developing an Adaptive Training Strategy and Policy for 
DoD,” Interim Report, Institute for Defense Analysis, October 2008 and the 
Web site Project White Horse, at http://www.projectwhitehorse.com/ 
[Accessed October 12, 2009]. 
19 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the 
Study of International Relations (New York: Harper Perennial, 1964). 
 12  •  Hammond 
 
dislocations that arise as a result of their use are far more difficult to 
anticipate. Even regarding technology, one should be chastened about 
predicting the future. In the early 1930s, Fortune magazine predicted 
the coming of the “electro-chemical war”—a view that was only 
partially correct—and Collier’s in the 1950s foresaw colonies on the 
moon by 2000. It is a difficult business, preparing for the future. 
That being said, preparing for the future is a necessary military task. 
If militaries are to function effectively in a rapidly changing world, 
they must learn to adapt quickly and well, and many of the officers who 
will make many a critical decision in 2030 (only two decades away) are 
already in the military of today. Are we preparing them as we should? I 
think not. And the irony in this circumstance is that we know what to 
do—we are just not doing it as well, as often, or as broadly as we need 
to. The U.S. Army Research Institute has done a lot of studies on 
adaptability, and as long ago as 2004 the institute stated in its research 
newsletter that, “To produce good military adaptive thinkers one must 
train a performance—a thinking performance—in much the same way 
that one trains any skilled, well-rehearsed, and extensively practiced 
behavior to enable expert performance.”20 The institute went on to state 
that, “We recognize that leadership in complex adaptive systems relies 
on relationship-building over role-defining, loose coupling over 
standardization, learning over knowing, self-synchronization over 
command and control, and emergent thinking over planning based on 
estimates.” The newsletter concluded: 
A contingency-based and responsive Army must place an 
enduring premium on a soldier that can work at any level within the 
spectrum of warfare. The vision of such a soldier, and the Army to 
which he belongs, is one of leadership that is flexible and adaptive. 
These leadership traits can only become intuitive to our leaders 
through a system of education and training for both officers and non-
commissioned officers that continues to be innovative, sequential and 
extensively resourced at all levels throughout the transformational 
Army..21 
There, in a single paragraph, is a blueprint for all modern militaries, 
both the United States and NATO allies, for how best to prepare for the 
future. Deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan have reinforced the 
importance of the message. As Dr. Leonard Wong of the U.S. Army’s 
                                                     
20 “Adaptive Leaders and the IBCT—Initiative Within Intent,” ARI 
Newsletter, 13(1), 2004.  
21 Ibid. 
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Strategic Studies Institute noted,22 accomplishing the mission in Iraq 
was dependent on the ability of officers to adapt to uncertain, complex 
environments and novel circumstances. Army Special Forces units in 
particular excel in just this. To some degree, this human capability is 
being addressed, but not across the U.S. military, and certainly not 
throughout NATO.  
According to the conclusions of one study, the U.S. Navy in general 
“has geared all of the competencies to business, to organizational 
development, to the application of technology, and not to warfighting.” 
The study went on to say that, “the Navy treats leadership as a task that 
requires certain skills depending on the specific job or rank of the 
individual.”23 The same study 5 years ago found that the U.S. Air Force 
“was beginning to address the development of adaptability based skills; 
however, the Air Force must devote more initiative and resources if it 
wants to see the transformation it seeks.”24 The U.S. Marine Corps has 
long emphasized adaptability and “has incorporated adaptability-related 
learning across the board.” Largely as a result of the effect of U.S. Air 
Force Colonel John R. Boyd25 and his emphasis on maneuver warfare 
and teaching at the Basic Course in Quantico for a number of years 
after his retirement, the Marine Corps has been emphasizing 
adaptability for a long time. “Since war is a fluid phenomenon, its 
conduct requires flexibility of thought. Success depends in large part on 
the ability to adapt—to proactively shape changing events to our 
advantage as well as to react quickly to constantly changing 
conditions.”26 The Marines have gone farther faster in this emphasis 
than any of the other services and seek to make room for errors and 
mistakes, so as not to punish initiative by institutional prejudice. They 
use tactical decision games extensively to develop adaptability and 
cognitive skills in courses and exercises. They even publish a tactical 
decision game monthly in the Marine Corps Gazette.  
                                                     
22 Leonard Wong, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience 
of Operation Iraqi Freedom (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2004). 
23 John C. F. Tillson et al., Learning to Adapt to Asymmetric Threats, 
(Washington, DC: Institute for Defense Analysis, 2005), 30. 
24 Ibid, 33. 
25 On Boyd and his effect on the U.S. military, see Grant T. Hammond, The 
Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security, (Washington, DC: 
Smithsonian Books, 2001). Reprints in paperback, 2004 and 2007. 
26 U.S. Marine Corps, “Warfighting,” Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 
1, 1997, 17. 
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So, 5 years ago for some, and nearly 20 years ago for the Marines, 
at least some in the U.S. military knew how to solve some problems to 
prepare for a difficult future in educating and training its members. 
However, this thinking has not permeated all the services or the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, nor has the general insight that trust, 
cohesion, and interpersonal dynamics—human interoperability—are 
more important than the technology used if we are to fashion effective, 
adaptive teams in the military. There is a certain irony here in that it is 
entirely likely that it is easier, faster, and cheaper to incorporate 
interpersonal dynamics than to assimilate new technologies and all their 
supporting doctrine, process, and organizational structures—things that 
the U.S. military seems to specialize in doing. As long as DOD in 
particular, and the U.S. military (and NATO allies and partners in 
varying degrees) in general, are committed to hierarchical control, 
centralized established policies, and micromanagement to ensure 
compliance to a standard, progress is likely to be slow and ineffective.  
Transformational Thinking  
What, then, are the requirements for educating and training for 
adaptability? Let me enumerate them as I have come to think of them 
based on a large amount of reading and analysis from a variety of 
sources. These are not unique and are not my ideas only. They are the 
compilation of a host of insights, both general and specific, from some 
20 years of working in professional military education and are offered 
as one perspective on transformational thinking, which I consider to be 
the essence of the process. 
There is no substitute for the basics—for not just knowing but 
understanding and being able to demonstrate how to use the facts one 
needs to know, the basic skills of one’s profession (e.g., military 
occupational skills for the U.S. Army, Air Force Specialty Code for the 
U.S. Air Force). Whether small unit infantry leader or pilot, one needs 
to know thoroughly the basics and understand how these contribute to 
mission effectiveness. However, it is more than reciting a checklist or 
the platoon leader’s warning order, it is understanding how to use them 
and being able to do so. This is thought of as training (giving answers 
to “How?”) but is actually education as well (asking both the “What?” 
and the “Why?” questions to better understand). Thorough knowledge 
and understanding at this level are essential to everything else and 
cannot be diluted, waived, or sacrificed in any way.  
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Develop a sense of self-awareness and self-knowledge and build a 
team. You must come to know yourself—your strengths and 
weaknesses—if you are to maximize the talents of the team you will be 
a part of or the group you intend to lead. Not knowing yourself means 
you cannot fully exploit the capabilities of others and maximize their 
contribution—and yours—to the task at hand. It is the essential bedrock 
for establishing solid interpersonal dynamics and relations, to build the 
human interoperability that is essential for groups—joint, interagency, 
and especially multinational. If you do not know yourself and only 
endeavor to know others, you know only half of what is required to 
form an effective team. By knowing others well, you can begin to know 
what must be done to build a team and sustain the cohesion and 
commitment necessary for military units to perform well. 
Know what to know about others, especially those with whom you 
must work. You must come to understand those in your command, 
particularly those under your command, and how best to work with 
them. This requires good powers of observation, objectivity, a dose of 
empathy to see things from another’s perspective, and a broader 
understanding of individuals and the groups to which they belong. At 
base, you must know the following about those who are under your 
command, those who are allies, those who are adversaries, and those 
who are merely observers: What do they value? What do they fear? 
What motivates them? What is their purpose (short-term and long-
term)? If you can answer these questions, you can build an effective 
strategy to interact appropriately with any group, whether to cooperate, 
contend, deter, defeat, or inform. If you do not know these things, you 
may have perfect knowledge in other realms (order of battle, etc.) and 
still fail in your efforts to interact effectively. On one level this is 
personal insight, biography, or a psychological profile. On another it is 
cultural anthropology and ethnography and an understanding of one’s 
culture and society. Both are important. 
Have the right thinking skills—conceptual, critical, and creative. 
One needs to be able to think theoretically and conceptually about what 
is going on and to have a sense of origins and precedents on the one 
hand and consequences, both intended and unintended, on the other. 
One needs to be able to analyze critically the circumstances confronting 
one and to devise the ends, ways, and means to deal effectively with 
them. However, one also needs to be able to synthesize, to be 
innovative and creative in finding new perspectives, approaches, and 
combinations to solve the problems confronted. One should be 
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encouraged to learn about how the decisions are made, not just what 
they are. This requires a combination of skills that John Boyd briefed as 
insight, imagination, and innovation.  
Ambiguity is a permanent condition and demands risk tolerance. 
Most militaries select and promote those who are risk averse; those 
who advance do so because they have not made mistakes. Not making 
mistakes becomes a goal, and hence bold initiatives or risky ventures 
are avoided as endangering one’s career. Officers should be encouraged 
to explore novelty and nonlinearity and to risk making mistakes 
without being punished for displaying initiative. Commanders should 
encourage experimentation, acknowledge that failure is a possibility, 
and not penalize those who fail because they are learning how to be 
intuitive and innovative. Learning how to cope with ambiguity and treat 
it as an opportunity and not a threat means taking risks, making 
mistakes, and learning from them. Over time, success in learning how 
to cope with ambiguity will help develop an intuition about what to do 
and how to do it. 
Dynamic scenarios should be used in which all of these skills need 
to be exercised frequently under a variety of conditions and tasks. 
Officers should be continuously faced with novel circumstances that 
cause them to have to adapt to new situations. Rather than command- 
or contractor-scripted war games whose outcome is known in advance 
(blue always wins), or short tabletop exercises with school solutions, 
one should use dynamic scenarios, both in the classroom and in the 
field. These scenarios should occur over 3 days or so and call for a 
series of decisions based on a flow of events over time that continually 
confront those involved with dynamic circumstances and novel 
challenges for which they are not prepared. Such dynamic scenarios are 
in effect carefully designed decision-making exercises to teach people 
how to become intuitive and adaptive. Participants should have to 
confront the unintended consequences of their choices and contend 
with the implications as a way to learn. They should never be allowed 
to get comfortable with a routine set of tasks. This means training 
toward a level of competence and capability based on intuition and 
skilled judgment that these exercises develop and reinforce. 
Red team as the adversary. The enemy is a skilled actor in his own 
right and is capable of making decisions to cope with a variety of 
realities that you may present. Conflict and war are interactive 
processes, and one must never forget that the opponent has an array of 
alternative courses of action. If one never thinks about how an 
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opponent may respond, or the actions and reactions that constitute his 
decision-making matrix, then one cannot be assured of having selected 
the best of one’s own courses of action. The opponent has his own 
campaign plan and end-state in mind, and it is different from yours. 
You know yours—you need to know his. If you do not, or at least have 
not thought through the possibilities, failure becomes more likely. The 
enemy decides, if he is defeated, when and how and what he will do 
thereafter. All are important considerations. 
After-action assessments are a mandatory part of the process and 
constitute a part of the lessons learned for groups and individuals. 
Experience in such contexts can be fleeting unless objectively assessed 
and the results—good, bad, and ugly—shared with those involved in a 
brutally honest way by those observing and assessing the activity. This 
requires a trained staff of assessors, a means for capturing and 
disseminating lessons, and follow-up to ensure that these become 
lessons learned, not lessons merely identified. It should be every bit as 
pointed and important as any other combat exercise and assess the 
thinking, decision-making, intuition, and skilled judgment—or lack 
thereof—of the participants. Feedback and further education and 
training based on that feedback to attain ever-higher skill levels is a 
must. 
Conclusions 
Gary Klein, a well-known and often-cited specialist in decision-
making, identified those traits that inhibited adaptability in teams: 
training for mastery of routines; telling people what to think, not 
teaching them how to think; focusing on the accomplishment of a plan, 
which will not likely survive first contact with the enemy, who is a 
thinking actor in his own right; using rigid and centralized command 
and control based on ever-greater amounts of information; and reliance 
on increasingly detailed and directive plans that are difficult to 
change.27 Yet we have persisted in creating military staffs at both the 
operational and strategic level that handle “planning” at ever-higher 
levels of detail, often resulting in lower levels of accomplishment. 
Myriad matrices, tables, annexes, acronyms, and templates purport to 
explain alternative courses of action, campaign plans, and directives to 
subordinate units, increasingly with massive amounts of data fusion, in 
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which intelligence, maps, and overhead imagery are combined to give a 
better picture of the battle space. However, command and control by 
plan rarely resembles the reality one encounters. True, certain 
elements—scheduling, logistics, and so on—demand extraordinary 
amounts of precision, but it should be more about what John Boyd 
called “appreciation and leadership” than command and control. 
We substitute data for information and assume that information is 
knowledge, knowledge is wisdom, and wisdom is truth. Alas, this is 
frequently not the case. One of the perils of the data-fused world of the 
commander is that he loses focus on his ultimate target—the perception 
of his opponent. Wars are begun, fought, and ended in the minds of 
men. What they make of a circumstance, what compels them to behave 
as they do, and their perception and understanding of the world about 
them—and by extension, our knowledge of their perceptions—are 
critical to contending with those who oppose us in a variety of contexts. 
Although knowing how an opponent views us and the world may be 
difficult to ascertain, knowing the enemy—what he thinks and why—is 
central to strategic engagement with him. 
It is often said that transformation is a process to change an 
organizational culture. Culture is ultimately shorthand for people and 
changing how people think and behave. Culture implies intellect, 
mindsets, tastes, and manners, and the refinement of these by education 
and training. If we fail to transform how we think and act, we will not 
have transformed ourselves, our organizations, or our processes. 
Adoption of technology alone does not constitute transformation, for it 
is a part of the accelerating change in the world of the 21st century with 
which we must learn to cope. 
We have had a revolution in security affairs, if not one in military 
affairs. The nature of security and the threats to it have changed 
radically. We need a revolution in military education if we are to truly 
transform. That revolution would abandon many of the hallmarks of 
military culture—centralized, hierarchical, standardized, competitive, 
prescriptive, sequential organizational frameworks and routines—and 
substitute those that are increasingly decentralized, distributed, 
diversified, collaborative, adaptive, and concurrent. Modern militaries, 
if they are to transform, must create learning organizations by 
recruiting, promoting, educating, sustaining, and reinforcing the ideas 
of people who are adaptive, intuitive, risk-tolerant, and comfortable 
with ambiguity. It means abandoning the traditional way in which we 
educate based on rote memorization, sequential performance of tasks, 
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and holding time constant in education and training and letting the 
performance vary in a system that is authority driven, hierarchically 
organized, centralized, and handles large numbers. This was a system 
designed for a 19th-century, assembly-line society and economy that no 
longer exist. It is on-site and on command, costly to sustain, and 
produces variable quality. It needs to be off-site as well as on, on 
demand as well as on command, customized, continuous, interactive, 
cheaper, and held to a high quality standard. We need to invest in 
teaching people how to think well and quickly, to teach them to be 
adaptive and synthetic as well as analytic in their thinking, and to 
imbue them with a form of intellectual Auftragstaktik. Our minds are 
our best weapons and a force multiplier. We should spend as much 
time, care, and attention on them as we do on the equipment we are 
issued and value thinking as much as doing. All are difficult for 
military cultures. 
Until we start to think differently, to learn how to think differently 
and to learn how to cope with ambiguity, to adapt and to contend with a 
complex, uncertain, rapidly evolving future, we will not really have 
reached the seventh level of change. We will not have transformed. 
Doing so in a world of “inevitable surprises” is a necessity. As Peter 
Schwartz has counseled, “Place a very, very high premium on learning. 
Most failures to adapt are, in effect, failures to learn enough in time 
about the changing circumstances.”28 Relative to the cost and effect of 
other kinds of transformation, investments in transformational thinking 
would seem to be far less expensive and pay greater dividends. It is 
time we got started in earnest and do more than pay lip service to the 
concept. 
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A Conceptual Framework 
for Innovation in Capability 
Development 
By John J. Garstka 
Abstract 
This essay examines the different types of innovation carried out by 
military and civilian organizations and the factors that can influence 
an organization’s ability to innovate, which is a function of both 
individual and organizational behavior. Perspectives on innovation 
from multiple domains can be synthesized to develop and refine 
insights into the factors that influence the ability of military 
organizations to innovate in developing and enhancing capabilities. 
Introduction 
here is wide consensus that organizations need to be able to 
successfully innovate to deal with challenges and exploit 
opportunities. Governments are often forced to innovate to meet 
the challenges posed by unforeseen crises, such as the September 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks, the outbreak of SARS in 2003, and the 
international financial crisis of 2008–2009. Militaries and defense 
organizations innovate in the development of strategy and in the 
development and employment of forces. The challenges faced by 
defense organizations can take the form of increased belligerence of a 
nation-state or non-state actors, an adversary’s development of more 
advanced warfighting capabilities, a deteriorating budget environment, 
or imposed requirements, as is the case for the nations looking to join 
NATO. In the commercial sector, innovation is focused on products 
and services. Challenges faced by commercial organizations include 
deteriorating economic conditions, actions of a competitor, changing 
consumer preferences, and shortcomings in leadership or management. 
Examples of opportunities in the commercial sector include the opening 
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of new markets, technology breakthroughs, the misstep of a competitor, 
changing consumer preferences, and a change in regulatory structure. 
Perspectives on Military Innovation 
 Military organizations need to be able to innovate successfully to 
develop and sustain competitive advantage. Militaries that have failed 
to innovate have often suffered at the hands of competitors who have 
more effectively developed and employed new warfighting abilities. 
Developing new concepts and translating them to operational 
capabilities requires military organizations to be able to innovate in a 
range of areas and on different time scales.  
Scholars have identified both macrolevel and microlevel factors that 
can contribute to, or attenuate, the ability of military organizations to 
innovate. These include civil–military competition (Posen, 1991), 
interservice competition (Cote, 1996), intraservice competition (Rosen, 
1991; Posen, 1991), the role of organizational culture (Kier, 1997; 
Murray, 1996), and the importance of unmet military challenges 
(Hundley, 1996). 
Posen asserts that a state’s security environment can create a 
demand function for innovation. States react in rational ways to address 
insecurities by either acquiring allies (addressing the external balance) 
or strengthening their militaries (addressing the internal balance).1 
Stephen Rosen categorizes innovations as either major military 
innovations or technological innovations.2 Major military innovations 
change organizational behavior, resulting in either the creation of a new 
arm of a service or changes in how one of the major combat arms of a 
service fights. Rosen also highlights the important role played by both 
product champions and viable career paths in enabling the development 
of new warfighting capabilities. 
Cote concludes that innovation is influenced to a large degree by 
intense competition between services.3 Examples of where interservice 
competition played a role include the competition between the U.S. 
                                                     
1 Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and 
Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornel1 University Press, 
1991), 13–33. 
2 Stephen Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern 
Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornel1 University Press, 1991), 1–53. 
3 Owen Cote, “The Politics of Innovative Military Doctrine: The US Navy 
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Army and U.S. Navy in the development of military aviation and the 
competition between the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy associated 
with the development of ground-based intercontinental ballistic 
missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. 
Kier posits that a state’s choices in developing doctrine are shaped 
by cultural factors.4 She found that organizational culture can 
predispose an organization to offensive military operations or defensive 
military operations and can also shape the trajectory of innovation that 
militaries pursue. Murray highlights the importance of organizational 
culture in creating a climate that is open and supportive of innovation 
and experimentation.5 
Hundley highlights the importance of unmet military challenges in 
creating a demand for new warfighting capabilities in revolutions in 
military affairs. He identifies the importance of combining doctrinal 
and organizational change with technology innovation, as well as the 
key role played by operational concepts. He also highlights the 
importance of institutional processes for exploring, testing, and refining 
conceptions of future war—that is, conducting experiments and 
assessing their results in facilitating the innovation associated with 
revolutions in military affairs.6 
Each of these perspectives describes key factors that enhanced or 
constrained the ability of military organizations to innovate in the 
context of various operational and strategic contexts. Insights into 
organizational innovation in the commercial sector can shed light on 
additional factors that can influence the ability of military organizations 
to innovate. 
Insights Relating to Innovation in the Commercial 
Sector 
Innovation in the commercial sector primarily revolves around the 
development of products and the offering of services. This primary 
dimension of innovation is supported by five other types of innovation.  
                                                     
4 Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine 
Between the Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 144–145. 
5 Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, Military Innovation in the 
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6 Richard Hundley, Past Revolutions, Future Transformations (Santa 
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• Product and service innovation involves the introduction of 
substantially improved goods and services. Innovations of this 
type might include improvements in function, characteristics, 
or technical abilities.7  
• Process innovation involves the implementation of a new or 
significantly improved production or delivery method.8 
• Marketing innovation is the development of new marketing 
methods with improvements in product design or packaging, or 
the promotion or pricing of products or services.9 
• Organizational or people innovation (also referred to as social 
innovation) involves the creation of new organizations, 
business practices, ways of running organizations, or 
organizational behavior.10 
• Business model innovation involves changing the way business 
is done in terms of capturing value. 11 
Innovation Frameworks 
H.J. Leavitt, in analyzing organizational change, introduced a model 
of organizations that consisted of the variables of task, structure, 
technology, and actors.12 Tasks were defined as the activities involved 
in the production of goods and services. Actors were defined to consist 
primarily of people, with the qualification that acts executed by people 
might at some time be automated. Technology was defined as problem-
solving interventions such as computers or production machinery. 
Structure was defined to include systems of communication, systems of 
authority (or other roles), and systems of workflow. One of Leavitt’s 
key observations was that these four variables were linked and that in 
many situations, change in one variable would necessitate changes in 
one or more of the other three variables. The relationship between these 
variables is portrayed as a diamond (see figure 1). 
                                                     






12 H.J. Leavitt, “Applied Organizational Change in Industry: Structural, 
Technological and Humanistic Approaches,” in Handbook of Organizations, 
edited by J.G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), 1144–1145. 
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Figure 1: The Leavitt Diamond 
Researchers examining how organizations employ information 
technology have applied constructs similar to Leavitt’s. In doing so, 
they have focused on the relationships between information technology, 
process innovation, organizational structures, and the roles and skills of 
individuals. Initially, there was a lack of understanding with respect to 
the degree to which fully leveraging information technology could 
require changes in these three other areas. 
Researchers analyzing organizations that effectively leveraged 
information technology to create competitive advantage identified the 
importance of linking strategy to information technology and 
organizational change. One of the more noteworthy efforts was the 
Management in the 1990s (MIT90s) Research Program conducted by 
researchers at the MIT Sloan School of Management. A key outcome 
of this research program is the MIT90s framework, shown in figure 2. 
This framework includes the elements of strategy, structure, 
technology, individuals and roles, and management processes, and 
incorporates the factors of the external technological environment and 
the external socioeconomic environment.13 In this construct, structure 
refers to both organization and process. The MIT90s research 
highlighted the primary challenge in the management of transformation 
as managing changes in strategy, structure, technology, and people. 
This research effort also highlighted the importance of taking into 
account organizational culture when pursuing organizational 
                                                     
13 M. Morton et al., The Corporation of the 1990’s: Information 
Technology and Organizational Transformation (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 19–23. 
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transformation enabled by information technology. The MIT90s 
research found that organizational transformation initiatives can be 
significantly inhibited when changes in the area of people or 
organization affect organizational culture. 
Contemporary approaches that address the linkage between business 
innovation and information technology focus on the relationships 
among strategy, information technology, process, and people.14 Dubey 
describes process innovation as a comprehensive approach that 
involves innovating tasks, people, and technology for the benefit of the 
customer.15 
Taken together, the Leavitt construct, the MIT90s model, and 
contemporary approaches clearly identify four distinct areas of 
innovation that are closely linked: technology, process, organization, 
and people. Technology and process innovation are the primary sources 
of competitive advantage in the marketplace, as they directly affect the 
development and refinement of goods and services. However, social 
innovations in the areas of people and organization can also be 
significant sources of indirect competitive advantage. 
Social innovations that focus on people and organization create new 
means to develop, employ, and retain human capital, as well as 
establish or improve organizations and organizational culture. 
Examples of innovation in this area include labor unions and stock 
companies (investor-owned companies). Social innovations such as 
employee stock options have played a critical role in enabling startup 
companies to attract the human capitol they need to carry out the 
innovation required to develop new products and services. Social 
innovations are also often required to enable large organizations to 
develop or enhance their ability to innovate. 
Types of Technology Innovation 
Henderson and Clark, in their seminal paper on innovation, analyzed 
why firms were challenged by certain types of product innovation. 
They developed a framework that distinguishes between four types of 
technology innovation: incremental, modular, architectural, and 
radical:16 
                                                     
14 Dubey, 76–114. 
15 Ibid., 79. 
16 Rebecca Henderson and Kim Clark, “Architectural Innovation: The 
Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failures of 
Established Firms,” Administrative Science Quarterly, March 1990, 9–30. 
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Figure 2: The MIT90s Framework 
• Incremental innovation refines and extends an existing design. 
Improvement occurs in individual components, but the 
underlying core design concept and the links between 
components stay the same. Commercial examples include 
refinements to automotive car designs, the development of 
various models of propeller-driven commercial airliners, and 
refinements to cell phones. 
• Modular innovation changes the core design concept of a 
technology. Commercial examples include the development of 
fuel oil-burning engines on ships to replace coal-burning steam 
propulsion, the development of digital phones to replace analog 
phones, the development of digital cameras to replace film 
cameras, and the shift from mechanical to fly-by-wire controls 
for commercial aircraft. 
• Architectural innovation changes a product’s architecture but 
leaves the components and the core design concepts they 
embody unchanged. Examples include the development of the 
laptop computer subsequent to the development of the portable 
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reduced the size of copiers, and the creation of the Sony 
Walkman radio. 
• Radical innovation establishes a new dominant design, and 
hence a new set of core design concepts embodied in 
components that are linked together in a new architecture. 
Examples include the initial development of the automobile, 
the vacuum tube, radio communication, the transistor, the 
development of the personal computer, and the development of 
the router. 
Henderson and Clark found that firms that had succeeded in radical 
innovation often faltered when faced by the challenge of modular 
innovation. In their research, they cite the examples of the challenges 
posed to Xerox, the pioneer of plain paper copiers, and RCA, a pioneer 
in radio technology. 
When competitors introduced copiers that were smaller and more 
reliable than Xerox’s offerings, it took Xerox almost 8 years to 
introduce a comparable product. The missteps and false starts that 
occurred during this period caused Xerox to lose half its market share 
and resulted in serious financial problems for the company.17 RCA 
faced similar challenges in the radio business when Sony introduced 
successive models of small transistor radios. RCA had pioneered 
transistor radio technology but did not believe there was a market for 
products built with technology they viewed as inferior to existing 
radios. Sony licensed the technology from RCA and gradually 
produced products with improved sound and FM quality that RCA 
could not match.18 
Sustaining and Disruptive Innovation 
Henderson and Clark observed that architectural knowledge tends to 
become embedded in the structure and information processing 
procedures of established organizations. They also observed that 
because of this phenomenon, architectural innovations destroy the 
usefulness of the architectural knowledge of existing firms while 
retaining the usefulness of the component knowledge. Consequently, 
the destruction of architectural knowledge is difficult to recognize and 
hard to correct. The result is that architectural innovations present 
                                                     
17 Ibid., 10. 
18 Ibid., 10. 
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established organizations with subtle challenges that inhibit or preclude 
their ability to respond to the actions of competitors.19 
In The Innovator’s Dilemma, Christensen addresses the question of 
why firms that have a record of successful innovation can fail 
miserably in responding to certain types of competitive challenges. He 
answers this question by introducing the concepts of sustaining and 
disruptive innovation.20  
Sustaining innovation creates or enhances products or services in 
ways that customers in mainstream markets already value. An example 
of sustaining innovation was Intel’s innovation in the x86 family of 
microprocessors. The 32-bit 386 processor improved on the 
performance of the 16-bit 286 generation of processors, using attributes 
the mainstream market valued.21 
Disruptive innovation creates an entirely new market through the 
introduction of a product or service whose performance is initially 
worse, based on the metrics valued by mainstream customers.22 These 
products or services often have other features that are valued by some 
customers. For example, Charles Schwab’s introduction of the discount 
brokerage was a disruptive innovation relative to the full-service 
offerings of brokers such as Merrill Lynch, whose mainstream 
customers valued the breadth of services offered by Merrill Lynch.23  
Christensen posits that sustaining innovations over time have the 
potential to overshoot the performance requirements of the mainstream 
marketplace. Disruptive innovations are often introduced in new 
markets or at the entry level of existing markets. Similar to sustaining 
innovations, disruptive innovations gradually improve, eventually 
taking market share from existing products or services. This 
relationship is portrayed in figure 3. 
                                                     
19 Ibid., 27–29. 
20 Clayton Christenson, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New 
Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail (Boston, MA: Harvard Business 
School Press, 1997), xx–xxi. 
21 Clayton M. Christensen and Michael Overdorf, “Meeting the Challenges 
of Disruptive Change in Harvard Business Review on Innovation (Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press, 2001), 114. 
22 Clayton Christenson, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New 
Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail, xv. 
23 Clayton and Overdorf, 106–109. 
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Figure 3: Performance of Sustaining versus Disruptive Innovation24 
In providing examples of the challenge posed by disruptive 
innovation, Christensen describes how companies in diverse sectors 
have been affected by disruptive innovation. Examples of disruptive 
innovation by sector are portrayed in table 1. 
A historic example of the effect of disruptive innovation is found in 
the competition between steamships and sailing ships. When 
steamships, a radical innovation, were first introduced in 1819, they 
could not compete against sailing ships in the transoceanic shipping 
market. In this market, steamships underperformed sailing ships in 
terms of speed, cost per mile, and reliability (they required frequent 
repair). Initially, steamships found a market on rivers and lakes, 
because they had a performance attribute that was highly valued: they 
could move against the wind or in the absence of wind (The 
introduction of steamship technology corresponds to point A in figure 
3). Over time, steamship technology improved through sustaining 
innovation to the point that it could outperform sailing ship technology 
on the open ocean (this improvement corresponds to movement from 
point A to point B in figure 3). 
                                                     
24 Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause 
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Sector Incumbent “Technology” Disruptive Innovation 
Transportation Sailing ship Steamship 




Financial services Full-service brokerages Discount brokerages 
Information technology Minicomputers Personal computers 
Steel mills Vertically integrated steel 
mills 
Minimills 
Retailing Full-service department 
stores 
Discount retailers 
Information technology Unix, Windows NT Linux 
Table 1: Examples of Disruptive Innovation by Sector25 
Despite the availability of the technology, not a single sailing ship 
maker built a steamship for use in any market. Their primary 
customers, transoceanic shippers, did not want to employ steamships 
until they became economically competitive. Eventually, virtually all 
ocean traffic was transported on steamships, and not a single company 
that built sailing ships survived to produce steamships in any market.26 
In the commercial sector, disruptive innovations challenge existing 
organizational values or business models in a way that makes it 
difficult for organizations to respond. Christensen observed that 
companies, in an effort to grow the bottom line, tend to pursue the 
opportunities that they believe will best generate top-line growth. This 
strategy usually translates to developing products and services with 
higher margins for leading-edge customers in existing markets. 
Disruptive products appear so intermittently that almost no companies 
have routine processes for dealing with them. Because disruptive 
innovations almost always promise lower profit margins per unit sold 
and are not attractive to the company’s best customers, they are 
inconsistent with the established business models and company 
values.27  
In assessing the factors that contribute to an organization’s ability to 
respond to the challenges posed by disruptive innovation, Christensen 
                                                     
25 Ibid., xxix. 
26 Ibid., 75–76. 
27 Christensen and Overdorf, 106–109 
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and Overdorf highlight the relationships among an organization’s 
resources, processes, and values. 28  
• Resources are defined as tangible assets—people, equipment, 
technologies, and cash—and less-tangible assets—product 
designs, information, brands, and relationships with suppliers, 
distributors, and customers.  
• Processes are defined as patterns of interaction, coordination, 
communication, and decision-making that employees use to 
transform resources into products and services of greater worth. 
• An organization’s values are defined as the standards by which 
employees set priorities that enable them to judge whether an 
order is attractive or unattractive, whether a customer is more 
important or less important, whether an idea for a new product 
is attractive or marginal, and so on. 
Christensen and Overdorf observe that as companies become large, 
their ability to enter new markets is diminished. This decreased 
capability is not caused by a lack of resources but, rather, a gradual 
shift in values. When an organization’s capabilities reside primarily in 
its people, changing capabilities to address new problems is relatively 
simple. However, change can be extremely difficult when capabilities 
reside in processes and values. The difficulty of change increases 
significantly as processes and values become embedded in culture.29  
Christensen and Overdorf posit that organizations have three 
options in developing capabilities to create new organizational 
capabilities for innovation: 
1. create new organizations within which new processes can be 
developed; 
2. spin out an independent organization and develop processes 
and values required to solve new problems; and, 
3. acquire an organization whose processes and values closely 
match the requirements of the new task.30 
The critical insights regarding innovation in the commercial sector 
discussed in this section can be summarized as follows:  
                                                     
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 113–114. 
30 Ibid., 117. 
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• Innovation can occur in the lines of development of people, 
process (task), organization, and technology. 
• Innovations in one line of development often require 
innovations or changes in other lines of development. 
• There our four types of technology innovation: incremental, 
modular, architectural, and radical. 
• Architectural innovation can present established firms with 
subtle challenges. 
• Innovations can be either sustaining or disruptive. 
• Disruptive innovations appear so infrequently that few 
companies have routine process for dealing with them. 
• Disruptive innovations are almost always inconsistent with an 
organization’s established business models and values. 
• An organization’s capabilities for innovating are both enabled 
and constrained by resources, processes, and values. 
Application of Insights from the Commercial Sector to 
Warfighting Innovation 
In Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies, Pierce applies 
Henderson and Clark’s innovation typology and Christensen’s concept 
of sustaining and disruptive innovation to military innovation.31 In 
doing so, he makes critical observations regarding the role of disruptive 
architectural innovation in explaining the success and failure of historic 
military innovations. 
The application of the Henderson and Clark typology for technology 
innovation to military innovation can be illustrated by the following 
examples: 
• Incremental innovation. This type of innovation translates to 
weapon and system upgrades. An example of incremental 
innovation is the innovation that led to the development of the 
Panzer IV tank after the development of the Panzer III tank. 
• Modular innovation. Examples of modular innovation include 
the shift from analog to digital ship steering systems, the shift 
from coal-fired steamships to ships powered by oil, the shift 
                                                     
31 Terry C. Pierce, Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies: Disguising 
Innovation (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 16–17. 
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from fuel oil to nuclear propulsion for ships and submarines, 
and the upgrade from analog radar to digital radar.  
• Radical innovation. Examples of radical innovation include the 
machine gun, the airplane, submarines, aircraft carriers, radar, 
computer-enabled codebreaking, ballistic missiles, stealth 
technology, and unmanned aerial vehicles. 
• Architectural innovation. Examples of architectural innovation 
include continuous-aim gunfire, carrier warfare, amphibious 
warfare, and blitzkrieg. 
In applying the concept of architectural innovation to warfighting 
innovation, Pierce asserts that architectural innovation can take place at 
two levels. The first is at the system level, where components change 
but the system architecture stays the same. An example of innovation at 
the system level is continuous-aim gunfire. This innovation increased 
U.S. Navy gunfire hit rates by 3,000 percent. At the second level, 
weapons systems are defined as components, and doctrine provides the 
linkages between system components.32 The product of this second 
level of architectural innovation will be referred to in this essay as 
“tactical architectures.” In providing examples of architectural 
innovations of this type, Pierce identifies carrier warfare, amphibious 
warfare, and blitzkrieg.33 Pierce then further characterizes technology 
innovations by applying the theory of sustaining and disruptive 
innovation.34  
Sustaining military innovations improve the performance of existing 
systems or the prevailing warfighting architecture. Examples of 
sustaining innovation include continuous-aim gunfire, enhancements to 
battleships that increased their survivability and the range, accuracy, 
and firepower of their main guns, and improvements to ballistic 
missiles that improved range and accuracy. 
Disruptive military innovations create a new source of combat 
power that in some way challenges or competes with the prevailing 
warfighting architecture of a military service. Pierce’s application of 
the concept of disruptive architectural innovation helps to explain the 
underlying characteristics of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). 
Knox and Murray characterize RMAs as “requiring the assembly of a 
complex mix of tactical, organizational, doctrinal, and technological 
                                                     
32 Ibid., 21–23. 
33 Ibid., 16. 
34 Ibid., 19–27. 
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innovations in order to implement a new conceptual approach to 
warfare or to a specialized sub-branch of warfare.35 Hundley describes 
an RMA as a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military 
operations that: 
• renders obsolete or irrelevant one or more core competencies of 
a dominant player; 
• creates one or more new competencies in some new dimension 
of warfare; 
• or both.36 
As in the commercial sector, the initial performance of a disruptive 
warfighting innovation is such that it underperforms the prevailing 
warfighting architecture. When initially introduced, this new innovation 
is typically employed to enhance the performance of the prevailing 
warfighting architecture. Over time, the performance of the disruptive 
warfighting innovation improves to the point where it outperforms the 
prevailing warfighting architecture and emerges as the dominant form 
of warfare.  
The development of naval aviation and carrier warfare illustrate 
how disruptive innovation can take place in a military context. When 
first introduced, aircraft had limited range, speed, and payload 
capabilities. As a result of these limitations, aircraft were first used in 
the scouting and reconnaissance roles in naval aviation to enhance the 
performance of battleship warfare. The contribution of aviation to 
improving the performance of the tactical architecture for battleship 
warfare is represented in the movement on the solid blue line in figure 
4 from point B2 to B3. When aircraft were initially introduced, they 
were launched and recovered from battleships. Over time, as the 
performance of aircraft improved, aircraft were assigned the mission of 
securing command of the air over the surface battlespace. 
Subsequently, as aircraft carrier technology advanced, it became 
possible for aircraft carriers to launch and recover larger numbers of 
high performance aircraft that were capable of dropping bombs and 
launching torpedoes. This innovation is portrayed in the movement 
from point C1 to C2 along the dotted green line in figure 4. Eventually, 
                                                     
35 MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, The Dynamics of Military 
Revolution, 1300–2050 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
12. 
36 Hundley, 9–11. 
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the performance of the combination of aircraft and aircraft carriers 
increased to the point where carrier task forces had the capability to 
conduct independent combat operations and carrier warfare could 
outperform battleship warfare. When point C3 was reached carrier 
warfare had effectively “disrupted” battleship warfare as the dominant 
means of conducting combat between naval forces. Additional 
examples of sustaining and disruptive warfighting innovations are 




Figure 4: Innovation Trajectories for Battleship and Carrier Warfare37 
Pierce makes the observation that the application of disruptive 
innovation theory to historic military innovation helps explain the 
success and failure of various militaries in pursuing military 
innovation.38 In applying the concept of disruptive architectural 
innovation to military innovation, Pierce highlights the importance of 
new operational concepts and the importance of examining new 
 
                                                     
37 This figure is a modification of the figure used in Pierce, 29. 
38 Ibid., 24–32. 
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Disruptive Architectural Innovations
USMC Amphibious Warfare 1905–1940 
Imperial Japanese Navy Carrier Warfare 1917–1942 
USN Carrier Warfare  1918–1943 
USN Defensive Sea Control 1970–1974 
USMC development of MAGTF Warfare  1975–1989 
USN Composite Warfare Commander  1985–1988 
USN Maritime Action Groups—Surface Land Attack Warfare 1988–1990 
Sustaining Architectural Innovations
Blitzkrieg  1930–1939 
USN Carrier Battle Group  1974–1978 
USMC Defensive Advanced Base  1900–1942 
USMC MEUSOC Warfare  1976–1988 
USMC Prepositioned Logistics  1984–1989 
Disruptive Radical Technology Innovations
USN Aegis Radar  1978–1986 
USN Tomahawk Missile  1978–1986 
USN Tactical Component Network  1996–2003 
Table 2: Examples of Sustaining and Disruptive Innovation.39 
combinations of technology and doctrine, as well as the important role 
played by new organizations. Pierce provides evidence that supports his 
hypothesis that different management methods are required to 
institutionalize a disruptive innovation. He then describes the critical 
role played by product champions in managing disruptive innovation. 
He also highlights the importance of the creation of new career paths in 
disruptive architectural innovation.40  
Pierce provides evidence of how “product champions,” such as 
Admiral Moffett and Admiral Yamamoto, initially disguised disruptive 
innovations as sustaining innovations to reduce organizational 
resistance and secure resources.41 He also asserts that the German 
success in developing blitzkrieg should be categorized as a sustaining 
                                                     
39 Pierce, 18. 
40 Ibid., 32–50. 
41 Ibid., 121–144. 
 38  •  Garstka 
 
innovation, because it supported the disruptive maneuver warfare and 
combined arms doctrine developed by General von Seeckt in the early 
1920s.42 In examining the challenges the British and French armies 
faced in developing armored forces, Pierce identifies the absence of 
effective product champions as a critical factor in these armies' inability 
to overcome the challenges of disruptive architectural innovation.43 
The application of insights from the commercial sector to 
warfighting innovation provides significant insight into some of the 
critical factors that influenced historic warfighting innovation. Pierce, 
in applying the concept of disruptive architectural innovation to 
warfighting innovation, highlights factors critical to the success or 
failure of historic warfighting innovation that are absent from the 
historical record. Combining Pierce’s insights with the findings of 
Leavitt and the MIT90s research provides additional insight into factors 
that can influence warfighting innovation. 
Synthesis of Findings on Innovation 
The importance of new operational concepts combined with 
technology and development of new doctrine and organizations is a 
theme supported by Murray and Hundley that can be summarized as: 
Unmet military need + new operational concept + new 
technology + new doctrine + new organizations = new 
operational capability 
Pierce modifies this formula as follows: 
Perceived military need + new operational concept + 
disruptive technology + new doctrine + new 
organizations + new career paths + product champions 
+ disguising innovation = new operational capability 
Comparing these two themes with the findings of Leavitt provides 
the motivation for focusing on the elements of technology, process, 
organization, and people as four primary lines or vectors of innovation. 
This line of thinking is diagrammed in figure 5.  
 
                                                     
42 Ibid., 39–50. 
43 Ibid., 32–37. 
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Figure 5: Revised Four-Element Model 
Leavitt, in formulating his original diagram, focused on how 
changes in one element could require changes in one or more of the 
other elements. These findings are consistent with findings of military 
innovation. The linkage between technology and doctrine that is 
involved in architectural innovation described by Pierce is represented 
by the line between technology and process in figure 5. The creation of 
viable career paths for naval aviators in the U.S. Navy in the 
development of carrier warfare is represented by the people element of 
the model. The creation of the new organizational units of panzer 
brigades and panzer divisions in the development of blitzkrieg is 
represented by the organization element. + 
The MIT90s research highlighted the relationship between people 
and organization in creating organizational culture and found that 
organizational transformation initiatives can be inhibited significantly 
when proposed changes in the area of people or organization affect 
organizational culture. As a consequence, the simple four-element 
model contains the cultural factors that inhibited the ability of the 
French and British armies to more aggressively pursue the operational 
implications of armored warfare.  
This simple, four-element construct accurately represents the end-
state of the architectural innovation described by Pierce and also 
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highlights factors that can constrain warfighting innovation. The 
application of the revised four-element model to military innovation 
provides insights into the challenges of innovation management and a 
simple model for understanding the role of different types of innovation 
in capability development.  
Comparison with Contemporary Approaches 
Applying the simple, four-element model to current military 
approaches for defining capability yields insights. The U.S. Department 
of Defense employs a construct referred to as doctrine, organization, 
training, leadership, material, personnel, and facilities (DOTLMPF).44 
The construct used by the U.K. Ministry of Defence is “defence lines of 
development,” which includes training, equipment, personnel, 
information, concepts and doctrine, organization, infrastructure, 
logistics, and interoperability.45 In the U.K. approach, a concept is 
defined as “an expression of the capabilities that are likely to be used to 
accomplish an activity in the future.” The Australian Department of 
Defence construct consists of the following elements: command and 
management, organization, major systems, personnel, supplies, support, 
facilities, and collective training.46 The relationship between these three 
constructs for describing military capability and the four-element 
model is portrayed in table 3. 
In analyzing table 3, it is clear that there is a close relationship 
between the four-element model and the elements of the three 
contemporary military approaches. Facilities and infrastructure seem to 
be the single major outliers from the four-component model. 
Combining insights from historic military innovation with 
contemporary approaches to defining capabilities results in the refined 
construct portrayed in table 4. This construct identifies processes and 
key process outputs and also distinguishes between activities that 
support capability development and activities that directly support the 
operation of mature capabilities. This construct explicitly addresses 
concept development, experimentation, and the role of experimental 
                                                     
44 Chairman of the Joint Staffs Manual 3170.01C, Operation of the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (1 May 2007), H2-H3.  
45 UK MoD Defence Lines of Development, referenced from the UK MoD 
Acquisition Operations Framework (V 2.0.18) accessed from 
http://www.aof.mod.uk/aofcontent/strategic/guide/sg_dlod.htm on 4 Nov 09. 
46 Defence Capability Development Manual 2006 (Canberra, Australia: 
Defence Publishing Service, 2006), 4-5. 
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articles. Implicit in the construct is that each process is conducted by an 





































*Interoperability has both a technology and a process component. 
Table 3: Contemporary Approaches for Describing Capability 
In analyzing table 4, it is possible to distinguish between the 
elements of the capability development processes and the elements of 
operational capability. The four-element model describes the primary 
elements of an operational capability as technology, process, 
organization, and people. This operational capability is developed, 
supported, and enhanced with a supporting set of processes. These 
distinct processes are nested and integrated to deliver and sustain 
operational capabilities. 
 42  •  Garstka 
 
 
Processes Process Output Relevant 
Facilities 
 Process Type 
Concept development Concepts  Development 
Experimentation Insight  Development 




Personnel Recruited, promoted, 
and retained personnel 
 Development 
Education Educated leaders Campus/ 
Labs 
Development 










Interoperability certification Technical 
interoperability 
 Development 
Individual training Individual readiness Training 
ranges 
Development 
Collective training Unit readiness Training 
ranges 
Development 
Tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTP) development 
Tactics  Operations and 
development 
Lessons learned Insight  Operations 
Logistics Delivered supplies  Operations 
Command and management Effective execution  Operations 
Exercises Readiness  Operations 
Operations Operational readiness Military 
bases 
Operations 
Table 4: Expanded Elements of Capability 
Distinguishing between the elements of operational capability and 
capability development processes yields a valuable insight that can be 
used to make sense of historic military innovation as well as shed light 
on capabilities required to manage innovation in the present. The 
contemporary DOTLMPF construct combines elements of operational 
capability with a subset of the elements of the capability development 
process. For example, the doctrine, organization, material, leadership 
and personnel correspond to process, organization, technology, and 
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people (which combines personnel and leadership). Operational forces 
are composed of these elements of capability. Training is the process 
used to prepare forces for operations. The output of the training process 
is forces with increased operational readiness. Material solutions are an 
output of the acquisition process. New operational concepts are the 
output of the concept development process. Similarly, the output of 
experimentation is insight in the potential effectiveness of new 
operational concepts. The key point here is that the processes that a 
military organization must use to develop new concepts and translate 
them to operational capabilities are not defined by the DOTLMPF 
construct. 
Developing new concepts and translating them to operational 
capabilities requires organizations to be able to innovate in a range of 
areas and on different timescales. The innovation involved in the 
development of new tactical architectures involves innovation on a 
large scale, involves multiple lines of development, and can play out 
over years to tens of years. The technology innovation involved in 
developing a new material solution may play out over years to tens of 
years. The process innovation involved in the development of new 
tactics, techniques, and procedures can play out on much shorter 
timescales. Similarly, the innovation involved in developing a 
personnel system may play out over a period of a few years. One of the 
major challenges of military innovation lies in linking and 
synchronizing innovation in two or more lines of development. 
Creating the Capability to Manage Innovation 
All historic architectural innovation has required the management of 
innovation in a number of lines of development. One of the critical 
factors in the success of historic architectural innovation has been the 
ability of an organization to develop the capability for managing and 
integrating innovation across multiple lines of development. 
One of the best examples of the importance of developing a 
capability for managing innovation is provided by the development of 
carrier warfare by the U.S. Navy. Admiral (then Captain) Moffett 
realized that to effectively manage and oversee the disparate activities 
related to aviation that were being conducted within the U.S Navy, a 
new organization needed to be created with powers equivalent to the 
existing Bureau of Navigation. He testified before the House and 
Senate naval affairs committees regarding the benefits of creating a 
stand-alone bureau focused on aviation. President Harding 
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subsequently signed a bill into law that authorized the creation of the 
Bureau of Aeronautics on July 13, 1921, and a week later nominated 
Moffett as the bureau’s first chief.47 This organizational innovation was 
a critical step in the development of carrier aviation. Once this 
organization had been established, Moffett proceeded to develop the 
capability for managing all aspects of naval aviation. The Bureau of 
Aeronautics had responsibility for overseeing the development of 
material solutions and experimental articles (technology innovation), 
training aviators (process and infrastructure innovation), developing 
new TTPs48 (process innovation), establishing a viable career path for 
naval aviators (people innovation), and assessing the military utility of 
carrier aviation through experimentation and wargaming (process 
innovation).  
The Bureau of Aeronautics, an organizational innovation, had to be 
created before the broader innovation process associated with aviation 
could be effectively managed. In other words, creating the capability 
for effectively managing the innovation associated with aviation and 
carrier warfare was a critical success factor in the overall innovation 
process. Over time, the Bureau of Aeronautics acquired the resources, 
developed the processes, and established organizational values that 
were critical to the development of carrier warfare.  
This observation leads one to think about military innovation in 
terms of both the capability for managing innovation and the capability 
for conducting innovation in the areas of concepts, technology, process, 
organization, and people. A simple model of the innovation 
management process and synchronizing innovation in these five areas 
is portrayed in figure 6. 
                                                     
47 Pierce, 124. 
48 Tactics, techniques, and procedures. 
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Figure 6: Model of Innovation Management 
Representing Architectural Innovation 
The evolution of a tactical architecture over time can be portrayed 
graphically, as shown in figures 7 though 10. These diagrams depict the 
relationships between the four lines of innovation and the evolving 
state of a tactical architecture. An initial tactical architecture is 
represented in figure 7. Figure 8 depicts a future state of this tactical 
architecture that corresponds to a situation in which technology has 
advanced, but doctrine or TTPs are lagging. The situation that exists 
where process innovation has caught up with technology innovation is 
portrayed in figure 9. A situation also can exist where several iterations 
of technology–process innovation take place before organizational or 
people innovation advance further. Figure 10 portrays the state of a 
tactical architecture in which organizational innovation and people 
innovation have advanced and a tactical architecture has reached an 
initial operational capability. 
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Figure 7: Initial Tactical Architecture 
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Figure 9: Linking Process Innovation with Technology Innovation 
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The pattern of successive iterative innovation in the four primary 
lines of development, combined with refinements to theory and 
operational concepts and the application of disguising innovation, 
occurred in the successful development of a range of tactical 
architectures. The relative magnitude and importance of the 
technology, process, organization, and people innovations varied in 
each case of disruptive tactical architecture innovation. However, the 
underlying pattern of connected innovation is constant across all cases. 
The development of amphibious warfare and carrier warfare provide 
examples of connected innovation. The order in which major 
innovations occurred in the development of amphibious warfare is 
presented in table 5. This order is noteworthy, in that the development 
of mature technology significantly lagged the development of doctrine 
and organization. The timing and sequencing of the innovation 
involved in the U.S. Navy development of aviation, carrier aviation, 
and carrier warfare is presented chronologically in table 6. This table 
captures selected highlights of a period of extensive innovation that 
took place over a period of 32 years and included the extensive use of 
Naval Aviation during World War I and World War II. 





Strategy Advance base operations in Micronesia 
1921 Process Plans Plan 712D–part of Plan Orange 
1933 Organization Organization Fleet Marine Force  
1933 Organization Innovation 
organization for 
technology 
The Marine Corps Equipment Board was the 
first U.S. professional body focused on the 
development of material suitable for use by 
forces conducting amphibious warfare. 
1934 Organization Innovation 
organization for 
doctrine 
Marine Corps School at Quantico—school 
shut down for 6 months in 1934 to develop 
doctrine for amphibious warfare 
1935 Process Doctrine Tentative Manual for Landing Operations 
1941 Technology Advanced 
technology for 
amphibious warfare 
Higgins Boat—Landing Craft Vehicle, 
Personnel (LCVP) 
Landing Ship Tank (LST) 
1934–1941 Process Exercises Fleet landing exercises 
1934–1941 Technology Early technology for 
amphibious warfare 
Dock loading equipment 
Table 5: Timeline of Key Events in the Development of Amphibious Warfare49 
                                                     
49 Ibid., 51–69. 
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Date Dimension of 
Innovation 
Area Example 
1908 Organization Organization Creation of general board 
1909 Theory/concept 
development 
Early concept First reports on viability of naval aviation filed 
1911 Technology Material First funds appropriated for ”Experimental work in the 
development of aviation for Naval purposes” 
1911 People Personnel First naval aviator qualified. 
1911–
1914 
Technology Material Aircraft Development 
1914 Facilities Facilities Establishment of Naval Aeronautic Station Pensacola—
pilot training base 
1914 Process Training Initiation and standardization of pilot training 
1914 Process Education Establishment of aeronautical engineering program at MIT 
1916 Technology Material First experiments with radio 
1916 Organization Organization Establishment of Naval Flying Corps  
1917 Technology Material Initiation of prototype aircraft production 
 1920 People Personnel “Authority to draw best graduates of the U.S. Naval 
Academy into aviation” 
1921 Organization Organization Establishment of Bureau of Aeronautics 
1921 People Leadership Moffett named first Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics; serves 
for 12 years until his death in an accident in 1933 
1922 Technology Experimental 
article 
Experimental carrier Langley (CV-1) 
1923 Process War games Naval War College initiates tactical war games focused on 
carrier aviation and carrier warfare. 
1923 Process Exercises Initiation of fleet problems—aviation used in Fleet 
Problem I. 
1925 People Leadership Reeves selected as commander, Aircraft Squadron, Battle 
Fleet, with USS Langley as his flagship 
1925-
1926 
People Personnel Policy created by which only aviators could be selected to 
command aircraft carriers and stations. 
1927 Process Doctrine/ TTP Development of TTP for launch, recovery, and attack 
1927 Process Doctrine Importance of “knock-out” blow against enemy air power 
in the opening minutes of a confrontation. 
1927 Organization Organization Establishment of small innovation group to “explore all 
aspects of aviation” 
1927–
1941 
Technology Material Carrier development (CV-2 through CV-8) 
1931 Theory/concept 
development 
Theory New theory of warfare for carrier aviation described by 
Moffett in memo to the secretary of the Navy 
1931 Organization Organization Establishment of small innovation group to develop fleet 
carrier doctrine 
1933 Process Doctrine Development of PAC-10—basic carrier doctrine for the 
Pacific 
1942 People Personnel Creation of the aviation-type commander 
1942 People Leadership Admiral King is first aviator selected to be Chief of Naval 
Operations. 
Table 6. Timeline of Key Events in Development of Aviation and Carrier 
Warfare50 51 
                                                     
50 Pierce, 121–131. 
51 The History of Naval Aviation, A Few Pioneers: 1898–1916; Test of 
Strength: 1917–1919; The Twenties: 1920–1929; The Thirties; World War II; 
accessed at http://www.historycentral.com/Navy/chron/ 
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Innovation Management for Tactical Architectural Innovation 
In the commercial sector, disruptive innovation creates problems 
because challenged organizations have business models, values, and 
organizational cultures that impede an effective organizational 
response. Organizational values and culture can similarly impede a 
military organization’s ability to pursue certain types of innovation. 
Pierce found that one of the most important roles played by product 
champions was disarming these organizational defense mechanisms.52  
In the development of armored warfare, both the British and French 
armies were constrained to a large degree by organizational values, 
attitudes, and cultures that precluded them from effectively moving 
past the primary role of tanks as infantry support weapons. 
In the French army, the prevailing attitude was that neither 1-year 
conscripts nor reservists could be effectively trained to conduct 
offensive military operations.53 In the early 1930s, Colonel Charles 
DeGaulle lobbied for the adoption of a professional army. His concept 
was to create seven divisions comprising 100,000 soldiers serving a 6-
year tour of duty. In his mind, it was clear that only highly trained 
professional soldiers were capable of conducting offensive military 
operations. Creating a large standing army was viewed by the Left as a 
threat to the Republic and was politically unacceptable. The social 
political environment of the 1930s resulted in the French army closing 
ranks, shutting down internal debate, and focusing on internal 
preservation.54 
In the British army, the prevailing attitudes of the cavalry toward 
the importance of the morale element of war and the cavalry’s focus on 
tradition impeded a broader examination of the potential role of 
armored warfare.55 As Pierce observes, the British army lacked an 
effective product champion capable of disguising the disruptive nature 
of armored warfare.56 The efforts of advocates for armored warfare, 
Liddell Hart and Fuller, were overly disruptive and placed the broader 
organization into a defensive mindset. Even when faced with evidence 
of successful experimentation that explored the operational utility of 
                                                                                                                    
NAVALAVIATION.html on 14 May 2009. 
52 Pierce, 192–201. 
53 Keir, 73–83. 
54 Ibid., 85–86. 
55 Kier, 136–137. 
56 Pierce, 32–37. 
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armored forces, senior British Army officers were unable to make 
changes that they felt would affect the culture they valued so highly.57 
The pattern of innovation in both the British and French armies is 
portrayed in figure 8. Both armies supported technology innovation and 
developed tactics for using tanks as infantry support weapons. Both 
armies trained personnel to operate tanks in this capacity. However, in 
both cases, constraints relating to people, organization, and culture 
impeded further innovation in armored warfare. 
Historically, the success or failure of tactical architecture 
innovations has been dependent on the success of a product champion 
successfully positioning an innovation in a manner that enabled 
existing organizational leadership to support it. Pierce found that this 
positioning was accomplished by disguising the initial phases of a 
disruptive tactical architectural innovation as a sustaining innovation 
that enhanced the warfighting capability of the prevailing tactical 
architecture.58 This disguising is primarily required to address the 
challenges of intraservice competition.  
In the development of carrier warfare both by the U.S. Navy and the 
Imperial Japanese Navy, product champions disguised the initial phases 
of the development of carrier warfare as sustaining innovations. This 
disguising involved focusing on the role of aviation in conducting 
reconnaissance, spotting, and securing command of the air over the 
surface battle space, as opposed to using independent air operations to 
attack an enemy fleet.59 In both cases, interservice competition with the 
advocates for land-based aviation enhanced the support for aviation 
within the navies.  
The importance of the disguising approach can be understood by 
examining figure 4 and figures 8 through 10. The increase in 
performance of the tactical architecture for battleship warfare over time 
is portrayed with the movement from point B1 to point B3 on the solid 
blue line. Performance improvements realized in moving from point B2 
to point B3 correspond to the improvements enabled by the 
employment of aircraft as spotters and scouts, which improved the 
realizable range and accuracy that could be achieved by a battleship’s 
main guns. 
                                                     
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., 196–197. 
59 Ibid., 127–130, 135–140. 
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The trajectory of innovation for carrier warfare is portrayed by the 
dotted green line in figure 4. The innovation involved in the 
development of the tactical architecture for carrier warfare is portrayed 
in figures 8 through 10. Figure 8 corresponds to a phase in the 
innovation process in which technology innovation leads other types of 
innovation. This could correspond to the situation in which carriers 
could launch and recover aircraft, and the primary mission of carrier 
aviation was being debated. Figure 9 corresponds to a point at which 
process innovation has occurred and is now synchronized with 
technology innovation. This phase of development, when carriers could 
conduct offensive operations to attack enemy fleets, corresponds to 
point C2. At this point, both Yamamoto and Moffett communicated to 
the proponents of battleship warfare the sustaining role of carrier 
aviation in supporting the main battle, which would be conducted by 
battleships. This obfuscation was necessary to maintain funding for 
carrier aviation until more mature tactical architectures for carrier 
warfare had been fully developed. The full development of these 
tactical architectures corresponded to the capability to conduct multi-
carrier operations, represented by point C3 in figure 4. 
Implications for Capability Development 
Yamamoto and Moffett both realized that their respective 
organizations would be taking on unacceptable levels of future 
operational risk if they did not pursue the development of carrier 
aviation and carrier warfare. The key to their success was recognition 
that the disruptive nature of carrier warfare required a disguising 
approach to manage internal organizational risk. 
Architectural innovations are the exception rather than the norm. 
Leaders in most military organizations can spend an entire career and 
never be faced with the challenges of disruptive architectural 
innovation or of creating a new competency in a new dimension of 
warfare. They are far more likely to be faced with the responsibility of 
leading or managing innovations in one to two areas, or to be faced 
with the challenge of leading sustaining innovation. 
Regardless of the type of innovation being pursued (sustaining or 
disruptive), the technology, process, organization, and people model 
provides a useful framework for understanding the role of different 
types of innovation in capability development. The model provides a 
simple framework for classifying lines of development and visualizing 
the evolution of tactical architectures. 
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From a practitioner’s perspective, the primary and supporting lines 
of innovation approach highlights the principal types of innovation that 
need to be considered in developing new capabilities or enhancing 
existing capabilities. Leaders can benefit from knowledge of the 
relationships highlighted in this model when faced with the challenge 
of leading or contributing to the successful implementation of large-
scale organizational change or capability development initiatives. By 
focusing on the relationships between the lines of innovation, as well as 
the timing and sequencing of the lines of innovation, leaders will 
increase their probability of success in developing or enhancing 
capabilities. 
Disruptive innovation poses challenges to both military and 
commercial organizations. Christensen and Pierce both highlight the 
key role that leaders must play in successfully championing a 
disruptive innovation and overcoming impediments created by 
prevailing organizational values and culture. Leaders who are unaware 
of the differences between sustaining and disruptive innovation are 
unlikely to succeed when faced with the challenges posed by disruptive 
innovation. Based on the historical record, disruptive warfighting 
innovations have the potential to be high-impact events. Consequently, 
military leaders need to be aware of this type of innovation to be able to 
successfully respond to the moves of potential adversaries or to 
successfully lead a disruptive innovation. As Christensen and Overdorf 
found, leaders, when faced with the challenge of disruptive innovation, 
must often create new organizations with processes and values required 
to respond to a competitor’s actions. These actions can be particularly 
challenging in a military environment. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Organizations need to have the capability to innovate to respond 
effectively to challenges and opportunities. Consequently, innovation is 
an organizational capability that is important in commercial, 
government, and military organizations. Different types of innovation 
can pose distinct challenges to organizations. Insights from the 
commercial sector and historic military innovation can help leaders 
develop an understanding of the nuances of innovation. Key aspects of 
innovation discussed in this essay are summarized below. 
• Innovation can occur in the lines of development of people, 
process, organization, and technology. 
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• There are four types of technology innovation: incremental, 
modular, architectural, and radical. 
• Innovations in one line of development often require 
innovations or changes in other lines of development. 
• Architectural innovation can take place at two levels: the 
system level and the tactical architecture level. 
• Innovations can be either sustaining or disruptive. 
• An organization’s capabilities for innovating are both enabled 
and constrained by resources, processes, and values.  
• Disruptive tactical architectural innovations are at the core of 
revolutions in military affairs. 
• Disruptive innovations may need to be managed by disguising 
them as sustaining innovations to reduce organizational 
resistance and secure resources. 
• Managing disruptive innovations as though they were 
sustaining innovations invariably results in failure. 
• Military innovation can be amplified or attenuated by 
macrofactors such as interservice and intraservice rivalry. 
• Organizational culture is a key determinant in an organization’s 
ability to innovate. 
The need for military organizations to be able to innovate in the 
areas of technology, process, organization, and people will persist as 
long as military organizations exist. With this backdrop, the innovation 
concepts discussed in this essay provide a framework for understanding 






The Importance of Innovation in 
Delivering Culture Change 
By Derrick Neal and Louise Carver 
Abstract 
Research reported by Neal & Taylor (2006) has highlighted the 
challenges faced to bring about change within the MoD, and it is 
argued that too much emphasis has been placed on the levers of 
organisational structures and systems/processes to drive change 
forward and too little on the people dimension. This paper argues 
that, to achieve the full benefits of Network Enabled Capability 
(NEC), the MoD needs to give serious consideration to how it can 
develop an NEC culture through a change program that gives due 
care and attention to modifying a number of elements, such as 
attitudes, reward systems, symbols, and behaviours that contribute to 
shaping the culture of the organisation. The starting point for any 
change programme is the establishment of the nature of the problem 
and the recognition that the problem needs to be communicated to 
those involved. The usual military approach is to conduct a training 
needs analysis (TNA) that is intended to identify the gap between 
where we are now and where we wish to be in the future. In the case 
of NEC, research already conducted has suggested that key players 
have not embraced the concept with the enthusiasm that may have 
been anticipated, and the view currently held is that the MoD does 
not yet have an NEC culture. Furthermore, it is apparent that the 
requisite support structures are not yet in place or fully exploited to 
ensure that all MoD personnel are aware of and can access training, 
education, and information to develop further their abilities to 
operate in a networked information environment. 
The paper presents preliminary findings from semi-structured 
interviews and analysis of primary data and provides insights as to 
the nature of the challenge that is faced by the MoD. 
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Introduction 
etwork-enabled capability (NEC) is not a new concept. The 
power of networks was clear to the Romans, who used an 
extensive network of roads to run a huge empire. The outcome 
of the Battle of Britain was arguably determined by exploiting 
networked information. Rapid technological advances have provided us 
with the means to acquire information from a variety of sources and 
make it available to decision-makers to achieve military effect. 
However, it is clear that it is the human factor—the skills, knowledge, 
experience, and attributes of those involved in managing and exploiting 
that information—that makes NEC powerful. 
The U.S. Armed Forces and Australian Defence Force (ADF) have 
made significant advances in their development of network-centric 
operations (NCO) and network-centric warfare (NCW), respectively, 
and we should capitalize on the lessons these organizations have 
already identified. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. Armed Forces 
“clearly demonstrated their asymmetric advantage . . . in such high 
intensity interstate warfighting” through “dramatically increased 
situational awareness.”1 The paper further states that, “the key was their 
information and their ability to act on it within the available window of 
opportunity.” Within the ADF, the NCW capability requirement is 
defined as “the integration of the information network with a series of 
grids (Command and Control, Sensor and Engagement) that facilitate 
cooperative activity by Defence personnel.”2 The ADF experience of 
operations with coalition partners in Iraq and Afghanistan has 
demonstrated “the potential operational benefits of NCW.” There is 
also recognition within the ADF of the potential for “unforeseen 
innovation” and of the opportunity to “maximise the potential for 
development of an NCW capability via the partnerships that will result 
from initiatives.” A study addressing the human dimension of NCW 
recommended that NCW awareness be raised through brochures and a 
road show, that senior leaders be appropriately educated about NCW 
concepts, that future leaders in the NCW era be prepared, that future 
workforce requirements be reviewed, that NCW tools be developed, 
                                                     
1 Future Conflict: Insights from Interviews with Senior Commanders. 
January 2006. 
2 Australian Government Department of Defence, NCW Roadmap, 2007. 
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and that a mechanism for evaluating and feeding back lessons learned 
into future collective training activities be developed. 
The NEC Handbook 
The U.K. position is slightly different in some aspects. Although 
NEC shares the tenets of NCO, it is more limited in scope, in that at the 
time Joint Service Publication 777 (JSP 777), the NEC handbook, was 
written, it was not seen as a doctrine or vision.3 However, since then, it 
is probably fair to say that NEC has evolved into a vision that is 
currently being pursued. NEC does not seek to place the network at the 
center of capability in the doctrinal way that NCO implies. Rather, 
NEC is much more concerned with evolving capability by bringing 
together decision-makers, sensors, and weapon systems and enabling 
them to pool their information by networking to achieve an enhanced 
capability. 
The production of JSP 777 was intended to raise awareness of NEC, 
develop a common understanding within the wider defense community, 
and situate the concept within the perspective of where the Ministry of 
Defense (MoD) is heading. In this regard, the Joint High Level 
Operating Concept (Jt HLOC) was endorsed by the Chiefs of Staff in 
2004 as the head-mark for how we should seek to conduct military 
operations in 2020. NEC is at the heart of the way of operating 
described in Jt HLOC. However, since Jt HLOC was written, the U.K. 
Armed Forces have gained considerable experience in Afghanistan and 
Iraq and have seen suicide bombers blowing up targets in London. 
Therefore, we need to assess continually how the evolving nature of the 
conflicts in which we become involved affect our command and inform 
and operate capabilities and to draw key deductions that should shape 
the development of those capabilities. 
NEC should be viewed as an enabler of mission command (one of 
the key underlying principles of the U.K. military), giving it new 
expression by allowing it to thrive in a context in which the commander 
can articulate his intent and then allow subordinate commanders to 
execute that intent in the knowledge that they share the same situational 
understanding, thus negating the need to interfere unless absolutely 
necessary. JSP 777 highlights four dimensions of NEC—networks, 
information, people, and joint action (see figure 1)—which overlap and 
                                                     
3 Joint Service Publication 777, Network Enabled Capability, edition 1 
(London: Ministry of Defense, 2005). 
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are mutually dependent. All of these dimensions need to be developed 
and managed for NEC to be fully realized. The dimensions of and 
challenges associated with the delivery of NEC within the U.K. MoD 
were highlighted and discussed in a paper by Neal (2007) that explored 
the issues of delivering NEC by drawing on classical change 
management theory and postulating how the gaps in the MoD’s 
application of NEC need to be addressed. 
 
Figure 1: The Four Interdependent Elements of NEC 
Matters have not been helped by the fact that since the late 1990s, 
the U.K. military has been under significant pressure from operational 
commitments, which have ramped up significantly since 2003. One 
consequence of this level of military activity is that the MoD finds 
itself having to deal with urgent operational requirements (UORs) and 
urgent operational tasks (UOTs). As a consequence, significant 
resources have had to be diverted to direct support to operations. The 
solutions to UORs and UOTs are delivered into theater, quite rightly, 
for a particular purpose, but this may also be at the expense of the 
necessary coherence of the larger equipment program intended to 
deliver NEC structures and systems and the development of a truly 
joined-up acquisition process that is part of an MoD-wide enterprise 
architecture. Indeed, some involved in the UOR/UOT process are quite 
clear that capability delivered through it is unlikely to fit with longer-
term plans but that, until the requirements, planning, and resourcing 
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mechanisms are sufficiently coherent, flexible, and responsive to 
address changing and unforeseen needs, users will continue to rely on 
the process to meet immediate operational needs 
It might be argued that, had the MoD put in place the doctrinal 
approach at the outset, some of these issues may have been more 
readily identifiable; however, it was never the intention in the United 
Kingdom to take such an approach from the outset. Indeed, it is noted 
very clearly in JSP 777 that the approach to change would be based on 
evolution, and as such, three stages had been clearly identified: 
Initial. Based on current doctrine, organizations, processes, and 
equipment where improvements to operational capability can be made 
in the short term. It is characterized by minor organizational changes 
and equipment enhancements, such as using data links to replace voice. 
Work to achieve this state will be characterized by interconnection. 
Transitional. Medium-term improvements in operational capability 
will be generated by incremental changes to current doctrine, 
processes, training, and equipment, validated by appropriate 
experimentation and exercises as part of the development cycle. This 
will be supported by major organizational change and the integration of 
technical systems to give greatly improved shared situational awareness 
(SSA) through better information management. Work to achieve this 
state will be characterized by integration. 
Mature. Maximum advantage will be gained from the optimal 
exploitation of information, delivered through developed doctrine, 
organizations, processes, and equipment, together with personnel 
appropriately selected, educated, and trained. It is typified by the 
dynamic creation of mission groups enabled by distributed 
collaborative working. This longer-term evolution is built on the 
lessons learned from the earlier states. Work to achieve this state will 
be characterized by synchronization. 
Why Are the People Issues So Difficult to Resolve? 
There are a number of reasons why the people dimension provides a 
major challenge in terms of delivering effective NEC, and they relate 
back directly to the literature on change management, in that humans 
are generally resistant to change. This is particularly true in situations 
in which there is no perceived “burning platform” that compels 
individuals or organizations to change. What might such a burning 
platform look like? At one extreme it might be the United Kingdom 
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finding itself in a conventional war with a nation that has a superior 
observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) loop and is inflicting 
significant losses on U.K. military forces. Another might relate to the 
government of the day facing sufficient public pressure to spend 
taxpayers’ money on public services other than defense. There might 
also be the risk that the United Kingdom’s inability to keep pace with 
major allies in improving the delivery of military effect would result in 
its being consigned a far less influential role on the world stage. 
However, the reality is that we are fighting new types of foes who 
are prepared to wage a long war and operate in ways that have not 
formed a major part of our education and training processes to date. 
The changing nature of threat has long been understood by military 
machines and expressed in the concern that, “if you prepare for future 
wars based on how you fought the last war, you will fail.” Management 
has its parallels, as expressed by Hamel & Prahalad (1996) in the 
notion that underpinning strategies 1 and 2, as shown in figure 2, are 
about catching up with your competitors and will always leave you at 
risk. It is the paradigm shift in option 3 that will put you in a position to 
drive the agenda. It might be argued that the current military operations 
in Afghanistan and Iraq are having to adapt to an enemy that has 
rewritten many of the rules of engagement and is defining the nature of 
the conflict, and to a certain extent Western forces are continually 
having to adapt and morph their responses. Perhaps this is overly harsh 
because, within the spectrum of NEC activity, there are clear examples 
where NEC technology has saved lives and continues to do so. One 
case in point is that of Blue Force Tracker, which has helped to reduce 
the incidence of friendly fire incidents. Another is the success that has 
been achieved with the application of OVERTASK in Afghanistan, 
where integrated decision loops have significantly reduced critical 
timescales in a number of aspects of the military machine and have 
promoted more joint operational applications, such as JADOCS and 
JChat, which in themselves promote a different set of behaviors that are 
consistent with the NEC philosophy. 
A particular challenge for the MoD in getting commitment to 
change is that most military staff are only in post for a maximum of 3 
years; indeed, given the current level of operations, many are unlikely 
to stay in the same post for more than 18 months. This high level of 
churn, as reported by Neal & Taylor (2006), can be a major barrier to 
real change being delivered within an organization. Comparatively 
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speaking, the civilian community is somewhat more stable (although 




















Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3  
Figure 2: Generic Strategic Options (Source: Hamel and Prahalad, 1996) 
in effect, there are those who may be in a post for several years who 
can “sit out” the changes initiated by military staff, or appear to support 
the change but actually deliver very little. This situation is well known 
in the change management literature, where such people are referred to 
as “worried stayers.” When talking to staff in organizations in which 
this dynamic exists, it is common to hear people talking about “change 
fatigue” and a lack of commitment, and the fact that no change is ever 
in place long enough to see the benefits because they have already 
moved to the next iteration. Furthermore, there is a tendency to see 
change as being driven and imposed from elsewhere, with little or no 
attempt to summarize the progress made before change was required or 
to explain why more change is required. Therefore, change initiatives 
are viewed, not surprisingly, with a considerable degree of weary 
cynicism. Specifically, within the NEC change perspective it is also 
important to recognize that there is a symbiotic relationship between 
equipment (and systems/processes/software) and humans, such that the 
operator will exhibit behavior that reflects the equipment, and the 
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equipment design will have been considered in terms of how humans 
behave. As a consequence, it can be a real challenge to break an 
existing paradigm, as it needs to reflect both facets simultaneously. 
Within the business environment, there are reported cases of senior 
management having to force the issue of the need for change by 
breaking the current systems and structures that act as a straitjacket on 
the behaviors of staff. Such an approach is not feasible within the 
domain of the military, as it can result in military personnel losing their 
lives through major systems failures.  
By definition, NEC is a facilitator of dispersed teams working in 
real time (or near real time), with decision-making having to take place 
in an increasingly information-rich environment. The work of Looy-
Hyde (2007) is particularly helpful in this regard, as she highlights the 
findings from industry and academia in terms of the factors and issues 
that need to be resolved for dispersed team working to be successful. 
For example, within the military, the notion of SSA and joint 
common operational picture (JCOP) are well understood, and we spend 
a great deal of time and effort to put in place technology/systems and 
training (individual and collective) to deliver SSA. Sonnenwald et al. 
(2004) defined SSA as “knowing about things that are happening in the 
immediate environment, [the environment of others] … and having an 
accurate understanding of the situation and the knowledge to respond 
appropriately as the situation evolves.”  
However, there is a significant difference between SSA and shared 
situational understanding (SSU), and the real risk is that one assumes 
that understanding is achieved. Bechky (1999) highlighted the fact that 
knowledge being exchanged through a computer-mediated 
environment, as opposed to face to face, can cause problems for team 
members from different roles as they struggle to understand one 
another. 
Looy-Hyde (2007) also draws attention to some of the consequential 
problems that flow from dispersed teams, as noted by Cramton (2001), 
who identified five key issues: 
• failure to communicate and retain contextual information, 
• an uneven distribution of information, 
• differences in salience of information, 
• speed of access to information, and 
• the interpretation of the meaning of silence (nonresponse). 
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As noted by Looy-Hyde (2007), the accurate interpretation and 
retention of information are problems that may still challenge the 
military, despite significant investment in state-of-the-art situational 
awareness (SA) communications tools. Although it is technically 
feasible to share information, one still must confront the issue of the 
“illusion of shared understanding,” as noted by Gibson & Cohen 
(2003), which can be exacerbated by cultural differences. There are, of 
course, a number of dimensions to this issue, and although a military 
may train in a joint environment and operate with a joint capability, 
there remains an element of single-service culture that can result in 
misunderstandings. Increasingly, in a NEC environment, the pool of 
information is being used by civil servants within the MoD in support 
to operations, other coalition partners, other government departments 
(OGDs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and, therefore, 
both organizational and national cultures have a potential for disrupting 
a SSU. 
One of the most significant barriers to achieving SSU is related to 
the difficulty of communicating social information, such as preferred 
communication style (hence the difficulty in developing a rapport), as 
this is often neglected in favor of task-related information, according to 
Chidaranbaram (1996). Such lack of focus is particularly damaging, as 
it results in communication becoming transaction-based, rather than 
relationship-based. Within a hastily formed network scenario, 
insufficient effort is devoted to developing a mutual understanding of 
ways of working and information priorities. To some extent, this results 
in individuals positioning themselves from the perspective of delivering 
the basic minimum service (from their view), which can very quickly 
lead to misunderstandings. It also means that, for any individual in a 
network, there will exist relationships that cover a spectrum of shared 
understanding and basis for working together. In some cases, parts of 
the network will work together frequently and over a period of time 
(and perhaps even hold the occasional meeting face-to-face), such that 
a degree of social exchange will take place and mutual understanding 
and trust will be developed. However, at the other end of the spectrum, 
no time or effort is devoted to this, parts of the network are simply 
users or suppliers of information, and there is little scope for mutual 
trust and understanding to be developed—which works against the 
aspirations of the NEC concept. 
Looy-Hyde (2007) and other researchers, such as Warkentin et al. 
(1997), Walther & Burgoon (1992), and Jones & George (1998), 
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highlight the importance of interpersonal relationships and, in 
particular, the importance of mutual trust, and they present findings 
from a number of studies that confirm that trust plays an important role 
in successful dispersed teamworking. The material presented by Looy-
Hyde (2007) suggests that ad hoc teams may benefit from developing 
relationships quickly. However, this aspiration is hindered by the lack 
of face-to-face communication. She explains the concept of swift trust 
by noting the following: 
There is research to suggest that trust is not always a necessity for 
effective task completion (Jarvenpaa & Leidner (1999)) and virtual 
team members are able to accomplish tasks without developing deep 
relationships but by developing “swift trust.” Out of twelve newly 
formed teams, those that were most able to cope with technological 
and task uncertainty and to resolve conflicts and problems were 
teams that formed trust quickly or “swift trust” (Meyerson et al 
(1996)). Unlike traditional trust, which develops over time as a result 
of shared experiences, interactions and social norms (e.g. Meyerson 
et al (1996)), “swift trust” develops amongst groups that initially 
exchange social information, enthusiasm, make others aware of their 
own constraints and show initiative (Jarvenpaa & Leidner (1999)). In 
times when teams are quickly formed and quickly disbanded, as is 
likely to be the case with a task based approach, the development of 
swift trust may be critical.” (emphasis added; Looy-Hyde, 2007, 5) 
The activities and assets required to realize effects within a 
comprehensive approach will necessitate a greater degree of interaction 
with OGDs, NGOs, and allies, and if interaction between these 
elements is to be optimized, there is a requirement not only for the 
technical infrastructure to support collaborative working, but also for 
the development of common understanding across all elements 
regarding how they can work together effectively and the norms of 
behavior that govern these interactions.  
The People Dimension Steering Group and the Basis 
for the Current Research. 
The People Dimension Steering Group (PDSG) is responsible for 
the People Line of Development of NEC and aims to generate capable 
and motivated personnel who, individually and collectively, can exploit 
the benefits and mitigate the risks of NEC. To achieve this, the PDSG 
has commissioned a number of strands of research work to help 
understand more fully the range of issues that need to be addressed and 
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shed light on the interactions between each of the strands of activity. 
The piece of research presented in this essay is intended to help inform 
the training and education interventions needed to deliver motivated, 
capable people for the NEC sociotechnical system and grow the 
accompanying culture and behaviors. 
The Research Methodology 
The project team examined sources of evidence from within the 
operational and business space and analyzed these sources to draw out 
key themes. These themes were then categorized into components and 
behaviors that may help or hinder the effective delivery of NEC. The 
findings were put to representatives from across the MoD by way of 
semistructured interviews to test their validity and determine new 
themes. The research approach was based on extracting views on the 
current NEC culture at a number of levels within each of the areas 
surveyed to provide a degree of vertical stratification. Such an approach 
was intended to establish the degree to which communication messages 
were being understood at various levels throughout the organization 
and the extent to which leadership behaviors were helping or hindering 
the adoption of the NEC philosophy. The data also provide opportunity 
to explore the range of perspectives from the military and civilian staff. 
Thereafter, the proposal is to use the validated research to gather 
further data via questionnaires and focus groups before providing an 
assessment of the gaps in skills, knowledge, and behaviors, and 
suggested ways of addressing these gaps. 
Preliminary Findings 
It is important to note at the outset that the themes that have 
emerged from the primary data gathering are indeed generalizations. 
Exceptions can be found within the MoD for every aspect reported in 
this essay The intention of highlighting the general themes is not 
intended as criticism but, rather, to help inform the MoD as to where 
additional effort needs to be placed if meaningful change in behaviors 
is to be embedded in the organization.  
Training, Education, and Understanding 
• Training and education underpin a great deal of the requirement, 
from ensuring that all staff have a basic awareness of NEC, to 
bringing all staff up to an adequate level of information 
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communication technology user skills and information 
management ability, to educating senior officers, training them on 
applications, and collective training before operational deployment. 
However, the overriding principle should be to develop an 
awareness of the rationale for and benefits of NEC over and above 
the skills involved in exploiting new technology and accompanying 
ways of working—the why as well as the what of NEC. A frequent 
comment about training was captured in the phrase, “we get 
buttonology without understanding.” This is exacerbated by the 
increasing reliance on training in the workplace, either on the job or 
e-enabled, which meets with resistance because people feel that 
they are too busy and there is no discernible benefit to having 
completed the training. 
• The technology is good, but people need to understand how to use 
it to best effect. People need to have trust and confidence in IT 
systems and processes. Not being able to email someone on a 
different system damages its credibility and users’ confidence. 
• Poor practice (e.g., sending documents rather than links and not 
sharing draft work) arises from both attitude and lack of familiarity 
with the technology. 
• A total frustration with pathetic search engines arises, especially 
when you know that what you need is somewhere in the system. 
• Knowledge of, familiarity with, and confidence in the equipment 
that people need to use will greatly enhance their ability to share, 
manage, and exploit information and operate effectively in a 
networked information environment. In addition, everybody needs 
to appreciate fully his/her responsibilities with regard to 
information sharing, management, and exploitation. 
• Awareness of the benefits of NEC and the means of accessing 
information on the skills and attributes required to operate 
effectively in a networked information environment is limited. JSP 
777 appears to be read only by those who believe that they need to 
as part of their professional responsibilities. In general, the 
perception is that NEC as a concept is overcomplicated and that it 
is either a preoccupation of specialists (front-line/communications 
experts/etc.) or an aspiration for the future. This aspect has major 
implications for the communications piece of delivering NEC. 
• “Cynicism is a blocker, so don’t give people grounds for being 
cynical.”  
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• There is no formal training for captains and warrant officers 
(WOs), and the organization does not promote corporate memory. 
• There should be officer military annual training tests (MATS) for 
NEC. 
• What NEC means in the business space should be explained to 
make it real for civilians. 
Leadership Issues 
• There is an overall view that, because NEC is all-inclusive, 
leadership of the changes required to deliver it successfully must 
start at the top (VCDS/2nd PUS). It cannot be “parked” in any one 
area.  
• “Traditional” style of leadership—command and control/face-to-
face communications/decision-making, and so on—are generally 
well-regarded. Tactical leadership rates more highly than 
strategic/political leadership. Leaders need to be more open-minded 
and responsive and better at understanding, inspiring, and 
developing their staff.  
• We need “charismatic” leaders—although the extent to which 
charisma can be taught/developed and leaders selected on the basis 
of their charisma is debatable. 
• Leaders need to be aware of and acknowledge their lack of skills or 
knowledge, but this is seen as a personal failing in front of more 
junior personnel. Having the authority to command does not make 
a leader the subject matter expert. “Very bright people don’t get air 
time because they aren’t the right rank.” 
• Involvement of senior leadership in promoting required kit is 
getting better, therefore providing more interest and better 
direction, governance, and possibly funding for training. 
• “You can’t do leadership by e-mail.” Leaders are needed who lead 
by example in NEC matters. 
• Telling people the consequences of getting something wrong is less 
productive than explaining the benefits of getting it right. 
• “I inspect units to see that the commander and the command chain 
drives the usage of joint personnel administration (JPA) and find, 
almost exclusively, that they are not.” 
• We have very competent leaders to deliver the “day job,” but we 
lack strong inspirational leaders to lead and deliver change; thus, 
for NEC, we lack effective leadership. 
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Social Networks/Working With Others 
• The development and maintenance of trust and confidence in a 
“social” relationship helps to enhance working relationships, 
particularly in the battle space. This becomes increasingly critical 
where dispersed teamworking and interoperability with non-U.K. 
Armed Forces organizations feature. 
• “Developing effective relationships is the key to everything else.” 
• The tendency within the MoD (and elsewhere) to operate in 
stovepipes and to use “tribal” identities as a means of behaving (or 
not behaving) in a certain way can obstruct the successful delivery 
of NEC. This can be exacerbated when interoperating with other 
organizations and/or nations is required.  
• The Army is not prepared to learn from anyone. For example, the 
Royal Navy and Royal Air Force have good JPA application, but 
the Army was never prepared to learn from them. 
Acquisition Processes and Structures 
• Acquisition processes need to begin with an accurate statement of 
requirement that is based on user needs rather than affordability or 
a perceived solution presented by industry. The processes also need 
to be sufficiently flexible to incorporate changing operational 
requirements and the need of the users to be involved in the 
development of equipment and capabilities—in short, a true 
partnering arrangement. 
• Career pathways and double tours in key positions should be 
provided so that we can get some sort of coherence. 
• People need a clear understanding of the capability acquisition 
process through training and education at a much earlier stage—in 
particular, those pursuing careers in the acquisition community 
should not be learning on the job when their focus is already on 
being credible and having an effect, and they are arguably less 
responsive to being educated about the why of NEC.  
• The IPT construct is effective in managing all aspects of one 
program or project; however, it hinders the coherent acquisition of 
capability across the MoD to meet MoD needs. 
• We are good at many things—including teambuilding, getting on 
and doing, working across boundaries if sharing a common aim—
and these should be acknowledged and built on. Tribalism can be 
counterproductive, and there are numerous examples of services 
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competing against each other, for example in the acquisition of 
major new equipment. 
Conclusion 
We believe that elements within each of the themes are either 
repeated or expressed in slightly different ways, but it is clear that some 
fundamental change management lessons have emerged, and that 
failure to recognize and find solutions to these issues will invariably 
lead to a lack of progress on embedding an NEC culture. 
Change management key lesson 1. It is necessary to 
communicate the need for change, and for this need to be 
expressed in a language that is meaningful to the target 
audiences. It was clear in the research findings that many 
interviewees had no real concept of what NEC meant to them, or 
indeed its relevance to their day job. The communication has to 
enable individuals to understand both the what and the why of 
change. 
Change management key lesson 2. Where a change in behavior 
is required in the delivery of a capability, it is necessary to 
demonstrate the benefits of new behaviors through the provision 
of sufficient equipment and time to explore and practice, such 
that individuals can gain the necessary confidence in its use and 
can “see for themselves” the benefits of the new approaches and 
to confidence in them. 
Change management key lesson 3. It is necessary for the 
organization to put in place systems and processes that can 
reward new behaviors being adopted to prevent individuals from 
defaulting to their old ways the moment the situation becomes 
difficult. 
Change management key lesson 4. Leadership needs to start 
from the “top of shop” and be seen to be leading by example. If 
new behaviors are required as part of the culture change, then the 
leadership at all levels needs to take ownership of the challenges 
and needs to be seen to be adopting and supporting new 
behaviors. 
Change management key lesson 5. Management in general 
needs to recognize that to bring about lasting change, some of 
the systems and processes in the current organization will need 
to change in fundamental ways. For example, the acquisition 
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process needs to reflect that equipment and systems users in the 
future will behave in very different ways, and that the new 
capabilities need to be designed with this in mind. It cannot be 
the case that we procure future systems that look and feel the 
same as the current ones, as this will only serve to reinforce 
current practices and behaviors. To achieve this one aspect 
concerns a change in philosophy to one of “what do we need?” 
as opposed to, “what can we afford?” 
Change management key lesson 6. This is probably the most 
important of all of the lessons, in that it requires the leadership 
and the organization to recognize that appropriate investment 
and time need to be devoted to the people dimension of change 
and that it should not be the defense line of development 
(DLOD) that is picked up at the last moment. Failure to 
recognize this will inevitably result in systems and capabilities 
that are introduced but fail to deliver their full potential or find 
themselves being modified from day one in a continual effort to 
make them workable for those who have to use them. 
Innovation in the people dimension is certainly possible through the 
use of technology, and this opens the door for a more creative use of 
simulation and synthetic environments. However, the approach to the 
use of technology needs to be challenged. At present, we tend to use it 
as a training tool to give individuals and groups practice at using 
applications before deployment or as part of officer broader education. 
It is our view that to effect cultural and behavioral change, the MoD 
needs to use the power of technology to challenge the current systems 
and processes. In other words, it should not be about simply improving 
efficiency in the current paradigm but about challenging the paradigm 
itself to be more effective. To this end, battle labs have a role to play 
when used in the context of challenging behaviors and as a basis for 
developing better understanding of the social interactions necessary to 
deliver the full benefits of networked decision-making. Away from the 
operational context, there also exists scope to use examples such as the 
“model office projects” to explore how individuals and groups might be 
able to interact in better (more effective) ways, such that the quality of 
output from individuals and groups—and hence the organization—
might be improved. It must be recognized that this is about far more 
fundamental change than simply doing today’s business more 
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efficiently—that a change in paradigm is required if the organization is 
to make a step change in its performance. 
Aligned to innovation in technology and its exploitation is the need 
for innovation in behaviors and culture, not least in the approach to 
leadership in the MoD. Although there is a need for a highly directive 
and autocratic style of leadership on operations, it is clear that this is 
becoming increasingly less productive and appropriate away from the 
front line. Indeed, one could argue that in an increasingly technology-
driven military, there must be a clear distinction drawn between 
decision-making—which is entirely the responsibility of the leader—
and the various leadership processes and attributes and support 
functions that must be present to enable decisions to be taken. There is 
a clear need for leaders to be innovative in stepping away from a 
traditional, hierarchical approach in which rank confers authority 
without question and toward a flatter approach in which the skills and 
attributes required to support the leader’s decision-making ability are 
clearly and precisely identified and accessible, regardless of rank or 
service and without there being any question that this consultative 
approach will bring about an unacceptable shift in the balance of 
authority. Both on operations and away from the front line, it is 
essential that leaders understand the people in their teams, but it is no 
longer enough to be aware of their skills and experience; particularly 
where they are leading dispersed or virtual teams, as is increasingly the 
case, they must understand individuals’ personalities, what drives and 
discourages them, and what they expect of their leaders, and they must 
also trust these leaders to fill the skills and knowledge gaps 
appropriately. 
In turn, individuals expect their leaders to be courageous and 
inspiring in their leadership, but in this day and age, this often means 
acknowledging that they do not have all the answers and allowing their 
subordinates to take risks and learn from mistakes while managing the 
effects of those mistakes, focusing attention on a clear outcome, and 
putting their people through some degree of discomfort to get there. 
Leaders must be able both to explain why a particular course of action 
(or change initiative) has not been successful and deliver the 
unpalatable message that an unpopular course of action (or change 
initiative) must be pursued to enable achievement of a necessary goal.  
In terms of individuals, there appears to be within the MoD an 
increasing aversion to taking risks and allowing others to take risks, 
which may well stifle the innovation and creativity necessary to deliver 
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NEC successfully. There appear to be several reasons for this, 
including a blame culture that begins above departmental level, a 
reliance within the military on getting a good confidential report at the 
end of a posting for career progression reasons, and the key role of the 
media in broadcasting information on military activities on operations 
and elsewhere. Individuals must be able to challenge those in authority 
if they believe that to do so will benefit the greater good and if they do 
so in a constructive way it will not threaten their career prospects. This 
is uncomfortable for both subordinates and leaders because both will 
fear the consequences to them personally of behaving in this way. To 
do so requires mutual trust and respect and a full awareness of others’ 
abilities and personalities, which are behaviors necessary to achieve 
NEC. Not to do so, however, risks failing to exploit the full power of 
the networks and the technology available, which is unacceptable in the 
NEC era. Courageous followership is becoming as important as 
courageous leadership, and a key role of leaders should be to develop 
courageous followers to go on to become courageous leaders in their 
turn. 
In support of this, the authors believe that creativity needs to be 
applied to generate case studies and scenarios that provide clear 
evidence that the adoption of new behaviors is beneficial to both the 
individual and the organization. A very simple example of this 
concerns the behavior of sharing information as opposed to hoarding 
information. Although most people will be able to understand the 
benefits from a cognitive perspective and will subscribe to the 
approach, that is not the same as defining how they will behave in a 
range of pressure situations. Such behavior has not been embedded into 
their psyche, and they run the risk of reverting to type. Sharing 
information is about far more than the technology or the orders that you 
are following. If it is the case that deep down, one feels that having 
control of information is an issue of power and influence, or a sense 
that you own the information, then the embedded behavior is one of 
having the right to determine “who gets what where and when,” and of 
others being grateful to have received it. However, from a cultural and 
behavioral perspective, this is very different from seeing yourself as 
one who can help others to make better informed decisions to the 
benefit of all concerned. In this context, instead of being the controller 
of a resource, one sees the sharing of information as a means to enable 
others to make better, timelier, and more confident decisions. 
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It is also the case that technology can be used in more innovative 
ways to communicate the intent of the change. The current practice of 
dumping “stuff on the Intranet” or firing out communications in 
newsletters is alright at a superficial level, but in terms of delivering 
key change messages, it generally does not achieve the objectives from 
the point of view of those in the organization who need to have a much 
deeper understanding of what is expected of them. A much richer array 
of communication is required; this also falls to the role of leadership in 
“walking the walk,” rather than issuing pronouncements.  
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People and Process Requirements 
for Success 
By Ralph Doughty and Terry Pudas 
Abstract 
Many studies have been conducted and speeches delivered about the 
need for a “whole of government” approach in the use of combined 
soft and hard power within governmental departments and agencies. 
Multinational forces and nongovernmental organizations are also 
needed to create a “comprehensive approach” for use in stability 
operations, disaster response, and humanitarian assistance missions.  
A solution to this dilemma is to educate and train all organizations 
involved so they understand each other’s capabilities and constraints 
before they deploy together for operational assignments. Because of 
people and funding constraints, most agencies are extremely 
reluctant to participate in long-term education and training 
programs. To address these needs, the U.S. Army created a new 
exchange program to enable agencies to send their employees as 
students to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and 
for participating agencies to sponsor Army officers to serve as 
interagency fellows at their agencies.  
This transformational solution involved people and process changes 
that required decision-makers in the agencies and the Army to first 
recognize the need and then modify their processes to enable 
interagency personnel to participate. This was accomplished 
successfully, and the pilot program is now being institutionalized 
within the Army.  
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Introduction 
any studies and speeches have been written about the need 
for a “whole of government” approach to the use of soft and 
hard power within government departments and agencies. As 
we strived to create a joint military force in the 1980s, we created new 
structures and processes. Ultimately, we understood that our ability to 
function as a truly joint force hinged on creating a new culture—a joint 
culture. With great effort, some pain, and help from Congress, we set 
about creating the joint professional military education program. 
Incentives were put in place making promotion of senior officers to flag 
and general officer rank contingent on completion of joint education 
and joint assignments. Over more than 20 years, a truly joint force 
evolved, one capable of bringing all elements of Department of 
Defense (DOD) capabilities to bear in an integrated and interdependent 
way. The initial phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom suggests that 
changing culture and behavior, although neither quick nor foolproof, 
can yield dramatic returns.  
We are at a point similar to the early 1980s, but on a much grander 
scale, in which the consequences of failure are too grave to 
contemplate. Clearly, there is a need for a larger and more cohesive 
team embracing all elements of national security. To bring to bear all 
the capabilities needed to prevail over the irregular, disruptive, and 
potentially catastrophic challenges facing us will require unity of effort 
and unifying institutions.  
Multinational forces and nongovernmental agencies are also needed 
to create a “comprehensive approach” that is capable of operating 
effectively in stability operations, disaster response, and humanitarian 
assistance situations anywhere in the world. Good progress is being 
made in integrating civilian and military personnel into organizations 
that bring together the best qualities of each agency or service to create 
an organization that is tailored to the specific mission of the combined 
organization. One example of this is the development of provincial 
reconstruction teams (PRTs) to address stability and reconstruction in 
environments that are unstable or dangerous, such as in Iraq or 
Afghanistan. First used in Afghanistan in 2002, a PRT is a 
military/civilian unit that assists with security, stabilization, and 
reconstruction efforts in unstable nations and complex environments. 
Other examples focus on agriculture to identify ways to improve the 
productivity of farmers and assist them in the selection of legal crops 
M 
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that can provide increased cash flow to support themselves and their 
local villages or provinces. As of March 2008, there were 26 PRTs in 
Afghanistan and 28 in Iraq. Critics of the programs note that the 
different agencies, funding sources, and authorities may lead to a lack 
of program coherence, or that they lack clear lines of authority, agreed 
missions, and measurable objectives. 
Creation of joint interagency coordination groups (JIACGs) is a 
relatively new initiative to coordinate U.S. Government civilian 
agencies’ operational planning in contingency operations. A JIACG 
supports day-to-day planning at the combatant commander 
headquarters; advises planners regarding civilian agency operations, 
capabilities, and limitations; and provides perspective in the 
coordinated use of all elements of national power. Functionally, JIACG 
tasks include working civil–military campaign planning issues and 
conducting outreach to key civilian international and regional contacts. 
Operational JIACGs have been established at all regional combatant 
command headquarters, although composition, organizational structure, 
and effectiveness vary. 
Another recent creation is the Center for Complex Operations 
(CCO), a DOD-led collaborative effort with the Department of State 
and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The 
CCO defines complex operations to include counterinsurgency; 
stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations; and 
irregular warfare.1 The CCO is developing a community of practice of 
civilian and military complex operations training and educational 
institutions and practitioners. The goal of the CCO is to enhance the 
ability of the U.S. Government to prepare for complex operations by 
catalyzing cooperation, coordination, and synchronization among 
educational, training, lessons-learned, and research institutions and 
organizations. 
On February 6, 2007, President George W. Bush and Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates announced the creation of U.S. Africa Command 
(USAFRICOM), an organization that enables DOD to better focus its 
resources on existing U.S. development and security initiatives in the 
region and provides African nations and regional organizations an 
integrated DOD coordination point to help address related needs. 
USAFRICOM is intended to build a more integrated staff structure, one 
that includes significant management and staff representation by the 
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Department of State, USAID, and other U.S. Government agencies 
involved in Africa. This is a major departure from the typical DOD 
military command structure and reflects an understanding of the key 
relationships among security, development, diplomacy, and prosperity 
in Africa. 
All of these “comprehensive approaches” involve placing people 
into environments that are new to them, such as the addition of State 
Department or Department of Agriculture personnel to a military 
organization operating in a reconstruction and stabilization 
environment. This structure results in players from the various 
organizations suddenly finding themselves in a new mission with 
partners they have never met whose methods of operation they do not 
understand. This clearly leads to inefficiencies and wasted motion that 
are sometimes dangerous and invariably delay the accomplishment of 
the mission. 
In an effort to integrate the total force with senior military and 
civilian professionals throughout all branches of the U.S. Government, 
the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review describes DOD support for the 
creation of an interagency National Security Officer Corps. DOD also 
is looking to transform the National Defense University to better 
support the education of U.S. national security professionals.  
A solution to this problem is to educate and train all organizations 
involved so that they understand each other’s capabilities and 
constraints before they deploy together. This “joint” education and 
training is one of the key tenets in Presidential Executive Order 13434 
(Bush, 2007), which implements a national policy to develop a cadre of 
trained national security professionals in executive departments and 
agencies. Although this solution makes sense, problems immediately 
arise when the various departments and agencies involved realize that 
they have neither the people nor the funding to enable them to send 
employees away for education and training. Most Federal departments 
and agencies are a monolayer deep in their staffing levels, and if they 
send someone off to training, the job that individual is assigned to do 
simply does not get done. In addition, money is extremely scarce in 
most departments and agencies, so funds are rarely available to send 
employees to education and training programs. As a result, departments 
and agencies are extremely reluctant to participate in education and 
training programs. 
DOD recognizes that it is in the best interest of both the services and 
the civilian agencies with which they share responsibilities to find a 
 Transforming Interagency Education  •  79 
way to solve this problem. Secretary Gates has repeatedly stated that 
the military does not want to take over the missions of other 
departments and agencies, preferring to work in a coordinated fashion 
with them to develop a more robust capability within them so that more 
effective teamwork could take place to get the missions accomplished. 
In remarks at the Brookings Institution on May 5, 2008, Secretary 
Gates said, “the State Department must be strengthened even further—
in money, people, and bureaucratic clout—to truly fulfill its 
responsibilities as the lead agency in American foreign policy” (Gates, 
2008). This is easier said than done, however. Transformation of long-
standing traditions and methods is difficult to achieve and normally 
requires a real sense of urgency for change, a vision for how the 
transformation should be accomplished, and a powerful guiding 
coalition to lead the implementation (Kotter, 2005). 
A New Approach 
Based on strong leadership from the top, the U.S. military has begun 
to make the transformation to a more comprehensive approach to 
dealing with situations requiring involvement of whole-of-government 
as well as nongovernmental agencies and multinational participation. A 
number of initiatives are currently underway to transform old stand-
alone approaches to a comprehensive approach that includes all 
appropriate government and nongovernmental players. One of these 
initiatives is being led by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff 
College (CGSC), a subordinate organization of the U.S. Army 
Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, which has 
developed a new program called the CGSC Interagency Exchange 
Program. This is a two-part program in which various agencies are 
invited to send their employees as students to participate in a variety 
of CGSC educational programs, and participating agencies sponsor 
CGSC interagency fellows to work in their organizations to provide 
broadening experiences for the army personnel.  
The Department of the Army officially authorized the Training and 
Doctrine Command to pilot this program on May 5, 2008. The first 
round of the Pilot Program, which was conducted in cooperation with 
the Army Human Resources Command during academic year 2009, is 
now complete and resulted in 24 students for CGSC from eight 
departments and agencies. In addition, seven CGSC interagency 
fellows were placed with six agencies. Participating departments 
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and agencies included Department of State (Main), Department of State 
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, USAID, 
Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Department of Health and Human Services, and the Veterans 
Administration.  
Current projections for academic year 2010, which began in the 
summer of 2009, indicate a total of about 35 interagency students from 
14 departments/agencies with 21 CGSC interagency fellows planned 
with 13 agencies, which—in addition to the departments and agencies 
mentioned earlier—now include the Department of Homeland Security, 
Department of Justice, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Department 
of the Treasury, and Department of Agriculture. These exchanges 
provide a forum in which military and interagency personnel can learn 
and appreciate the capabilities each brings to the problems at hand, 
which results in experiential learning gained by working issues side-by-
side in an educational environment that is similar to the operational 
environment they will face together in stability operations, disaster 
response, or humanitarian assistance missions. 
This transformational solution had significant hurdles to leap before 
it could be successful. First was the transformation of the people who 
make decisions on the composition of classes that make up the 
curriculum. Many decision-makers saw no need for civilians to be 
allowed into the classes at all, feeling that they displaced army officers 
from seats that were rightly theirs. Once these decision-makers were 
given enough information to finally “see the light,” the next step was to 
modify the processes that governed the conduct of the courses and to 
include interagency needs and constraints into the exercises that were 
part of the curriculum. Fortunately, the technology had been designed 
and built into the CGSC Lewis and Clark Center to enable these 
changes to be made expeditiously.  
The CGSC Interagency Exchange Program is now in its second 
year, and benefits are already being realized. One organization, 
USAID, had two of its civilian employees graduate from the program 
in the summer of 2008. One of these graduates is now the USAID 
representative on the staff of the U.S. Central Command and is 
participating in their assessment of the stability of various countries and 
regions of the world. The other graduate is now in Afghanistan working 
in Combined Joint Task Force 101, where they are beginning to see 
progress in dealing with the real-world problems that exist there.  
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Clearly, this joint program of education and training with all 
interagency players is beginning to pay dividends for all parties 
involved, but that is not the end of the story. Not only are the students 
increasing their skill levels and learning to operate over a broader 
spectrum of challenges but the Army and the various agencies are 
gaining new perspectives that translate into increased capabilities for 
joint operations. So this part of the program has been successful in 
transforming the “normal” way of doing business separately into a team 
effort in which the players understand each other’s capabilities and 
constraints, thereby resulting in a more responsive and capable team 
that can deploy and immediately begin to identify and implement 
workable solutions.  
Again, however, this is not all. The second part of the CGSC 
Interagency Exchange Program enables U.S. Army officers, typically 
majors who have already completed the CGSC Intermediate Level 
Education course, to serve a fellowship in the departments and agencies 
that send students to study at CGSC. This fellowship allows the Army 
officers to work alongside agency employees in the agency setting, 
which results in a tremendously broadening experience for these 
fellows. Separate papers are being written by these fellows to describe 
the types of assignments in which they have been involved in their 
individual agencies. Assignments to date have included participation in 
the development of diplomatic responses to the Georgia crisis in 2008 
and an on-the-ground assessment in 2009 of methods for improving the 
value of geospatial intelligence supplied to U.S. troops in military 
operations. 
The Way Forward 
The ultimate solution is for the Obama Administration and Congress 
to see the benefits of fully integrated education and training and 
provide adequate funding to the civilian departments and agencies to 
enable them to participate with the U.S. military at the levels needed to 
generate educated and fully trained teams to take on the tasks in front 
of us throughout the world. With more successes like the ones seen so 
far in the CGSC Interagency Exchange Program, this is viewed as a 
distinct possibility. As a matter of fact, a number of key leaders are 
advocating laws to more fully integrate departments and agencies into a 
better-educated and better-trained team capable of working more 
effectively with their international partners and nongovernmental 
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organizations by developing a national security career path for civilian 
professionals similar to the Joint Service Officer model in the military 
(Flournoy & Brimley, 2008).  
One solution would be legislation to bring about the same type of 
joint actions for the interagency that were experienced in the original 
Goldwater-Nichols Law, which created the Joint Force of all the 
military departments (Locher, 2008). The difficulties of operating in a 
joint, interagency environment today are many, and the solutions will 
likely require legislation that overhauls the entire national security 
system. However, that is not the purpose of this essay. Rather, the 
purpose of this essay is to identify and describe methods that can 
successfully integrate the education and training of national security 
professionals to create a more functional comprehensive approach as 
we move toward increased interagency cooperation. The following 
sections describe the changes in people and processes that are 
necessary to achieve this improved educational and training 
environment. 
People Changes 
The first change required is that people involved in joint education 
of national security professionals must recognize the fundamental need 
for joint education and training. People cannot cooperate with other 
organizations effectively without first understanding the capabilities 
and constraints of their own and the other organizations. This requires 
education and collaboration with the other organizations. When people 
“don’t know what they don’t know,” it is difficult for them to see the 
need for more education and training. As a result, employees are not 
inclined to volunteer for additional education or training unless they are 
directed to do so by their superiors. One way to address this problem is 
for organizations to first get their senior leaders on board with the need 
for education, and then for those senior leaders to implement personnel 
policies that reward employees for getting the right education and 
training. That is, education with departments and agencies outside their 
own are then viewed as “career-enhancing assignments” that result in 
better jobs and more responsibility for the employees who obtain the 
joint interagency education and training. This will then lead to a change 
in the culture of the organization that will fundamentally transform the 
way employees think and act about joint interagency education. 
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The people who are senior leaders must also transform the way they 
communicate to subordinates. It is not good enough for an agency to 
release a notice of the availability of educational and training programs 
their employees may want to attend. Simply releasing this notice 
without first creating and implementing human resources programs that 
specify the benefits to the employees for selecting these educational 
programs (which clearly require work and entail hardship to complete) 
will not yield positive results. Personal involvement with high-potential 
employees is one good way to send the message to others in the 
organization that getting interagency education and training is a good 
way to enhance a career. 
Human resource staff must also work to ensure that the monetary 
costs of gaining added education and training do not fall on the 
shoulders of employees. Travel and temporary duty costs must be 
adequately funded by the department or agency, as the employee is 
already sacrificing by moving family or by being away from them for 
extended periods of time to get the added education.  
Process Changes 
A number of process changes are needed to implement an effective 
joint education and training program in the interagency. First is the 
recognition that a “schools account” or “personnel float” is needed so 
that the organization’s work output does not suffer while people are 
away at school. This Schools Account does not exist in most 
departments and agencies—hence the need for the CGSC interagency 
fellows, who are able to come into the departments or agencies sending 
students to CGSC and help to limit any reduction of work output from 
the agency. In reality, however, this could be considered as a short-term 
solution that helps until the departments and agencies can gain 
adequate funding and personnel authorizations to create their schools 
account and handle it themselves. Until this point is reached, however, 
the use of army officers as CGSC fellows to the individual agencies is 
essential, and also provides a much-needed learning and broadening 
experience for the fellows, who will then be much better prepared to 
work in operational interagency assignments in the future. For this 
reason, it may be that “never” is the right time to cease the assignment 
of fellows to departments and agencies. 
Second, appropriate selection processes need to be developed and 
put into place in the agencies to enable the most deserving employees 
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to be selected for needed education and training. These processes 
should be based on the fundamental premise that such selection is a 
career-enhancing assignment, and that not only will their employees 
come back from their schooling better prepared to serve in joint 
interagency assignments, but they will be much more likely to get 
assignments that further their careers. Once this process is clearly in 
place in the organization, there will not be problems with finding 
volunteers for education and training opportunities. 
Processes must also be in place to routinely reimburse the 
employees fairly when they must travel and live for a time away from 
their normal place of work. This requires senior-level leadership at the 
start, and then it requires that processes continue to ensure that this is 
routinely accomplished. 
One of the key processes in the CGSC Interagency Exchange 
Program is that the interagency personnel who come to CGSC are 
placed in small, 16-person seminar groups, where they receive most of 
their education. These seminar groups have a carefully coordinated 
mixture of combat and combat support officers from the Army, as well 
as one or two joint service officers from the Air Force, Navy, or Marine 
Corps, and an international officer from one of over 80 countries. The 
objective of the CGSC Interagency Exchange Program is to also 
include one interagency student in the staff group. With this type of 
student mix, a range of joint, international, and interagency 
perspectives is included in the class discussions and group exercises. 
As a result, excellent experiential learning occurs that would be almost 
impossible without this mix of highly knowledgeable and experienced 
officers and civilians, who learn cultures and methods of operating with 
their joint/interagency counterparts on a daily basis. Finally, personal 
relationships are developed that will last for a lifetime of personal and 
professional successes. The combination of these processes and the 
multicultural perspectives experienced by the students on a daily basis 
results in extremely well educated students who are prepared for the 
complex and uncertain challenges they must face together in the future. 
The final process change that is critical is to develop innovative 
ways to overcome the lack of money and people so as to be able to 
accomplish these educational and training initiatives. The exchange 
program is clearly one innovation that helps to defray costs and 
encourage people to participate. Many more methods are needed, 
however, as we will never have all the money we need to educate and 
train everyone to the levels we wish. 
 Transforming Interagency Education  •  85 
Conclusions 
Old habits die hard, and transformation is often thought to be a 
gimmick used by senior level personnel to acquire additional funding, 
power, or prestige. However, whether through new technology, 
processes, organizations, or innovations, mankind has always found 
new and better ways to fight. With the resurgence of irregular warfare 
and the problems associated with instant information availability to 
virtually everyone in the world, we must not forget that educated teams 
of all the organizations available to a country are needed if we are to be 
successful.  
Joint education for our military leaders has paid enormous 
dividends. It is imperative that we explore the creation of a similar 
construct for the leaders of agencies and departments responsible for 
prevailing over current and future security challenges. The United 
States runs the risk of squandering its economic, informational, 
military, diplomatic, and technological advantages unless we invest in 
our most valuable commodity—our future senior leaders—to create the 
attitudes, values, and beliefs that underpin a new culture. This is a 
matter not of cost but of choice and is fundamental to our future 
success.  
This essay has described one way to provide the needed education 
and training by exchanging people who can help to educate each other 
and change the culture of the participating organizations. This 
transformational solution involved people and process changes that 
required decision-makers in the agencies to first recognize the need and 
then modify processes to enable interagency personnel to participate. 
Changes to internal army processes were also required to provide 
interagency fellows to serve in the agencies. This was accomplished 
successfully, and the pilot program is now being institutionalized 
within the U.S. Army, with exceptionally valuable results for the 
organizations and nations involved.  
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STAR-TIDES and Maritime 
Environments 
By Linton Wells II and Walter L. Christman 
Abstract 
The Department of Defense is increasingly involved in missions such 
as post-war stabilization and reconstruction, humanitarian 
assistance/disaster relief, and building the capacity of partner 
nations. An international, knowledge-sharing research program 
called STAR-TIDES examines innovative approaches to public-
private collaboration and “whole-of-government” solutions to 
provide affordable, sustainable support to stressed populations in 
these environments. STAR-TIDES encourages unity of effort among 
diverse organizations where there is no unity of command. It 
addresses problems through seven broad action areas: 
- Gather, share, and evaluate information about capabilities 
- Develop social networks and build trust 
- Align policy, doctrine and field operating procedures 
- Resolve legal and regulatory constraints 
- Address resource requirements 
- Train, exercise and educate, and 
- Integrate with associated activities. 
Implementing these measures requires crosscutting changes among 
people, processes, operations, and technology in complex, civil-
military environments that are every bit as transformational as high-
end warfare initiatives. STAR-TIDES approaches have been 
examined extensively in terrestrial contingencies, but not yet in 
maritime ones. This paper focuses on their application to maritime 
environments and their effects on the Sea Services.  
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Introduction 
ational security transformation seeks major advances in 
capabilities for defense, diplomacy, and development through 
changes in people, processes, organizations, and technology. It 
is an ongoing process, not a finite event. This essay examines some 
aspects of transformation by investigating interactions between two 
initiatives, the 2007 Maritime Strategy and a research project called 
STAR-TIDES.1 It emphasizes activities that involve more than one of 
the transformation categories, such as how people interact with 
processes, or technology with organizations. 
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower was issued 
jointly by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard in October 
2007.2 It is a seminal document and a significant departure from past 
approaches. The new Maritime Strategy moves beyond traditional 
naval roles such as power projection, sea control, strategic deterrence, 
and forward presence to include capabilities like maritime security, 
humanitarian assistance, and disaster response. This embraces evolving 
notions of cooperative security,3 which the strategy explores in depth, 
promoting interoperability and engagement with diverse partners.  
One of the strategy’s central tenets is that “Preventing wars is as 
important as winning wars” which reflects the fact that the Department 
of Defense (DOD) is increasingly involved in missions such as postwar 
stabilization and reconstruction, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, 
                                                     
1 TIDES stands for Transformative Innovation for Development and 
Emergency Support. TIDES is part of a broader effort, Sustainable 
Technologies, Accelerated Research, or STAR. Hence, STAR-TIDES. 
2 Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and 
Commandant of the Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower (2007), Introduction. 
3 See, for example, Commander, U.S. European Command and 
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Military Contribution to 
Cooperative Security, Joint Operating Concept, version 1.0, September 19, 
2008. It defines cooperative security as, “The set of continuous, long term, 
integrated, comprehensive actions among a broad spectrum of U.S. and 
international governmental and nongovernmental partners that maintains or 
enhances stability, prevents or mitigates crises, and enables other operations 
when crises occur.” A more theoretical treatment is provided by Michael 
Mihalka, “Cooperative Security in the 21st Century,” The Quarterly Journal 
2005(Winter):113–122. 
N 
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and building the capacity of partner nations. It also mirrors the 
profound changes that have taken place in U.S. national security 
strategy, policy, and doctrine since 2004.4 
The new Maritime Strategy is complemented by an innovative, 
international social network focused on knowledge-sharing that is part 
of the STAR-TIDES project.5 The project examines transformational 
approaches to public–private collaboration, whole-of-government 
solutions, and transnational engagement. It is pioneering new forms of 
global partnership, with a goal of providing sustainable, affordable 
support to stressed populations in postwar, postdisaster, or 
impoverished environments. STAR-TIDES encourages unity of effort 
among diverse organizations where there is no unity of command. 
Combining distributed organizations and new institutional approaches 
to cooperative security can improve effectiveness in complex, civil–
military environments. Such efforts may be every bit as 
transformational in the prevention of war as advanced research and 
development and high-performance systems procurement are in the 
preparation for combat operations.  
STAR-TIDES approaches have been examined extensively in 
terrestrial contingencies,6 but not yet in maritime ones. This essay thus 
focuses on the approaches’ applicability to maritime environments, 
their transformational aspects, and their effects on the Sea Services. It 
links theory and practice to highlight ways in which the new Maritime 
Strategy can flourish in the context of diverse, crosscutting initiatives 
that link people, processes, organizations, and technology in novel 
ways.  
                                                     
4 The National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy address 
complex operations and engagement with civilians; DOD Instruction 3000.05 
focuses on Stability Operations; Army Field Manuals 3-0 (Operations), 3-07 
(Stability Operations) and 3-24 (Counterinsurgency, which also is Marine 
Corps Warfighting Publications 3-33.5) provide Service-level doctrine on 
these types of situations. 
5 TIDES = Transformative Innovation for Development and Emergency 
Support. It is part of the broader effort called STAR (Sustainable 
Technologies, Accelerated Research). 
6 See, for example, Linton Wells II et al., STAR-TIDES and Starfish 
Networks: Supporting Stressed Populations with Distributed Talent (Center 
for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizon, 2009, 
forthcoming). 
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The Maritime Strategy 
This essay addresses two questions: How can the distributed 
organizational structures represented by STAR-TIDES help meet the 
goals of the Maritime Strategy? And how are these structures 
transformational?7 Can examples of cooperative security with 
nontraditional partners be used to illustrate links between new 
organizational forms and the goals of the Maritime Strategy? 
The Maritime Strategy is shaped by the proximity of large 
populations to the coast worldwide, along with disruptive factors such 
as social instability, the effects of climate change, mass 
communications that focus on human suffering, and extremist and 
criminal elements that arise as a result of instability. To counter these 
emerging threats, the Maritime Strategy seeks to integrate sea power 
with: 
other elements of national power, as well as those of our friends and 
allies. It describes how seapower will be applied around the world to 
protect our way of life, as we join with other like-minded nations to 
protect and sustain the global, inter-connected system through which 
we prosper. Our commitment to protecting the homeland and 
winning our Nation’s wars is matched by a corresponding 
commitment to preventing war. 
This requires global cooperative engagements among governments, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations 
(like the United Nations), and the private sector, all partners with whom 
STAR-TIDES seeks to engage as well. The Maritime Strategy’s focus 
on reducing the causes of instability also aligns with STAR-TIDES’ 
focus on reducing stress on populations. 
This emphasis on interdependency—a recurring theme of the 
Maritime Strategy—represents a major conceptual change from the 
way sea power was envisioned only a few years ago. It occurs within 
an emerging cooperative security concept that moves beyond 
deterrence based on conventional and nuclear warfighting capabilities 
as the primary means of preventing war. Although by no means 
abandoning the need for decisive combat power, the strategy 
recognizes that U.S. security interests are linked with those of other 
                                                     
7 The authors wish to thank Ivan Labra, a research associate at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, for posing the issue in this insightful way and for his 
thoughts in addressing it. 
 Transformational Initiatives in Civil-Military Operations  •  91 
nations and emphasizes the importance of engaging effectively with the 
world’s interlocking “networks of trade, finance, information, law, 
people and governance.” It fosters asymmetrical global partnerships to 
address emerging challenges to human security posed by globalization 
and climate change.8  
The U.S. approach is not unique, however, as innovative navies 
around the world are focused on similar transformations. Rear Admiral 
Tan Kai Hoe, Chief of Staff of the Singapore Navy, outlines the issues 
well:9 
While different navies may face different specific challenges, there 
are some global trends which are key drivers of transformation. Chief 
amongst these is the uncertain global environment, with an increase 
in new security threats and security concerns . . . in addition to 
fulfilling their traditional roles of ensuring good order at sea and 
protecting maritime commerce, [navies] are also expected to 
contribute towards the maintenance of global security through 
ensuring maritime security against terrorism, or by standing ready to 
provide relief to natural disasters. [Navies also] must continue to 
hone a sharp edge in conventional war fighting to deter aggression, 
and to win in conflicts if necessary. [T]hey have to develop new 
capabilities, structures and processes to meet the broadened range of 
new and existing operational demands. 
A key tenet of the Maritime Strategy is to foster cooperative 
relationships over time, which means the Sea Services must develop 
more expertise in the cultures, histories, and languages of international 
partners. They also must coordinate better with other U.S. armed forces 
and government agencies. As the strategy says:  
Although our forces can surge when necessary to respond to crises, 
trust and cooperation cannot be surged.10 They must be built over 
                                                     
8 The Maritime Strategy relies on six core capabilities: forward presence, 
deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, and humanitarian 
assistance and disaster response. 
9 Tan Kai Hoe, RADM, “Naval Transformation: Progress, Prospects and 
People,” Pointer: Singapore: Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces 
2008;34(2):6. It is noteworthy that Singapore entrusts roughly 1 percent of its 
defense budget to the “Future Systems Architect,” charged with developing 
transformational concepts. 
10 STAR-TIDES-related research into human interoperability is looking at 
ways to accelerate trust-building across different cultures. It clearly is better if 
trust has been built and social networks developed before a crisis emerges, but 
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time so that the strategic interests of the participants are continuously 
considered while mutual understanding and respect are promoted.  
Forward maritime deployments help promote sustained 
relationships with partners, enable rapid responses after disasters, and 
help mitigate disruptions or keep them localized. 
STAR-TIDES and the Maritime Strategy: Three 
Dimensions of Interaction 
STAR-TIDES can complement the Maritime Strategy by helping to 
create more stable environments and reduce preconditions for 
conflict.11  
In lieu of the deployable, expensive, and hard-to-sustain types of 
equipment that DOD often brings to these contingencies, STAR-TIDES 
focuses on crosscutting, whole systems12 approaches to seven types of 
infrastructures: shelter, water, power, integrated combustion and solar 
cooking, cooling/lighting/heating, sanitation, and information and 
communications technologies. STAR-TIDES supports the rapid 
dissemination and adaption of knowledge developed in these domains 
though the use of online collaborative capabilities and the creation and 
maintenance of publicly available knowledge repositories through its 
Web presence at http://www.star-tides.net. 
The STAR-TIDES concept cultivates interactions among 
nontraditional partners. Joining STAR-TIDES’ adaptive capabilities to 
the capacity of our maritime organizations and their international 
                                                                                                                    
it may be possible to build trust more quickly than expected, even under 
stressed conditions. Research is ongoing. 
11 Three specific areas of emphasis outlined in the Maritime Strategy lend 
themselves to STAR-TIDES-like interactions: improve integration and 
interoperability, enhance awareness, and prepare our people. In addition, the 
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), signed in January 2009 by the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, identifies four basic categories of 
military activity for the Joint Force in 2016 to 2028: combat, security, 
engagement, and relief and reconstruction. STAR-TIDES contributes directly 
to the last two categories and indirectly to setting the conditions for security. 
12 “Whole systems” in this context means looking at approaches among 
different infrastructures to see how they can complement each other. For 
example, heat from solar cooking can purify water and also heat rocks or 
bricks to help avoid pulmonary and eye diseases from having to burn fires 
inside shelters.  
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partners could be transformative—a “non-force” multiplier, if you will. 
It helps establish the conditions for peace.  
The transformational nature of STAR-TIDES’ organizational 
construct lies in its ability to access distributed talent. It leverages new 
technologies to create on-demand, resilient capabilities that are 
focused, yet broadly accessible and comprehensive. Drawing on this, 
STAR-TIDES can interact with traditional maritime approaches along 
three dimensions: 
• provide crosscutting analyses of capabilities for distressed 
populations that apply to the seven core TIDES infrastructure 
areas; 
• promote rapid process innovation to improve ways of doing 
business in such areas as unclassified information sharing; and 
• assist in developing and implementing partner-centric 
solutions through an agile planning process that engages 
public–private, whole-of-government, and international 
partners. This approach contributes to unity of effort among 
diverse organizations that will not subordinate themselves to a 
single chain of command. 
The global talent accessed by the STAR-TIDES network has helped 
address real-world problems such as stabilization and reconstruction in 
Afghanistan, humanitarian assistance/disaster recovery (HA/DR) in 
tropical regions such as Cyclone Nargis relief in Myanmar, and 
building the capacity of partner nations in Africa. It also has 
contributed to disaster response within North America by exploring 
shelter solutions for the Canadian Arctic and providing aid to first 
responders in the United States. 
Implementing Interactions 
Innovation and Scenario Planning for “Wicked Problems.” In 
their classic 1973 treatise, Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber introduced 
the concept of “wicked” problems to social planning, contrasting 
“wicked” problems with the relatively “tame” and soluble problems 
found in mathematics, chess, or puzzle solving.13 The phrase evokes a 
                                                     
13 Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of 
Planning,” Policy Sciences, 1973;4:155–169 [reprinted in N. Cross (ed.), 
Developments in Design Methodology (Chichester: J. Wiley & Sons, 1984), 
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problem thought to be difficult or impossible to solve because of 
incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements that are often 
hard to recognize. Further, because of complex interdependencies, the 
effort to solve one aspect of a wicked problem may reveal or create 
other problems. For DOD, the ability to support the types of 
contingencies posed by the challenges of globalization, instability, and 
insecurity from whatever cause is often impeded by limited trust and 
cooperation with civil-military mission partners,14 limited abilities to 
share information and situational awareness, and a lack of suitable, 
low-cost, support infrastructures. When all three shortfalls are present, 
the potential for wicked problems is very high. 
STAR-TIDES can help the Maritime Strategy address such 
problems. In complex operations, the United States cannot achieve the 
social, political, and economic goals for which its military forces have 
been committed unless it can engage effectively with the populations it 
is trying to influence. These include local governments, businesses, and 
members of civil society.15 These interactions typically involve 
complex relationships that usually include concurrent mixes of 
collaboration, competition, and conflict.16 The ability to share 
unclassified information is particularly important, as is being able to 
reach beyond the boundaries of joint military forces and work 
effectively across other organizational membranes.17 Unclassified 
                                                                                                                    
135–44]. The definition of a wicked problem is available online at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wicked_problem. 
14 Civil-military mission partners include other U.S. Government agencies, 
international organizations; NGOs; state, local, territorial, and tribal 
governments; indigenous security services; and others (including commercial 
firms and individuals as appropriate) who are directly contributing to the 
ongoing mission. Some NGOs object to the term “partner” and prefer less 
binding terms like “participant.” Private volunteer organizations, largely made 
up of volunteers, are making increasingly important contributions in complex 
operations. 
15 See, for example, Mark Gerencser et al., Megacommunities (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2008). 
16 See “Converging, Combining, Emerging,” the Executive Summary of 
Highlands Forum XXXII, May 29–31, 2007. Available at 
https://www.hlforum.com/conferences. 
17 See Hans Binnendijk and Patrick Cronin, Civilian Surge: The Key to 
Complex Operations—A Preliminary Report (Washington, DC: National 
Defense University Press, 2008). See especially chapter 13, “Engaging with 
Local Actors.” 
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situational awareness and the communications networks to share it are 
not mere technical adjuncts to combat operations or major HA/DR 
deliverables such as food, shelter, water, and security. They are the 
critical enablers of everything else that happens.  
STAR-TIDES brings knowledge-sharing and cost-effective 
infrastructures, but it also includes a planning process that examines 
scenarios through a structured, multistep approach. The goals of this 
approach are to enhance the ability of civilian coalitions (business, 
government, and civil society) to operate in stressed environments, 
extend the military’s ability to work with civilians in such situations, 
and economize by identifying low-cost logistic solutions and 
rationalizing supply chains. The scenarios help tie the diverse pieces 
together. 
There is a long tradition of scenario planning within the military, 
and especially the Navy, as generations of participants in the Naval 
War College’s Global war game may attest. Likewise, the literature of 
scenario-based planning is wide-ranging and has been shaped by 
experience in both government and the private sector. Years ago, Pierre 
Wack wrote in the Harvard Business Review:18 
Scenarios deal with two worlds; the world of facts and the world of 
perceptions. They explore for facts but they aim at perceptions inside 
the heads of decision makers. Their purpose is to gather and 
transform information of strategic significance into fresh perceptions. 
This transformation process is not trivial—more often than not it 
does not happen. When it works, it is a creative experience that 
generates a heartfelt “Aha” … and leads to strategic insights beyond 
the mind’s reach. 
STAR-TIDES emphasizes the needs of affected people “on the 
ground” who will need to accept, implement, and sustain the solutions. 
For the purposes of the Maritime Strategy, the global community of 
STAR-TIDES contributors, plus the “bottom-up” focus, can provide 
key insights for addressing many of the unique wicked problems 
inherent in complex, multisector interactions. Moreover, the inclusion 
of local communities of business, government, and civil society is an 
important link between strategy and task in support of the cooperative 
                                                     
18 Pierre Wack, “Scenarios: Shooting the Rapids,” Harvard Business 
Review 1985(November–December):140. The authors thank Naval 
Postgraduate School faculty member Marc Ventresca for bringing this article 
to our attention. 
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security agenda. These can combine to provide the “Aha” experience 
mentioned by Pierre Wack. 
Some examples provide clarification. The ones below are built 
around an HA/DR scenario in the Western Pacific. 
The first step is for planners, supported by the STAR-TIDES 
network, to postulate the desired end state and success metrics and to 
build paths to them from the initial scenario conditions. (How long 
should people stay in temporary shelters? How will first responders 
reach the victims?) 
Then, drawing on the information in the STAR-TIDES knowledge 
repository, and especially by “pulsing” the far-flung STAR-TIDES 
network for ideas, “crosscutting” solution sets can be postulated (mixes 
of shelter, water, power, etc.) that can be tailored to the needs of the 
scenario. (Which combinations of shelter, water, power, cooking, etc. 
would be likely to work best in Western Pacific environments in the 
rainy season and afterward?) Not all solutions suit all scenarios. 
Building partner nation capacity to stabilize southern archipelagos calls 
for different answers (and probably staffing) than supporting mountain 
earthquake victims in winter. 
The most important action is to identify the local, multisector 
coalition members who will have to live with and sustain the solutions 
on the ground, and then engage them effectively. (What part of the 
local government performs FEMA–like functions? What local 
languages are involved? How do U.S. forces, aid agencies like USAID, 
the United Nations, and others interact with them?) Social network 
development and trust building must be combined with bottom-up 
engagement that focuses on the stressed populations in their 
environments and also informs top-down project managers. Human 
interoperability must be encouraged not just among people, but also in 
institution building and in interactions with available equipment. 
The next step is to refine the scenarios, desired end states, metrics, 
and solution sets in concert with the appropriate local coalition leaders, 
U.S. entities, and international players. For example, the number of 
projected homeless may need to be adjusted based on local knowledge, 
and the postulated infrastructure sets may need to be tailored to local 
preferences. 
Sources of supply need to be identified for the proposed solutions. 
There are four main options: government stockpiles or contracts, non–
U.S. Government stockpiles or contracts, commercial supply chain—
indigenous and international, and empowered citizens (if only everyone 
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had had three days worth of food and water before Hurricane Katrina). 
As an example of ways to empower civilians, STAR-TIDES is working 
with computer gamers and the One Laptop Per Child project to write 
games that could teach children how to prepare themselves and their 
families better for disasters and how to respond after a disaster hits. 
Field operating procedures (including military tactics, techniques 
and procedures) need to be aligned with policies and doctrine to help 
people on the ground understand the limits of what can and cannot be 
shared, what approvals are needed, and so on to work well together. 
The United States now has fairly comprehensive policy and doctrine 
about complex operations, but until they are converted into tactical 
guidance that can be implemented by those in the arena, the results on 
the ground will be disappointing. 
Ideally, these steps will have been taken well in advance of a crisis, 
and thus form the basis for planning and consequence mitigation.19 
Because information will be widely shared via the STAR-TIDES and 
related Web sites, others can benefit from lessons learned from any one 
scenario and apply them to their own situations. Planners in all 
complex contingencies need to consider what alternatives to traditional 
command and control20 need to be designed and implemented for 
disparate stakeholders in these environments.21 To let diverse 
organizations “focus” on problems and develop a shared situational 
                                                     
19 One example is a pending technology demonstration project called 
PEAK (Pre-positioned Expeditionary Assistance Kits). In conjunction with 
partner nations, kits will be developed that can support U.S. and partner 
nations in building the capacity of the partner nations for scenarios of interest 
to them. These kits will be tailored to local needs and prepositioned in their 
areas. This work is sponsored by the U.S. Southern Command. 
20 Traditional military command and control typically will not work with 
civil–military mission partners in complex operations, as nongovernmental 
organizations, civilian agencies, police forces, and so on usually will not 
subordinate themselves to military command. This is one reason why it is 
important to focus on how to achieve unity of effort when there is no unity of 
command.  
21 David S. Alberts, “Agility, Focus and Convergence, The Future of 
Command and Control,” The International C2 Journal 2007;1:1–30. This 
seminal paper addresses the need, in any contingency, to design structures that 
focus on the problem, are agile enough to meet the needs of the situation, and 
can converge the resources to get the job done. NATO is reaching similar 
conclusions in its reviews of network-enabled capabilities C2 Maturity 
Models. 
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awareness of what’s going on, network-enabled capabilities are 
essential that link as many participants as possible. In turn, this requires 
an underlying data strategy that allows all information on the network 
to be discoverable, accessible, and understandable. The community of 
interest for Maritime Domain Awareness is doing this very effectively.  
Legal and Regulatory Issues. U.S. Government accountability 
rules limit DOD’s ability to transfer goods and services bought with 
one kind of funds to other areas under different circumstances. For 
example, it is hard to leave behind military equipment for disaster 
victims. Both the Maritime Strategy and STAR-TIDES need to 
understand these constraints and address them as appropriate. In 
addition to general rules on equipment transfer, planners must 
understand what regulatory and other issues must be addressed in 
particular scenarios (customs and border clearance, or export controls, 
for example). 
The distributed nature of modern information sharing raises an 
important question that will have to be answered by governments and 
other organizations in the next few years. That involves the oversight of 
and accountability in so-called covenantal arrangements. There are 
well-established procedures for managing accountability and oversight 
in command relationships and in contractual relationships, but there are 
few models for inspectors general and accountability offices to use 
when the arrangements are made by covenant (e.g., handshakes, 
distributed data storage outside a firewall like Google Docs, 
agreements among disparate cultures—“three cups of tea,” etc.). 22 
Many activities in complex civil–military operations, Web 2.0 
environments, and other situations in which there is no unity of 
command will have to rely on covenants. This is an important issue that 
will have to be addressed from many standpoints—managerial, policy, 
legal, and accounting. Both the Maritime Strategy and STAR-TIDES 
efforts to promote partnerships among diverse organizations will have 
to engage here as well. 
Training, Exercising, and Education. A key part of any program 
is to train the trainers first, and then those who will use the 
infrastructures in the field. Rotary Clubs do an excellent job of this in 
                                                     
22 The authors are indebted to Mr. Ken Hamilton of the KENTIA 
Management Group for this insight. 
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supporting deployments of the ShelterBox disaster relief kit.23 
ShelterBox will deploy a team of trainers who speak the local language 
to teach local Rotarians how to set up the tents and use the shelter box 
equipment, so that they in turn can train survivors. Exercise programs 
are needed to practice, refine, and revisit issues; incorporate lessons 
learned; and change behaviors. Some broadly inclusive exercises can 
be used as models, including Operation Golden Phoenix, which 
involved more than 140 different partners in the summer of 2008, and 
the annual FA-Hum (Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias) disaster 
management event sponsored by SOUTHCOM, which engages more 
than twenty Central American and Caribbean nations, U.S. military 
forces, and transnational institutions. 
Transformational Aspects of STAR-TIDES and the 
Maritime Strategy 
As noted earlier, transformation involves changes in people, 
processes, organizations, and technology. Both the Maritime Strategy 
and STAR-TIDES invoke crosscutting changes among all of these 
areas. A good expression of how these linkages can work is expressed 
in the book Democratizing Innovation by Eric von Hippel, professor 
and head of the Innovation and Entrepreneurship Group at the MIT 
Sloan School of Management, in Boston, Massachusetts. The book 
describes how people participate in the development of products they 
use and explains in detail the emerging process of user-centric 
democratized innovation. Von Hippel states:24  
It is now clear that users often innovate, and that they often freely 
reveal their innovations. But what about informal cooperation among 
users? What about organized cooperation in development of 
innovations and other matters? The answer is that both flourish 
                                                     
23 http://www.shelterbox.org/home.htm. The ShelterBox Trust is a 
registered U.K. charity that provides emergency aid for victims of natural and 
other disasters anywhere in the world. Since operations began in January 2001, 
it has helped over 800,000 people and worked in more than 52 countries, 
responding to earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, tsunamis, wars, volcanoes, and 
so on.  
24 Eric von Hippel, Democratizing Innovation (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2005), 93. The book is also licensed under a Creative Commons license 
and is available as a downloadable PDF document on http://web.mit.edu/ 
evhippel/www/democ.htm. 
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among user-innovators. Informal user-to-user cooperation, such as 
assisting others to innovate, is common. Organized cooperation in 
which users interact within communities, is also common. Innovation 
communities are often stocked with useful tools and infrastructure 
that increase the speed and effectiveness with which users can 
develop and test and diffuse their innovations. 
As illustrated in the scenario analysis example, the STAR-TIDES 
innovation community can address planning issues quickly, at several 
levels, in ways that can improve the abilities of the Sea Services and 
regional combatant commanders to engage complex operational 
challenges. This is especially true when the interactive tools of social 
software and Web 2.0 are brought to bear.25 Moreover, diverse groups 
can explore multiple dimensions of the interactions among people, 
processes, organization, and technology to promote innovative, 
crosscutting interactions in a number of ways. Six examples follow. 
People and Processes. The Maritime Strategy and STAR-TIDES 
both focus on preparing people for new types of missions in complex, 
networked environments. Both promote more integrated processes 
among governments, nongovernmental organizations, international 
organizations, indigenous entities, and others in support of “relevant 
populations.” An important part of this is to convert strategy, policy, 
and doctrine into effective field operating procedures quickly. In 
addition to learning how to write such procedures, the Sea Services 
should pursue human interoperability and organizational research to 
develop trust and build social networks before they are needed in 
crises. 
People and Organizations. A common theme of the Maritime 
Strategy and STAR-TIDES, as well as the work of the Transformation 
Chairs network, is that education is a very important, even strategic, 
investment for the United States. This is less traditional education than 
the conversion of educational approaches to promote innovative, 
adaptive thinking, and lifelong learning. In parallel, U.S. national 
security institutions, including the Sea Services, need to change their 
cultures to emphasize experience with complex operations when 
selecting people for leadership positions and promoting them. This 
                                                     
25 See, for example, Mark Drapeau and Linton Wells II, “Social Software 
and National Security, a ‘Net Assessment,’” Defense and Technology Paper 
61 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Center for Technology and 
National Security Policy, 2009). 
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typically requires that lessons from real-world activities be learned and 
converted quickly into changed organizational and individual behavior.  
People and Technology. Technological solutions for complex 
operations must be affordable, implementable, and sustainable by 
indigenous, “relevant populations” in their worlds—not just by U.S. or 
coalition forces or aid organizations. Initiatives such as the Global 
Maritime Partnership recognize this as they work to engage the world’s 
navies and coast guards, often in their waters, and help develop their 
capabilities. In the same vein, STAR-TIDES expressly looks for 
alternatives to expensive DOD programs of record in favor of those 
more suited to building partner capacity. In both cases, Sea Service 
personnel can benefit by thinking more broadly about how crosscutting, 
“whole systems” approaches (using different systems together) can 
increase effectiveness by integrating disparate technologies.  
Processes and Technology. Unclassified information sharing with 
civil–military mission partners beyond the boundaries of the Joint 
Force is essential to success in the kinds of operations addressed by 
both the Maritime Strategy and STAR-TIDES. This often involves 
relatively low-tech solutions, including collaboration tools that can 
work with users who have limited access to communications. This 
requires changes in traditional military communications processes that 
emphasize links within the boundaries of joint forces, rather than 
beyond them. In support of such shifts, the April 2009 DOD instruction 
on unclassified information sharing26 and the provision of Internet 
access to nongovernmental organizations on Maritime Partner station 
ships27 are important steps forward. 
Processes and Organizations. In recognition of the growing 
importance of complex operations, civilian deputies have been 
established for the four-star commanders of both the U.S. Southern and 
Africa Commands. This truly reflects transformational organizational 
change. The growing use of covenantal relationships, discussed earlier, 
will require significant shifts in organizational processes to achieve a 
balance between decentralized innovation and oversight with 
accountability. Finally, the Sea Services and the STAR-TIDES research 
                                                     
26 DODI 8220.02, “Information and Communications Technology, 
Capabilities for Support of Stabilization and Reconstruction, Disaster Relief, 
and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Operations,” April 30, 2009. 
27 Naval Studies Board, Maritime Security Partnerships (Washington, DC: 
National Academies Press, 2008). 
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network should work together, along with the Center for Complex 
Operations (CCO) and others, to help partner organizations implement 
lessons learned and adjust educational curricula accordingly.28 
Profoundly innovational outcomes can result. 
Technology and Organizations. Information technology enables 
the flat, porous network of STAR-TIDES, as well as the data-based 
communities of interest that are essential for accurate maritime domain 
awareness. In turn, such awareness demands expanded intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as interagency (and 
international) information-sharing and cooperation. This is true not 
only for combat operations, counterterrorism, antipiracy, and 
counternarcotics but also for humanitarian assistance/disaster relief. 
The ability to gain situational awareness rapidly and share it widely is 
the critical enabler of all other actions in these situations. What is 
transformational is that this can be achieved with relatively low-cost 
systems and distributed, federated organizations, based on responsible 
sharing and collaboration.  
Summary 
The Maritime Strategy calls for persistent engagement at all levels 
to build enduring relationships and promote understanding with 
nontraditional partners to help avoid conflict. STAR-TIDES’ 
multidisciplinary, international approaches and linking of distributed 
talent already are contributing solutions to real-world challenges. Both 
include transformational elements that cut across people, processes, 
organizations, and technology to facilitate public–private, whole-of-
government engagement to improve performance in complex 
environments. These complementary efforts can help build global 
partnerships to address the challenges of globalization, instability, and 
insecurity in the 21st century. 
                                                     
28 The Center for Complex Operations is a developing “community of 
practice” of civilian and military complex operations training and education 
institutions and practitioners (see essay 4). The CCO defines complex 
operations as consisting of counterinsurgency; stability, security, transition, 
and reconstruction operations; and irregular warfare. The authors have adopted 
a more expansive definition that includes humanitarian assistance and disaster 





Global Cooperation in New 
Security Structures 
By Henrik Friman 
Abstract 
In 2005, Admiral Mike Mullen, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, proposed 
the Global Maritime Partnership (GMP). His concept was to create a 
1,000-ship Navy consisting of 313 American military ships and 
approximately 700 ships from trusted partners, including Sweden. The 
United States will provide ships able to operate on the open sea, and the 
partners will predominantly contribute ships adapted to the geographical 
areas where the GMP will operate. This 1,000-ship Navy may be the first 
example of a WikiForce, that is, a developed, adaptive way of organizing 
for the future.  
Usually discussed in the context of business and academia, wikis are 
technical solutions that enable cooperation by simplifying publication and 
updating of information through open, Internet-based technology. The 
best-known example of a wiki is Wikipedia, an online encyclopaedia that 
contains millions of entries compiled and maintained by innumerable 
contributors working independently. Other examples are: MySpace, 
Flickr, Second Life, YouTube, Linux etc. Tapscott (2006) describes how 
the business community has made use of wiki technology and how the new 
technologies created what he calls Wikinomics. Wikinomics is based on 
mass communication and contains tools that enable openness, 
connectivity, and sharing and facilitate acting globally. Applying logic 
similar to that described by Tapscott in Wikinomics, new defence concepts 
are now possible, such as the 1,000-ship Navy—a WikiForce. 
A WikiForce has not previously been discussed conceptually. In this text 
an introductory description is made of how WikiForces can organize 
professional forces and how these principles can support the construction 
of future security structures. As its starting point, the discussion brings 
insights from wiki society, from the perspective of military development. 
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Introduction 
n the literature, there are comprehensive descriptions of how the 
Information Age’s various technical innovations have come to 
influence military security structures. This development is known 
in everyday language as Force Transformation, which can be 
summarized with the words digitalization and globalization (Friman 
and Higgins, 2007). The digitalization of society, for instance, in the 
military security sector has influenced preconditions in a number of 
areas. Nowadays, military operations have sensors that are able to 
collect high-quality data—almost in real time—that quickly can be 
processed to situation maps that are disseminated globally to a large 
number of users, almost regardless of where those who need 
information are. As a preparation for coming efforts with new 
technology, events can be modulated and simulated ahead of time. 
Technology can be produced as extremely small units and tailored 
solutions through so-called nanotechnology, thereby reducing costs for 
transports and possibility for discovery, while at the same time 
increasing life span and efficiency. There are technological advances 
underway in a number of areas that directly affect the military security 
area, which in turn creates new conditions for how military operations 
can be carried out and accelerates demands for new ways of working 
and organizational structures.  
At the same time as the information age’s technological advances 
are making an increasingly clear entry into society, there has been a 
change in the military challenges. Since 9/11 and the tsunami disaster, 
which can be described as shocks for security planning, increasingly 
high demands are today being made on military units to be able to 
contribute in situations that traditionally have been regarded as civilian 
rescue operations. Military units are today given an increasingly clearer 
role in crisis situations, and the need to be able to interact 
multinationally and with nontraditional players—for instance, other 
authorities, companies, and relevant organizations—increases. 
The military profession was previously seen as a resource to be 
deployed when society’s other resources was not adequate. At this 
time, however, defense is increasingly being given tasks in the 
forefront of the rescue services. The military is no longer the ”strategic 
reserve” of the rescue services’ leader but can be seen as an active 
component to be deployed at an early stage to solve situations that have 
I 
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arisen, which demands that the military profession also must include 
what were previously seen as civilian competencies.  
The transformation of the military has entailed that today’s defense 
forces have been given increasingly global tasks, in which, for 
example, Swedish units at short notice can be deployed far beyond 
Swedish territory in internationally assembled units. The Swedish 
defense has made the transition from a mobilizing defense to a mission-
oriented defense. The development in society and the defense mean that 
new security structures are being developed. The innovation force that 
has driven developments in the area of technology spills over to 
innovative organizational solutions. These new organizational 
structures take increased consideration of global security thinking for 
solving tasks that are conceivable for the future. 
The condition for military organizations to be able to function in the 
situation described here is heavily dependent on how the organization 
can be coordinated and can interact with other players. The capacity for 
cooperation should be considered one of the most decisive factors for 
success in future crises or wars (Bordetsky & Friman, 2006). Today 
this conclusion is shared by relatively many people, and there is 
currently a large amount of work underway for the development of a 
climate for cooperation within the field of the military profession. In 
the debate there is talk of the wiki society. The question raised in this 
text is, how the wiki society’s insights and challenges are conceptually 
thought to be designed for military operations with regard to 
profession, organization, and security.  
The Wiki Society 
For most people the Information Age has come to be associated 
with the Internet and with sending digital messages via e-mail, SMS, 
and MMS instead of handling paper with faxes and written letters. 
Within the business world, among other areas, so-called wikis are being 
discussed and introduced as an active component in everyday work. 
Wikis are technical solutions that enable cooperation by simplifying 
publication and updating of information via Internet-based technology. 
The best-known wiki application is Wikipedia, an online encyclopedia 
that contains millions of entries contributed and constantly refined and 
updated by innumerable users who need only minimal knowledge of 
how to use a computer. Wikipedia is an international knowledge bank 
that is continuously growing and evolving. Earlier encyclopedias, such 
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as the National Encyclopaedia and Encyclopaedia Britannica, took 
decades to produce and offered limited opportunities to be 
supplemented, updated, or corrected after publication via 
supplementary sheets and volumes. Those paper encyclopedias could 
be searched only by persons with physical access to them. Wikipedia 
can be searched by anyone with access to a computer—including 
handheld devices—and an Internet connection. 
Examples of technologies that facilitate universal information 
sharing and social networking—collectively called social media—
include Twitter for brief text communications among subscribers, 
MySpace and Facebook for personal publication of an individual’s own 
data; Flickr for sharing of images and video; Second Life for 
interaction via avatars in a virtual world; YouTube for publication of 
video clips; and Linux, an openly developed operating system for 
personal computers. These technologies have in common that they are 
developed in cooperatively by users of the services.1 
What distinguishes the wiki society from the previous information 
society is the level of collaboration enabled by new forms of 
connections. Early on in the information society, the focus was on how 
to make information available for as many users as possible; in today’s 
wiki society, it is more about how to be able to cooperate with as many 
people as possible, thereby increasing productivity and effectiveness. It 
should be apparent that this altered focus on availability of information 
has professional and organizational consequences. Whereas earlier 
organizations focused on producing and spreading messages through 
information by emphasizing “credible” places/sites, today the focus is 
on a credible collaboration partner with clear relations to other credible 
partners. Confidence is the key to common projects such as wikis.  
An author with a particular interest in the development and 
implications of the information society is Don Tapscott, who described 
in 1993, together with Art Caston, a paradigm shift in business based 
on the development of information technology. They argued that 
information technology would significantly change the business life of 
the future in a more open and client-oriented way.2 In 1998, Tapscott 
published Growing Up Digital: Rise of the Net Generation, which was 
                                                     
1 For a more extensive description of social media see Drapeau & Wells 
(2009) and Crebolder et al. (2009). 
2 Don Tapscott and Art Caston, Paradigm Shift (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1993). 
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about the profession of the coming “net generation.” The book 
discusses how new kinds of organizations through so-called 
communities and workspaces, affect the way people meet and exchange 
information, and where issues of loyalty and belonging are 
highlighted,3 together with nationalism. These are many of the thoughts 
and ideas that can be seen today within the development of tools for 
collaboration, for which wikis have been used as illustrative examples 
in this text. 
Two years later, Tapscott, together with David Ticoll and Alex 
Lowy, published texts about digital capital that were about how to do 
business on the Web.4 In the book, the first steps were taken toward his 
book Wikinomics. The arguments behind digital economics are still 
colored by the economic models that prevailed in the industrial society 
and early information society. It was not until Wikinomics that the step 
with wikis was fully taken. Wikinomics is based on mass 
communication with tools that facilitate openness, connectivity, and 
sharing and that enable global action.5  
By following Tapscott’s work over the last 15 years, an image of the 
development of the information society is created in which previous 
logic, structures, and regulations are strongly questioned. It is no longer 
reasonable to believe that the new information technology only could 
lead to automatization of previously known processes. Completely new 
kinds of attitudes and behavior have been created, which in turn leads 
to new kinds of operations. A similar development is underway today 
in the military area. Previously tightly bound national defense 
structures are now being dismantled and reshaped as parts of 
international security structures that can be used far from the national 
territory. It is, in this context, exciting to study Admiral Mike Mullen’s 
launch of the concept of a 1,000-ship navy. Could it be that the U.S. 
Navy has adopted the logic of the wiki society, and that the time is now 
ripe to create what could be called a WikiForce?  
                                                     
3 Don Tapscott, Growing Up Digital: Rise of the Net Generation (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1998). 
4 Don Tapscott et al., Digital Capital: Harnessing the Power of Business 
Webs (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School, 2000). 
5 Don Tapscott and Anthony D. Williams, Wikinomics: How Mass 
Collaboration Changes Everything (New York: Portfolio, 2007). 
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The Wiki Force 
Cass Sunstein (2006) described a conceivable future American 
Department of Defense based on a wiki system in which manuals and 
regulations are written as wikis. Examples that are taken up are 
WikiLaws, in which critical legal issues are dealt with, and how higher 
civil servants are updated and inform each other about the development 
of events in various regions through shared and jointly built 
information surfaces.6 Sunstein’s forward thoughts are today a reality. 
On June 2, 2009, the U.S. Forces–Afghanistan command launched a 
Facebook page, Twitter feed, and YouTube page to communicate the 
Afghan mission to the world via cyberspace. Since beta testing began 
on May 12, 2009, the U.S. Forces–Afghanistan Facebook page has 
drawn more than 4,700 fans, and more than 1,400 people and 
organizations have signed up to follow its tweets on Twitter. There was 
no active marketing of either site during the beta testing period.7 The 
number of portals and blogs in the military domain is increasing 
rapidly, and common texts are being developed with the help of new 
technologies. The development has progressed so far that Dave 
Wennergren, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Information 
Management and Technology and Deputy Chief Information Officer, 
stated at the conference WEST’07 that no more portals are needed. The 
information supply through digital information surfaces is on such a 
massive scale that what is now in demand is surfaces that increase the 
value of available information.  
In 2005, Admiral Mike Mullen, then-U.S. chief of Navy Operation, 
proposed the Global Maritime Partnership concept, creation of a 1,000-
ship navy consisting of 313 American ships, plus approximately 700 
ships from other trusted partners. Not even a great power like the 
United States is today able to organize and equip a naval force that can 
manage every challenge of the future security situation. The world 
economy is today interconnected, and regional crises can rapidly lead 
to global consequences. The many environments and diversity of 
threats requires flexibility and presence in many areas, and the U.S. 
Navy has today made the transition from having land-based base areas 
to being largely sea-based. To manage the increasingly comprehensive 
commitments to global security, a dialogue is now being initiated with 
                                                     
6 Cass R. Sunstein, Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 
7 U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, press release 20090206-01, June 2, 2009. 
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“allied” partners to manage future challenges together. In this context, 
Sweden has been asked to participate in the development of the 1,000-
ship navy and has responded positively.  
The idea is to create the capacity for global maritime security 
through cooperation, in which national navies will function as global 
ambassadors.8 The United States has taken on the role of providing 
ships that are able to operate on the open sea, and the remaining nations 
will contribute with ships that are more specifically adapted for the 
geographical area in which Global Maritime Partnership will operate. 
An example of this is drug control and piracy operations in U.S. 
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM): “SOUTHCOM strives to halt the 
flow of illegal drugs into the United States by supporting the region’s 
multinational effort to combat narcoterrorism, threats to legitimate 
governments, and dangers that are the direct result of the production 
and sale of those drugs. SOUTHCOM missions to combat this threat 
are twofold. Counter Drug operations involve the detection, 
monitoring, tracking and interdiction of drug runners. Counter 
Narcoterrorism operations are those where U.S. military forces provide 
support to partner nations that are combating narcoterrorist groups 
within their borders,”9 
At first glance, the concept may be experienced as a new way of 
organizing international marine battle forces, but with more in-depth 
analysis, one discovers that the 1,000-ship navy may be the first 
example of a WikiForce, that is, an entirely new way of organizing for 
the future. The 1,000-ship navy goes beyond sharing information 
surfaces to actually sharing resources and tasks. 
The U.S. Office of Force Transformation had previously initiated a 
study of the development of future maritime battle forces, Task Force 
50.10 Task Force 50 was a maritime battle unit active during Operation 
Enduring Freedom, the commander of which developed a command 
system based on wiki technology.  
We wanted a better method for distributing information across the 
battle group. We didn’t want it to make the war fighter’s job harder. 
Rather, we wanted to prevent duplication of effort. We needed a 
dynamic warehouse of continuously updated information. Above all, 
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it had to filter and format information, eliminating the spam, adding 
value to the information, and ultimately improving speed of 
command. 
—Rear Admiral Thomas E. Zelibor 
The result was that the battle group changed its behavior, from 
having staff meetings for sharing of information to devoting more time 
to solutions of the operation. In the final report, one can read:11 
Evidence gathered in this study suggests that it takes not only 
sophisticated technology and money to facilitate transformation. It 
also requires the synergistic development of technology and funding, 
as well as the co-evolution of organization, people, process, trust, and 
of course, strong leadership and an environment that will allow 
transformational people to initiate and sustain innovation. 
The Wiki Organization 
On a number of occasions, arguments have been put forward that 
the use of the wiki concept changes attitudes and behavior, as well as 
the way activities are organized. Despite this, relatively few new 
organizational forms have been presented in the literature. The 
argument can be seen as traditional and is primarily about switching 
from centrally governed and regulated planning and control routines to 
decentralized and more self-organized organizational forms. Initiatives 
such as Wikipedia challenged traditional encyclopedias not only in 
their functionality but also in the way in which development happens 
and is governed. The power and control of the development is no 
longer in individual institutional organizations but has shifted to the 
users. This trend shift has been described by Alberts and Hayes as edge 
organization.12 
Edge organization is a structure that is predicted to be more agile 
than traditional structures. It is a structure in which allocation of 
decision mandates, increased interaction, and increased distribution of 
information create better conditions for functioning.13 In one of the 
                                                     
11 Office of Force Transformation, “Task Force 50 During Operation 
ENDURING FREEDOM,” U.S. Office of Force Transformation (2006), 22. 
12 David Alberts and Richard Hayes, Power to the Edge: Command 
Control in the Information Age (Washington, DC: CCRP Publication Series, 
2003). 
13 NATO RTO, SAS-050 study group, panel’s final report. Available at 
http://www.dodccrp.org/files/SAS-050%20Final%20Report.pdf. 
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s work panels14 work is underway 
in developing the future concept of command and control. Today the 
direction is to see command and control based on five stages of 
organizational development (contradictory, neutral, coordinated, 
interacting, and mutual) that are better at describing the future than 
today’s command and control models. Table 1 is a compilation of the 
factors that have been deemed to be of particular interest for describing 
the five stages of development. 
We know from earlier research that the organizational structure is 
affected by the set task, as well as the conditions under which the 
organization is expected to function. This means that if the work is 
conducted in stable and relatively predictable situations, organizational 
forms that can be expected to exist during the lower stages of 
development can handle the situation very well. However, if the 
circumstances become volatile and unpredictable, increasingly higher 
stages of development must be used. It is plausible that the relationship 
between different players in a particular field will change over time and 
that there are different stages of development for different players. 
Of particular interest is how transfers between the various stages of 
development occur, rather than identifying at what level the 
organization is. Even if the latter aspect may be considered important 
for creating an understanding of the actual working conditions, it is by 
being better able to understand the dynamics of the development from, 
for example, neutral to coordinated or coordinated to interacting that 
improvement is accomplished. With greater understanding, the 
commanders are given instruments and indicators of how the 
organization’s functionality should be developed to best complete set 
tasks. 
                                                     










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: Transitional Factors between Different Developmental Stages 
(Source: Part of data and underlying information from NATO RTO SAS-065 
working group) 
To manage the transition from an interacting to a mutual 
organization, new thoughts and ideas for command and control and 
structuring are required. Traditional organizational structures that are 
based on Barnard’s (1938) ideas about organizations—that when 
persons are prepared to contribute to the operations they can 
communicate with one another to achieve common objectives—can 
partly be questioned.1 At the mutual level, the operations occur based 
on organizational borders, and the question of how self-awareness is 
affected across system boundaries becomes of increasing interest. The 
question regarding which organization one belongs to becomes 
increasingly subordinate to the question of understanding intentions 
and creating opportunities to meet imminent challenges. By creating 
more innovative organizational forms, flexible structures adapted to the 
situation are developed that can be changed dynamically as the 
development of events is underway. At the same time, traditional and 
ingrained roles and patterns are challenged. Commanders, who 
previously had been given clear areas of responsibility and resources, 
are placed in a new situation, facing increased insecurity, where they 
                                                     
1 Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1938). 
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are no longer given clear mandates in the traditional meaning. Moral 
and ethical standpoints concerning right or wrong are more prevalent 
now, even at lower organizational levels. 
The reasoning is based on every organization having a number of 
relationships to different partners. In certain relationships, the 
organization can have contradictory relationships at the same time as 
the relationship to others can be interacting or mutual. With this as a 
starting point, the organization becomes a kind of positioning in 
relation to other units over time. For the higher forms of cooperation to 
function, there must be loyalty and trust. Without loyalty and trust, the 
conditions for wanting to cooperate and take risks will be lacking. 
The issues that can be seen in the different developmental levels can 
be described on a scale from function- to process-oriented. This means 
that in contradictory relationships, it is primarily functions that develop 
in isolation and in competition with one another. In neutral situations, 
dependence in function and process are established, whereas in the 
coordinated stage, the focus is more on processes to create functions. 
At the interacting level, it is primarily processes that are jointly handled 
to mutually provide opportunities for testing entirely new forms, 
described in this text as innovative organizational forms. 
 
















Table 3: Developmental Stages 
Innovative organization forms have a stable and conscious sharing 
of intentions under increasing self-awareness across system boundaries. 
There are striking similarities with the previously described WikiForce. 
Both the same logic and course of action for achieving results can be 
found in the mutual level, as in WikiForce. Under these conditions, the 
demands on the military profession will also change.  
Wiki’s Demands on the Profession 
With the change described here as a starting point, the question can 
now be raised as to how the profession—military commanders—will be 
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affected if a WikiForce becomes reality. It is too early to be able to give 
a clear-cut answer today, but a number of interesting observations can 
be noted. 
The military profession has traditionally been likened to an 
administrative profession. Military commanders are expected to 
command and control operations. The ability to develop plans, optimize 
resource allocation, and perform ongoing follow up has been rewarded. 
The operations are then assumed to function within a given framework 
and own responsibility known as task tactics. In reality, only limited 
freedom to act is given because the framework completely governs the 
operations. Based on the principles of a WikiForce, the profession will 
be more about creating conditions for solutions in which several 
interacting parties are involved. A future military commander’s 
potential to succeed lies in their ability to influence the interest of these 
interacting partners to achieve desired results, rather than in perfecting 
plans. In contrast to the administrative schools of leadership, I believe 
that the development of the profession is moving from governance and 
control to interaction design and an understanding of the possibilities of 
exerting influence. Commanders will search for real options in their 
problem space and will be judged on their ability to recognize 
opportunities.  
Future military commanders have traits that are in many ways 
similar to the way entrepreneurs are described in the literature. Based 
on Burch’s (1986) description of entrepreneurs,2 table 4 provides a 
hypothetical list of characteristics of military commanders in 
innovative organizations. 
The development of the military profession is influenced by 
previously well-designed and well-trained units to specific tasks that 
are deployed in relatively known environments. Today network units 
are being developed that are constantly in a design stage without clear 
tasks. The challenge for these units is to create routines and structures 
while at the same time trying to avoid blockings that make the unit less 
flexible. It is the task of the military profession to balance the unit’s 
rationality through coordinated efforts, while at the same time retaining 
flexibility. 
                                                     
2 John G. Burch, “Profiling the Entrepreneur,” Business Horizons, 
1986;September–October:13–17. 
 116  •  Friman 
 
Conclusion 
WikiForce is a concept of great importance in which small countries 
such as Sweden, together with larger players, can create security 
structures that would otherwise not be possible. For instance, within the 
Swedish–Norwegian cooperation that is now underway, there are far-
reaching plans for mutually shared functions. The cooperation between 
national armed forces is becoming increasingly tangible and real. Many 
say that this is a sign of globalization, but without value being added in 
the process, no investments will happen. There is today a tangible value 
added by cooperating across national borders. 
We must not underestimate the technical challenges in creating a 
WikiForce. One of the main challenges is the security of our systems. It 
is not satisfactory, as in today's wiki system, to build a national security 
solution on the principle that it is self-correcting. Without more 
research on creating secure systems we cannot trust to a WikiForce to 
function. Wiki systems are now part of our daily operations, and we 
must now work to take advantage of them when we build national 
security. 
The WikiForce concept creates greater dependence on other parties. 
By going down this path, Sweden creates dependence on allied partners 
and forfeits the ability to remain neutral. Sweden has a long tradition of 
a “total defense” concept, meaning that the country had all resources 
needed for defending the nation, even if it had little of these resources. 
The transformation will shift the focus from total defense to selective 
capabilities that could be included in a collaborative force. If these 
capabilities are of no interest to other parties, will Sweden be welcome 
in a collaborative force? 
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Desire to achieve A pressure to overcome problems, and 
create conditions for successful initiatives 
Hardworking Works far beyond regular work hours to 
manage to keep all relations ”alive” 
Desire to work in 
proximity of others3 
Works well together with other individuals 
to generate desired knowledge and results 
together 
This trait requires a good ability to negotiate 
and look for so-called win–win situations to 
be able to establish mutual trust 
Nurtures quality The will to take responsibility and monitor 
initiatives until they are self-regulating 
Accepts 
responsibility 
Is morally, legally, and mentally responsible 
for initiatives; there is a focus on own 
benefits 
Reward-oriented Aims at succeeding, works hard, and takes 
responsibility, while at the same time 
desiring appreciation and compensation for 
their efforts. 
This can be values other than money, such 
as appreciation and respect 
Optimism Lives according to the philosophy that this 




Frequently aims at creating exceptional 
results that they can be proud of 
Table 4: Hypothetical Traits of Future Military Commanders 
                                                     
3 This trait contrasts with Burch’s view, whereby Burch spoke of the 
entrepreneur as a person who preferably works alone, which is not compatible 
with increased mutual interaction.  
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Linking Complexity, Cognitive 
Processes, Adaptability, and 
Innovation 
By Sandra Martínez 
Abstract 
A paradigm shift in our understanding and practice of leadership is 
required to meet 21st-century national security challenges. The author 
argues that emergent principles and processes observed in complex 
natural and social systems offer valuable insight, a framework for inquiry, 
and a blueprint for change. The author explores the phenomenon and 
mechanisms by which emergence of novel structures and processes arise 
in systems operating at the “edge of chaos” and discusses the 
opportunities and constraints of self-organization, linking social science 
literature to literature on command and control generated by the 
Department of Defense. Then the author presents a conceptual framework 
for leadership development and “systemic interventions” to support 
transformation. The Leadership Development Framework is compatible 
with a view of leadership that is emergent, collaborative as well as 
competitive, and complex, and captures the dynamic outcomes of 
interdependencies among many agents. A description of the pilot action 
research project conducted in 2008 at the U.S. Army War College on 
complexity leadership and development, supported by the Transformation 
Chairs, follows. The author concludes with recommendations for the 
education and development of national security professionals based on the 
results of the study and emergent principles. 
Introduction 
dvances in information and communications technology enable 
continual interaction among individuals, teams, networked 
groups, organizations, and societies. In this way, technology 
has accelerated the process of globalization, the process whereby ideas, 
labor, capital, and goods cross national borders with few barriers. This 
A 
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dynamic exchange has qualitatively changed the environment by 
making it more complex. Globalization has created interdependencies 
among and between nation-states, markets, non-state actors, and other 
constituent parts of our social, biological, and physical ecosystems. 
Contrary to initial predictions, the process of globalization has not 
brought about a convergence of culture but, rather, reflexivity about 
one’s own culture and identity in relation to others (Guillén, 2001). 
Information technology has rendered knowledge accessible along the 
critical dimensions of time and cost, with both positive and negative 
outcomes. The churn of ideas and practices made possible by this 
interconnectedness presents great opportunities for innovation and 
creation of wealth. However, it has also introduced the challenge to 
national security of asymmetric conflict with unofficial actors or rogue 
states that leverage the power of a networked organization using these 
technologies. It has also wrought the reality of 24/7 media and 
communication, which has increased the strategic significance of 
information warfare. In summary, the dynamic complexity of the 
environment, intensified by the advances in information and 
communication technology and other new technologies, has changed 
the “metabolic rate” of knowledge processing and creation and the 
rules of the game, and thus the dynamics of power. 
It is clear from the 2008–2009 financial crisis that we have not fully 
considered the effects of these interrelationships, nor do we understand 
the rules governing these interdependent complex systems in which 
natural and human systems collide. Yet, the challenges of natural 
security in such an environment require us to strive to understand the 
logic, underlying structures, patterns, and mechanisms of the 
interrelated systems within which we live and to which we contribute 
so we can use this knowledge to act effectively.  
This essay argues that a new way of understanding the world, a shift 
in paradigm, is required to successfully negotiate constructive action in 
this environment. This shift involves drawing from the advances in our 
understanding of dynamic complex systems—knowledge originally 
developed in the natural sciences of physics, chemistry, and biology 
that for the last 15 years has influenced the social sciences. Drawing 
from the body of knowledge based on emergent principles or 
complexity science to understand social systems in the context of 
national security issues, in particular, has a history and numerous 
precedents. After World War II, the mathematician John van Neumann 
explored self-replication in machines in his work with cellular 
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automata—abstract robots represented as cells on the computer screen 
operating under a set of rules. This research was partly motivated by 
the problem of the reliability of U.S. Air Force missiles (Goldstine, 
1972). Vice Admiral Cebrowski and John Garstka (1998), in their 
development of the concepts of network-centric warfare, also drew 
from this scientific foundation. The U.S. Department of Defense 
Capstone Concepts for Joint Operations of 2005 described the 
organization of the Department of Defense, its adversaries, and the 
environment as complex adaptive systems. In addition, the United 
States Army Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design (2008) 
incorporates the concepts of complex adaptive systems; discusses 
nonlinearity; recommends approaching problems in a more holistic and 
less reductive manner; emphasizes the importance of reflection, 
learning, and adaptation; and quotes John Holland (1995), who was one 
of the key theorists in the development of emergent phenomenon, to 
describe distributed, noncentralized “direction.” However, a 
paradigmatic shift, as we know from the work of Kuhn (1962), involves 
a fundamental change in the set of assumptions that undergirds a causal 
explanation of the world. This transformation in thinking and practice 
has not occurred within U.S. national security institutions. A better 
understanding of the mechanisms supporting emergence and self-
organization and the role of leaders in shaping and influencing 
direction and outcomes within organizations and interorganizational 
initiatives is necessary.  
Paradoxically, although the great power of computers allows us to 
explore and gain insight into the self-organizing process of physical, 
biological, and social systems, which are often accessible on our own 
computer screens, we concurrently are confronted with the limits of our 
knowledge. We realize that we can never know and understand 
complex systems completely and that these systems are creative and 
ever-changing, and do not easily yield to prediction or control. The 
emergence of order spontaneously from the interaction of agents 
loosens the deterministic, linear connection between a particular action 
or cause and the ensuing outcome challenging our conventional 
rationalist paradigm. Richardson (2008) emphasizes the 
incompressibility of our knowledge of systems—that we cannot 
represent a system accurately in anything less than a representation of 
the whole system because whatever we omit may have nonlinear, and 
thus unpredictable and disproportionately large, effects. Nonetheless, 
we can move forward with the knowledge that we possess to enlighten 
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particular aspects of a system. Ironically, as the scale of our exploration 
in time and space enlarges, we begin to recognize the limits of our 
understanding. Some humility and even reverence in the face of this 
creativity, recognizing our place in the universe, may be an important 
aspect of this paradigmatic shift (Kaufmann, 1995).  
Although there are many critical processes of national security, 
including strategic planning, that would benefit from a deeper 
understanding of emergent principles, it is perhaps in the domain of 
command and control principles, processes, and practice where its 
effect is most overarching, for several reasons. First, the principles of 
centralized command and control, although they have been slowly 
changing for centuries, are core values of the military—often 
unexamined principles emphasized in military training and education 
(Alberts, 2007) and reinforced by professional norms and promotional 
systems. Second, leadership principles and practice cross domains, 
influencing all other activities and domains within the national security 
community. Finally, command and control practices directly affect the 
culture and structure of our organizations through which and across 
which our projects and initiatives are realized.  
It is the unanticipated emergence of “new higher-level systemic 
patterns or structures functioning according to new laws and consisting 
of new properties” that characterize complex systems (Jay, 2004) that is 
so exciting because of what it offers in terms of contributing to our 
understanding about how novel social structures and processes—
indeed, transformation and innovation in social systems—occur. As 
innovation is fundamentally about generating the novel, research about 
emergent processes will offer insight into innovation (Goldstein, 2005). 
Some theorists believe that the bifurcations of self-organization are the 
primary sources of creativity, diversification, and innovation in systems 
(Nicolis & Prigogine, 1989).  
Even though there is some overlapping between chaos theory and 
complexity theory, in the study of social systems we are primarily 
using complexity theory, as it accounts for the capacity of systems to 
carry information about themselves and their environment and act 
based on that information, to replicate their ideas at remote sites, and to 
engage in deliberate adaptive behavior (as well as unconscious 
adaptation) based on past experiences and anticipated outcomes 
(Marion, 1999). Although bordering on chaos, complex systems are 
more stable than chaotic systems. However, complex systems are 
nonlinear and unpredictable for several reasons. First, they are sensitive 
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to initial conditions—conditions that can reverberate and amplify 
through an interactive system to lead to outcomes grossly out of 
proportion to the initial size and intensity of the cause. Second, several 
phenomena present themselves as a result of the interaction of agents 
within the system. Interaction among agents can release potential 
energy to affect behavior and outcomes in unpredictable ways, first 
observed by Poincaré and referred to as “resonance.” Another 
phenomenon, correlation, results when two particles collide and their 
behavior begins to act in synchrony (Marion, 1999; Prigogine, 1996). 
This essay argues that these social mechanisms help explain what is 
described in network-centric warfare as self-synchronization, and that it 
is correlation that offers constructive constraints to the process of self-
organization. These properties of complex systems preclude a reductive 
approach to systems that assumes that with knowledge of most or 
almost all of the facts governing the constituent parts of a whole, one 
can control and predict outcomes of the whole system. Complexity 
argues for a more holistic understanding of systems.  
Emergent Leadership 
The common conceptualization of leadership is that in which the 
authority to lead is primarily vested in an individual whom we assume 
has the ability to predict, plan, and control outcomes. The desirable 
attributes of the leader associated with this model are based on 
assumptions of a linear relationship between organizational design, 
strategy, human behavior, and the desirable outcome of organizational 
effectiveness; however, these expectations do not capture the reality, 
nor are they compatible with the nonlinear world in which we live. This 
conventional perspective views the major functions of a leader to be 
designing the organization to “fit” the environment, planning the 
strategy, and hiring the “right” people to effect specific performance 
outcomes. The perspective about what is effective leadership arising 
from this viewpoint does not consider the possible effects of interaction 
and mutual influence among many agents within the organization and 
throughout the larger system of systems in which the organization 
operates, frustrating expectations of simple cause–effect relationships. 
In effect, within the conventional perspective on which most research is 
based, leaders are viewed as either heroes, in the case of organizational 
effectiveness, or scapegoats when the outcome is failure, without 
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consideration of the nonlinear and emergent properties of the situation. 
(Plowman & Duchon, 2007) 
From this new perspective, leadership is viewed as a process and an 
emergent event arising from dynamic interaction among agents over 
time (Lichtenstein et al., 2006). One leader may emerge at a particular 
moment to advance common interests and goals and then recede to let 
another individual or group lead at another point “leadership in 
complex systems takes place during interactions among agents when 
those interactions lead to changes in the way agents expect to relate to 
one another in the future” (Hazy et al., 2007, 7), whether the changes 
are the result of changing perceptions about objectives or strategy or 
norms relating to behaviors.  
Complexity Science 
Although delving deeply into the mechanisms supporting the 
process of emergence is not within the scope of this essay, some 
explanation of “singularities” will offer a foundation by which to 
advance our dialogue. Singularities are the critical points, transition 
points, or phase transitions, when a disordered state reaches a threshold 
and undergoes a transformation process of self-organization when 
previously disconnected elements or agents begin to interact in concert 
in an ordered pattern. These singularities mark the emergence of order 
out of chaos.  
As the self-organization process may be modeled mathematically, it 
is possible to configure a visual representation of its behavior—a phase 
portrait. The trajectory of behavior of the system in time may be traced 
by a point representing the state of the system along critical dimensions 
corresponding to the degrees of freedom as it moves in time through 
phase space. The mathematical powers of computation offer us the 
opportunity to learn more about systems,—how they change, and how 
new structures are formed by exploring attractors and bifurcations in 
the phase portrait.  
In the process of self-organization, singularities or critical points are 
embodied in “attractors” and “bifurcations” in the phase portrait. 
Attractors act like gravitational pulls to attract systems to their orbit. 
Leadership in complex dynamic systems is most analogous to a strange 
attractor. The trajectories of strange attractors, although stable, never 
repeat themselves and have the capacity to change, diminish in size, or 
involve a narrower or broader range of beliefs and behaviors in the 
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social system. Qualities of strange attractors represent long-term 
behavioral tendencies of a system and are products of nonlinearity and 
interactivity. Within the leadership realm, they can represent a 
prevailing ensemble of interconnected values beliefs, ideas, norms, 
symbols, attitudes, and action tendencies that support a particular 
leadership prototype (Marion, 1999). Panzar et al. (2007) argue that the 
challenge of organizations is to simultaneously engage the potential of 
three types of dynamical leadership attractors—formal leadership, 
emergent leadership, and shared leadership—to effectively meet the 
challenges of complex environments.  
In his description of the “far-from-equilibrium” phenomenon, by 
which systems adopt novel processes and structures, Prigogine (1996) 
discusses the role of bifurcations in thermodynamic systems. A system 
is stable until it reaches a critical threshold on a path or trajectory 
between near-equilibrium and far-from-equilibrium called the point of 
bifurcation, when a critical parameter crosses a threshold. At this point, 
the system crosses the boundary to a landscape of different attractors 
available to the system. It is an unstable system until it “chooses” to 
fluctuate to one of the alternative attractors to regain its stability. 
Bifurcations are the point in the trajectory when one kind of attractor is 
transformed into another. What is so captivating about this discovery is 
that in moving to a different trajectory from instability, the system self-
organizes to realize some degree of learning, innovation, and even 
transformation. This appears to be a mechanism for innovation, radical 
change, and structural change. Through this process, new levels of 
order spontaneously emerge in nonequilibirum systems, resulting in 
greater system capacity to adapt to outside conditions (Marion, 1999; 
Prigogine, 1996).  
Although those holding conventional views of social systems view 
this instability and these fluctuations as undesirable, effective leaders 
understand that these “far-from-equilibrium” states might seek to 
generate learning and new order for the system within this emergent 
process. Moving from a paradigm of leaders who predict and control 
for specific outcomes to those who appreciate the generative potential 
of instability, the question becomes, how does leadership support the 
potential for learning and the realization of transformation, adaptability, 
and resilience in an organization or institution? 
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Command and Control Literature of the U.S. 
Department of Defense 
Linking the broader social science literature with U.S. Department 
of Defense (DOD) literature is important for several reasons. First, to 
draw effectively from knowledge created in academic networks we 
need to integrate the contributions of both communities. The Minerva 
Initiative, introduced by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in 
2008, highlights the need for deeper and broader conversations between 
the DOD community of researchers and analysts and academia to 
mutually benefit both communities. The military has a great legacy of 
action research, which can be exploited in the most positive sense to 
more effectively translate advances in understanding so they may be of 
use to practitioners. 
Alberts & Hayes (2003, 2006) draw from the “edge of chaos” metaphor 
in their research on edge organizations. In their analysis of the practice 
and principles of command and control (C2), Alberts & Hayes (2006, 
2007) identify three essential factors of C2 in the structures and 
processes of a given enterprise: the degree of constraint in patterns of 
interaction, the degree of control in the allocation of decision rights, 
and the degree to which information is distributed (see figure 1). 
Alberts & Hayes (2006) argue that, although a traditional C2 might be 
appropriate for a limited set of conditions, different approaches to 
leadership ranging from traditional C2 to highly distributed forms of 
leadership are required to function effectively in the networked 
environment of the 21st century. This model is a useful tool for 
practitioners, theorists, and analysts in examining their assumptions 
about authority and control and in moving toward different models of 
effective leadership. Alberts and his coauthors apply the term edge 
organizations to those organizations that leverage turbulence by 
exercising few constraints on patterns of interaction among agents, 
broadly allocating decision rights, and allowing information to be 
widely distributed to accelerate rates of learning to maintain 
competitive advantage. 
Alberts, Garstka, and Stein (1999) developed the key tenets of network-
centric warfare based on a new mindset about warfare, in which combat 
power and strategic advantage are achieved by leveraging the 
advantages of geographically dispersed, network-centric operations to 
achieve commanders’ intent. The authors articulated a process whereby 
sharing of information among agents effects a high level of shared 
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Figure 1: C2 Approach Space (Source: Alberts, 2007) 
situational awareness and understanding “that can be exploited via self-
synchronization.” Several case studies offered some evidence to 
support the theory (Gonzales et al., 2005; U.S. Department of Defense, 
2006).  
The author asserts that self-synchronization can often be more 
usefully understood as an emergent process of self-organization, 
whereby the phenomena described earlier—correlation and 
resonance—help explain the mechanisms by which self-
synchronization occurs. Correlation can be seen to represent constraint 
on the system, as it binds self-organizing within behavioral limits 
structured by, for example, “implicit command intent,” as behaviors 
that adopt a certain level of synchrony and act with some degree of 
harmony. Resonance describes how potential energy is released when 
individual agents interact, and could be viewed as the more expansive 
force that is constrained by the correlation mechanism.  
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Linking the Cognition of Emergent Leadership to 
Innovation 
Recent advances in social sciences underscore the role of cognition 
in decision-making, and, by extension, innovation. Boisot and his 
colleagues (Boisot, 1998, 2007; Boisot & MacMillan, 2007; Boisot et 
al., 2007) have contributed substantively to our understanding of 
knowledge processes within and between systems. Rejecting the 
embedded notion, which is especially trenchant in the world of 
information and communications technology, that information has a 
reality totally separate from the social and cognitive processes that give 
it life, Boisot (2007, 7) fully examines how “[I]nformation only 
becomes knowledge if it gets internalized and becomes part of the 
recipient’s expectation structure—that is, if it affects the recipient’s 
belief structure, taken as a disposition to act.” In the elaboration of his 
three-dimensional Information-Space, or I-Space, Boisot highlights the 
nuances of organizational and institutional behavioral patterns that 
support information processing and knowledge creation by tracing the 
dynamic behavior of data flows. The three dimensions of Boisot’s I-
Space capture the forming and structuring of phenomenon, and then the 
dispersion of information, that characterize agent behavior. The three 
dimensions are the degree of codification by assignment of perceptual 
and conceptual categories, the degree of abstraction (structuring the 
form by reducing number of attributes), and the degree of dispersion of 
information (Boisot, 1998).  
What patterns of collaboration characterize an effective project 
team, an organization, or even a society? How does the team or 
organization support or experiment with new ideas? What beliefs do 
they have about effective leadership? What is their learning curve; that 
is, what patterns are associated with both their distribution of 
information and knowledge and their behavioral patterns in terms of 
rethinking and restructuring ideas, beliefs, and behavior? Boisot and 
MacMillan (2007) emphasize the importance of the mindset of the 
leader, entrepreneur, and institution in supporting learning and 
innovation. Real innovation does not correspond with situations when 
all the facts supporting an action are known or even exist. As a 
consequence, to be innovative, there must exist a disposition toward 
risk to act under conditions of uncertainty, when the justification for 
acting is based on conjecture and belief, rather than facts, because they 
are unavailable. As a consequence, important capacities are the 
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recognition by the agent of the underlying relationship between the 
type of justification for action and the action itself; the level of 
awareness and flexibility to distinguish between uncertainty and risk, to 
deal with uncertainty constructively, and to choose among different 
levels of risk, dependent on the situation; and an understanding that an 
agent can influence and shape “plausible and possible” worlds to make 
them more “probable and actual” (Boisot & MacMillan, 2007). 
Innovation is integrally connected to effective knowledge management, 
which balances exploitation of existing capacities with the process of 
exploitation—the creation of new knowledge.  
Leadership Development Framework 
Given the high levels of uncertainty, complexity, and volatility 
existing in the world today, how should we conceptualize effective 
leadership? How does our understanding of emergent processes, 
nonlinearity, and the interdependency of systems affect what 
constitutes effective leadership? How can we develop and support 
leadership processes that undergird flexible, adaptable organizations 
with capacities for both competition and collaboration? In the 
introduction to this essay, the author proposed that a paradigm shift in 
our understanding of leadership is required—one that is responsive to 
the challenges of the 21st century and incorporates the knowledge of 
recent advances in science, especially complexity science. On the basis 
of material presented in this essay, it is possible to describe a 
conceptual framework to approach leadership and leadership 
development that is compatible with both the complexity of the 
networked and interdependent environment and the challenges it 
presents to national security.  
The leadership development framework (LDF) is grounded in 
constructive development theory—a conceptual approach firmly 
grounded in the knowledge that human beings naturally continue to 
develop through adulthood, progressing through distinct stages. This 
theoretical framework asserts other tenets, including that development 
is more than acquiring new information and consists of qualitative 
changes in the way we know or make sense of the world, that the 
demands placed on adults frequently surpass their developmental 
capacities, that development is stimulated through the continuing 
interaction between the individual and the environment, that individuals 
are active participants in their own growth, and that an individual’s 
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development, both the enhanced understanding and skills within one’s 
present stage of development and movement from one stage to the next 
stage, benefits from support for this emergence, extension, and 
elaboration as a way of knowing and the skills associated with each 
stage (Popp & Portnow, 2001, 49–52). 
The framework is cognitive and interpretive, in that it links action-
logic to action. The way we make sense of the world and how we 
interpret our experience influences our actions. We justify our actions, 
and we act in ways that we believe will bring about particular results or 
outcomes based on our map of causal relationships. The relationships 
between belief and action we espouse may not be the same ones that 
we, in reality, enact, or we might be unaware of them; nevertheless, the 
strength of the link between our cognition and action remains the same. 
 Several theorists have identified specific stages of development 
characterized by distinct ways of organizing information (cognitive 
frameworks)—the manner in which individuals construct their 
experience and knowledge to create meaning. The stages of individual 
development, called action-logics1 in the LDF and described in more 
detail below, correspond closely to the stages of development identified 
by other development psychologists, including Kegan (1994; Torbert, 
1991), Alexander (Alexander & Langer, 1990), Kohlberg (1984), 
Loevinger (Loevinger & Wessler, 1970), and Wilber (2000). The 
Leadership Development Profile (discussed below) emerged from 
Cook-Greuter’s theoretical and empirical work to enhance Loevinger’s 
work (Cook-Greuter, 1990, 1999; Torbert et al., 2004).2  
                                                     
1The meaning of the term action-logic is somewhat related to the more 
commonly used term mindset. However, this term, coined and defined by 
William Torbert and David Rooke in their development of the Leadership 
Development Framework and Profile, more specifically refers to schemas and 
strategies used by entities (individuals, teams, organizations, and societies) for 
reflecting on and representing their experience. The term action-logic 
emphasizes the relationship between this logic or organization of reality and 
the action of the entity. See the following references: W. Torbert, Action 
Inquiry: The Secret of Timely and Transforming Leadership (San Francisco, 
CA: Berrett-Koehler, 2004); David Rooke and William Torbert, “Seven 
Transformations of Leadership,” Harvard Business Review, 2005;April:67–76; 
and Martin’s chapter, “The Schema,” in Complexity: Metaphors, Models, and 
Reality (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994)  
2Examining the overall distribution of developmental action-logic scores 
from the results of several studies of professional adults in the United States 
 Emergent Leadership  •  131 
 
This essay proposes that the LDF is compatible with what has to 
this point been referred to as emergent leadership—a perspective that 
incorporates what we have learned about interaction, learning, change, 
and innovation in systems from complexity science. The larger 
framework of emergent leadership incorporates the generative and 
constructive power of action. Thus, a critical epistemological stance of 
this approach is that actors not only interpret the reality of their 
environment but also, in doing so, contribute to the construction of the 
reality around them. In other words, individuals do not act on a larger 
reality that exists separately from themselves but, rather, participate in 
the construction of the system or systems of which they are part 
through their beliefs, and attitudes and the expression of these ideas in 
their actions. This is not to be confused with the Newtonian position, 
which asserts that actors can control their environment in which an 
assumption of linearity prevails. Nor, in contrast, should this position 
be conflated with an extreme phenomenological position that posits that 
the world does not exist separately from our construction or 
representation of it. The emergent leadership framework, as does the 
LDF, takes a realist approach to constructivism.  
The LDF identifies and describes seven stages of leadership, 
characterized by an increasingly complex manner of understanding 
oneself, perceiving the world, interpreting experience, and interrelating 
with others and the environment: the Opportunist, the Diplomat, the 
Expert, the Achiever, the Individualist, the Strategist, and the 
Alchemist. Table 1 distills a large body of literature describing the 
qualities of each of the seven stages, from the Opportunist through the 
Alchemist. (More detailed description of each stage are available in 
Rooke & Torbert, 2005, and Torbert et al., 2004). Some dimensions 
along which individuals transform are the main focus of their 
awareness, their perspective on relationships, their sources of 
satisfaction, their relationship to power, and the valuable contributions 
they make to an organization. For example, an Achiever welcomes 
                                                                                                                    
using the Leadership Development Profile and others highlights the degree to 
which different developmental theories and the measures associated them are 
similar. Specifically, the results of different studies conducted in the United 
States using either the Leadership Development Profile or Kegan’s Subject-
Object Interview yielded distributions of developmental scores that were 
almost identical for both sets of studies: 58% of the subjects scored at Expert 
level or below, and 35% to 36% scored at Action-Logic Achiever, with 6% to 
7% scoring at later action-logics (Torbert, Action Inquiry).  
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feedback, is increasingly self-aware, and prefers to work in teams. The 
Achiever’s main focus is on achievement in the near future and 
planning and making a strategy for the future. A Strategist’s main focus 
is the interplay between visions, strategies, actions, and actual 
outcomes and is increasingly able to deal with complexity and paradox, 
as well as being willing to act “outside the box.” Each successive later 
stage reflects a more complex understanding of interdependencies of 
entities, whether individuals, teams, organizations, or 
interorganizational systems, as a basis for action, as well as high-level 
capacities for mutual feedback, sharing power, and temporal 
orientation. An important dynamic of this model is that with the 
development to each successive stage, the individual does not abandon 
the capacity to act from the orientation of earlier action-logics. An 
individual’s self-awareness of their tendencies to think and act in with a 
particular action-logic, as well as the relationship between the mindset 
and the action, enables the person to act from a chosen perspective 
purposefully and with full awareness. In other words, in developing to a 
later stage, the individual enhances a repertoire of beliefs, attitudes, and 
behaviors by which to respond to the environment. Relevant to our 
understanding of organizational transformation, Rooke and Torbert 
(1998) found a statistically significant relationship between the action-
logic of the Strategist and a chief executive officer’s ability to lead 
successful organization transformation.  
The leadership development profile (LDP) is the assessment 
instrument associated with the LDF, developed over the past 20 years 
through modifications of Jane Loevinger’s Washington University 
Sentence Completion Test through a collaboration of Susanne Cook-
Greuter, Dal Fisher, David Rooke, and Bill Torbert. The Washington 
University Sentence Completion Test is one of the most widely used 
and thoroughly validated instruments in pscyhometrics (Loevinger 
1985; Loevinger & Wessler, 1970; Torbert et al., 2004). The LDP 
consists of 36 sentence stems that are completed by those taking the 
assessment. The answers are coded, interpreted, and analyzed in a 
rigorous process (Torbert et al., 2004). The measure is designed to 
capture the level of leadership development of the individual by 
identifying the dominant action-logic of an individual; that is, how the 
individual interprets their environment and explains their actions. 
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Table 1: Action-Logics: Seven Transformations of Leadership (Source: drawn 
from the work of David Rooke and Bill Torbert) 
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This action-logic, or map by which the individual makes sense of 
the world, is scalable. In other words, the behavioral tendencies based 
on a causal map can characterize an individual, a team, an organization, 
an inter-organizational initiative, or a society. This does not mean that 
all individuals within a group or organization possess an identical map; 
however, there exists sufficient coherence and compatibility that a 
particular action-logic does, in fact, characterize how action is justified 
and the domination of one action-logic over others. However, 
alternative action-logics or leadership attractors may exist in the 
landscape of a system. In addition, for example, the recognition of a 
great discrepancy between the stated goals and actual outcome of an 
initiative or strategy of an organization or a nation can lead to a 
bifurcation, when the landscape of attractors changes dramatically. 
The foundational argument of this essay is that maintaining 
competitive advantage in a network-enabled and interdependent world 
calls for a new perspective—a paradigm shift in our thinking about 
leadership and leadership development 
Drawing from this framework, the author has identified leadership 
capabilities required within organizations operating in national security. 
These capabilities can be applied to individuals, as well as teams and 
organizations or networked communities.  
1. Sufficient cognitive agility to reconcile multiple and diverse 
mental frameworks (Kegan, 1994; Rooke & Torbert, 1998). 
2. Sufficient cognitive complexity to respond and adapt to diverse 
and changing environmental and internal stimuli. Applying 
Ashby’s law of requisite variety to social systems (Ashby, 
1956), individuals, teams, organizations, and societies must 
have enough variety in their cognitive frameworks to be able to 
adapt to a range of circumstances. A subset of this capability is 
to have a high degree of self-awareness, enabling the entity 
(whether an individual, a team, an organization, or a society) to 
be able to identify the assumptions being brought to bear 
relating to particular situations and to understand the limits of 
their application to act effectively (Alexander & Langer, 1990; 
Argyris & Schön, 1974; Scharmer, 2007).  
3. A worldview consistent with complexity; for example, 
embracing uncertainty and change as opportunity, learning 
from diverse points of view, and tolerating differences.  
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4. Enhanced capabilities for mutual feedback and power sharing 
(Argyris, 2004; Torbert et al., 2004).  
5. An ability to recognize emergent patterns in both social and 
physical systems (Plowman & Duchon, 2007; Scharmer, 2007)  
6. An ability to harness collective intelligence by working in an 
inclusive, collaborative way to grow communities of trust, 
including the ability to encourage conversations, enhance 
connections to share information, and support mutual sense-
making (Plowman & Duchon, 2007; Scharmer et al., 2004).  
7. An understanding of sense-making and learning processes and 
how they contribute to an organization’s capability for 
innovation, adaptation, and timely action (Boisot & 
MacMillan, 2007; Senge, 1990; Weick, 1995). 
8. Ability to maintain perspective from multiple temporal realities 
concurrently; that is, being actively aware of how the past is 
influencing the present and how current actions might affect 
the future (Jaques, 1982, 1989; Senge et al., 2005; Torbert et 
al., 2004).  
These capabilities and cognitive frameworks (action-logics) are 
compatible with an emergent perspective, representing movement 
toward a different paradigm or, if you will, toward an alternative 
leadership attractor, and they are captured in the administration of the 
LDP. There is a growing body of literature and consensus that supports 
their effectiveness in “leading” complex adaptive systems.  
LDF and LDP Compatibility With Emergent Processes 
The LDP is one of the few highly validated instruments that are 
compatible with the conceptual foundations of complexity theory. The 
framework and profile are consistent with viewing leadership as a 
dynamic emergent phenomenon in complex social systems, whereby 
“leadership can be enacted by any interaction in an organization” 
(Hazy et al., 2007, 2), rather than being lodged within one person or 
role.  
As leaders advance to later-stage action-logics, they acquire higher 
level capacities to learn, adapt, offer and accept feedback, and share 
power. The leader’s capacity for encouraging conversations and mutual 
sense-making required for network-enabled operations is emphasized. 
Acting from later-stage action-logics, individuals and organizations are 
not fearful or perplexed by complexity, change, or paradox—conditions 
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characteristic of “far-from-equilibrium” states—but, rather, recognize 
the generative capacity of these states and seek to use these challenges 
productively and positively as opportunities for learning and 
development for themselves, their organizations, and their societies.  
Emergent Leadership Action Research Project 
The author of this article designed and conducted a pilot project 
exploring leadership and leadership development that was integrated 
into the delivery of an elective in Defense Transformation for resident 
students at the U.S. Army War College during the academic year of 
2007–08 and was supported by the Transformation Chairs Network, 
formerly of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This study was 
designed as an action research study (Reason and Bradbury, 2001), in 
that the “human subjects” acted as full participants in the study to 
maximize both their learning and development and the validity of the 
findings using their contributions and insights.  
The research objectives were to increase understanding of the 
relationships between leadership and organizational development and 
transformation in the context of multinational, interagency, and joint 
military projects and missions; gain knowledge about how to structure 
projects and programs of leadership development to support and 
accelerate effectiveness and transformation at our institutions; and 
support leadership development of individual participants. 
The LDP was the instrument used to assess the leadership 
development of the participants in the study. The results of the 
assessment and the debriefing sessions with individual participants, as 
well as participant observations made by the author as principal 
investigator during the course of the 10-week course, were used as data 
sources.  
The demographics of the 14 participants are presented in table 2. In 
summary, it was a small, self-selected group that included both military 
and civilian U.S. Army personnel. Two of the participants were from 
foreign military services—one European and another Asian. Ten were 
colonels, and two were lieutenants. The two civilians had equivalently 
high ranks in the civilian core. Thirteen were students, and one 
participant was a faculty member. The elective was taken in the final 3 
months of a highly selective resident program for developing leaders at 
the strategic level in national security. A high degree of trust was 
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established among the students and between the students and the 
faculty. 
 
Gender: 10 male/4 female 
Military/civilian: 12 military/2 civilian 
Of 12 U.S. citizens, 3 were African-Americans 
Of services: All were Army 
U.S. citizens/foreign fellow: 12 U.S./2 Foreign Fellows 
Of foreign fellows, one was European and the other Asian 
Age: 40 to mid-50s 
Rank: 10 colonel/2 lieutenant colonel/2 civilians, who had had equivalently 
high ranks in civilian corps 
Education: All but one participant had a master’s degree 
Deployments: At least 6 with recent leadership experience in combat 
operations 
Table 2: Demographics of Participants in Leadership Study 
This study was an exploratory, inductive study, rather than a 
statistical one. The participants were not randomly chosen but were a 
small group of self-selected participants who, as evidenced by their 
choice of electives, were interested in transformation and leadership. 
By virtue of their presence in the highly selective group of resident 
students at the U.S. Army War College, they most likely demonstrated 
strong leadership in either field operations or enterprise management 
within the DOD or the foreign equivalent. 
Results of the Study 
The distribution of the action-logics is represented in table 3 and is 
compared with samples representing other populations reported in 
studies by Torbert and Harthill. In summary, 7% of the study sample 
scored at the Expert level, 50% scored at the Achiever level, 21.5% at 
the Individualist level, and 21.5% at the Strategist level. Note that the 
sample of students, managers, and supervisors represented in the far 
left column were assessed between 1980 and 1995 and were 
predominately from the United States. The sample of consultants and 
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managers were assessed between 1993 and 2006 and were 
predominately in the United Kingdom. In this simple comparison, we 
see that the shape of distribution of action-logics remains similar across 
all samples; however, as the complexity of experience reflected in the 
sample increases, the top of the bell curve moves to the right, toward 
later-stage action-logics. 
The framework was found to be viable for use in the context of 
national security professionals, in that the logic of the framework 
resonated with the participants in the context of their experience. They 
readily used it to explain the outcomes they had experienced in 
previous leadership experience and to design strategies about how to 
address organizational and leadership challenges in their future. The 
framework seemed to help participants understand their own behavior. 
In summary, the conceptual framework created a tangible path for 
development, including the consideration of strategies for their future 
leadership growth in the context of their next position. This qualitative 
finding is valuable because the LDP had not been previously been used 
within the population of national security workers. This pilot project 
demonstrated that the framework was viable from the point of view that 
it made sense to them and generated interest in their own development.3 
We cannot generalize from this very small sample to a larger 
population; however, on the basis of these results, one can extract a 
number of insights. Our institutions of national security are, for the 
most part, producing and rewarding Achievers. Even though Achievers 
play a very important role in organizations, we need to support the 
development of the action-logic of Strategists to accomplish the 
organizational transformation necessary in so many of our institutions. 
Although Achievers become involved in the crafting of plans and 
strategies for the future, they tend to focus on achieving shorter-term 
goals, sometimes forsaking longer-term strategic outcomes. Given the 
challenges of the 21st century for high levels of collaboration, 
innovation, learning, and adaptability, institutions need to encourage 
                                                     
3 In ensuing presentations to national security professionals who work in 
the field and among researchers and instructors who educate this population 
the framework was similarly received. For example, this was the reception at 
the 2008 Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop held at 
Carlisle, PA.  

























4.0%  0.0%  0.0%  
Diplomat 11.0%  1.0%  0.0%  
Expert 37.0%  14.0%  7.0%  
Achiever 30.0%  45.0%  50.0%  
Individualist 11.0%  25.0%  21.5% 
Strategist 5.0%  12.0%  21.5% 
Alchemist and 
ironist 
2.0%  3.0%  0.0%  
Total (rounded 
figures) 
100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  
Table 3: Distribution of Action-Logics (Source: Harthill, Inc. and Sandra M. 
Martinez) 
and offer support to Strategic Leadership—leadership that is “adept at 
creating shared vision across action-logics” (Rooke & Torbert, 2005, 
71) and can deal with the interrelationships of personal, organizational, 
national, and international developments. Research has shown that 
Achievers need to develop through an Individualist stage, in which they 
question the cultural prescriptions for behavior and the goals and 
strategies of the organization within which they function and as they 
seek to reconcile personal, professional, and organization needs. In the 
context of this framework, we need to support this development of 
motivated, high-potential leaders to move through a period that is 
inherently unconventional to reach a higher-level capacity for 
leadership.  
Larger and longitudinal research projects measuring the same 
dimensions are necessary to answer such questions as, is the U.S. 
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military leadership in a phase transition? What are some of the 
emerging characteristics of the merging military or national security 
leader? What are the factors influencing this transformation? What is 
the range of variability of leadership development among different 
military hierarchy, different services, or other constituent groups? 
Recommendations 
To meet the challenges of the 21st century, our institutions of 
national security need to effectively engage in multimodal ways of 
supporting leadership with enhanced capacities for collaboration, 
innovation, and in general, achieving productive outcomes for systemic 
interventions at many levels in complex environments.  
Our educational institutions play a vital role in meeting these 
challenges. I recommend curricula for national security professionals 
that fully integrate tangible and effective programs of leadership 
development within more traditional academic programs. Several DOD 
educational institutions are currently designing or implementing hybrid 
Master’s degree and certificate programs that include resident and 
distance-learning elements in which the institutions integrate this type 
of leadership development into the curriculum. On the basis of this 
pilot study and the principles presented in this essay, the 
recommendations are to use leadership development assessments 
designed to measure capabilities related to cognitive complexity and 
effectiveness in complex environments, offer feedback to students in a 
learning environment in relationships of trust and in the context of the 
challenges of their current and future positions, and accompany this 
process with opportunities for reflection to support increased awareness 
about how participants perceive and structure reality and how this 
influences their behavior and, ultimately, their effectiveness within 
their organization and larger network of individuals with whom they 
interact. 
For students to progress, they require opportunities to experiment 
with new ways of thinking and behaving in the context of their 
professional and organizational challenges. The academic elements of 
these programs should include carefully selected content about 
emergent principles that will contribute to the students’ understanding 
of how complex adaptive organizations function and will offer new 
meaningful insights about leadership as a process in general, as well as 
their own perceptions and behavioral tendencies related to leadership. 
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In addition, the content, assessments, and activities of the program 
should be linked to the students’ understanding of innovation, learning, 
and transformation in complex adaptive systems. Faculty need to 
subscribe to a framework that is compatible with the paradigm 
presented and commit to developing relationships of trust with the 
students and sharing power in the classroom to encourage learning.  
Conclusions 
Technological and organizational innovation are intrinsically 
intertwined processes involving exploration at many systemic levels 
including the individual, organizational, interorganizational, and 
societal. Sustaining innovation requires a mindset or action-logic that 
understands complex adaptive systems and that can leverage 
advantageously a balance between the exploitation of information and 
knowledge already possessed with the exploration for new knowledge 
to achieve desirable outcomes. To maintain competitive advantage, our 
institutional action-logic and practices need to reflect a high level of 
complexity about the interrelatedness of systems—more specifically, in 
this context, the integration of technological, social, cultural, and 
cognitive elements of the innovation process—drawing from the most 
advanced knowledge in the physical and social sciences.  
To maintain a competitive position and contribute to sustaining both 
national and international security, we must leverage the creative 
capacity of our systems, rather than suppress them by unwarranted 
attempts to control exchange of information and creation of knowledge. 
In contrast, individuals, teams, and the leadership culture of our 
institutions need to understand better what risk means in a highly 
interrelated and complex world. We cannot accomplish these objectives 
in an interdependent world without achieving a faster “rate of learning” 
than our adversaries, which involves leveraging the collective 
intelligence of all our resources. Ready or not, whether we like it or 
not, the “edge of chaos” is generally where we are operating or need to 
be functioning. Recently, there seems to be a reluctance to use the term 
“transformation” within the DOD; however, it seems clear that 
organizational and institutional transformation is exactly what is 
necessary to accomplish the paradigmatic shift in thinking and behavior 
that is required for sustained learning and competitive advantage and 
for securing the common good.  
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The individuals and organizational cultures that support thinking at 
the threshold of complexity we have described require high levels of 
self-awareness, tolerance for a broad diversity of thought and approach, 
capacities for sharing power, and a range of temporal orientations and 
mutual feedback. This essay has presented a framework for 
conceptualizing these capabilities and some methods and tools for 
realizing the transformation. 
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An Unwanted Necessity 
By Theodore C. Hailes and John Geis 
Abstract 
The Blue Horizons research project is a series of overlapping, 1-year 
studies examining the changing strategic landscape created by 
accelerating technological change. Focused 20 to 30 years into the 
future, its purpose is to recommend where today’s scarce resources 
can best be invested to ensure that the U.S. Air Force has the right 
capabilities to meet future challenges. This year’s study developed 
four alternative futures against which to weigh these future 
capabilities: a peer China, a resurgent Russia, a failed state, and a 
jihadist insurgency. Among the key consequences identified in this 
year’s study was that decision cycles are rapidly increasing in speed. 
The traditional observe-orient-decide-act loop is shrinking toward 
an observe-orient-decide-act point at which future battlefield 
decisions will have to be made at machine speeds. Although humans 
will still set the rules of engagement, they will be “on the loop”—
monitoring battle execution—rather than being “in the loop”—
making all the command decisions in real time. This essay examines 
the technologies and attendant threats that make keeping that man 
“in the loop” in many critical situations impossible. 
Introduction 
From man in the cockpit—to in the loop—to on the loop. 
he quality and timeliness of decisions has tested military leaders 
since the dawn of warfare. An old Japanese Samurai saying that 
“one should make his decision within the space of seven 
breaths”1 captures the importance of time within the decision-making 
                                                     
1 Yamamoto Tsunetomo, quoted by Tsuramoto Tashiro in Hagakure, 1716. 
Yamamoto Tsunetomo was a samurai who, late in life between 1709 and 1716, 
dictated his thoughts to an apprentice, Tashiro, who published the collections 
of the samurai teachings and traditions in Hagakure, which translates into 
English as “hidden leaves.” 
T 
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process. Certainly, however, as modern science has taught, time is 
relative.2 This is true in both basic physics and warfighting. Time has 
been, and remains, a critical component of decision-making. Yet as 
warfare progressed from tribal battles on the plains, where decisions 
took days or weeks, to nuclear missiles spanning continents in minutes, 
the necessity for timely decisions has increased.3 The quality and 
characteristics of this change are the focus of this essay. 
The component parts of any decision-making process have 
traditionally revolved around the skill of the leader and his knowledge 
of the terrain, the enemy, the objectives, and the quality of his own 
force.4 These criteria have arguably changed little over time. However, 
in retrospect, what seemed to create great stress and forced rapid 
decisions in the past seems to be in slow motion compared with the 
battlefield that will exist within the next decade as the trend line 
compresses even further the ability to react effectively.5 It is the thesis 
of this essay that the time available to make critical decisions is being 
so compressed that humans may no longer be able to participate, and 
life-and-death decisions will necessarily become machine-to-machine 
decisions, with the human involvement limited to an interested 
                                                     
2 For a simplified discussion of relativity, see Michael Fowler, “Special 
Relativity: What Time is It?” lecture, University of Virginia, 2008. Available 
at http://galileoandeinstein.physics.virginia.edu/lectures/srelwhat.html 
[Accessed April 10, 2009]. 
3 The Battle of Little Bighorn is illustrative of timescales of 19th-century 
battle. To engage the Native Americans, General Custer’s divisions broke 
camp at least several days, and in some cases weeks, before the infamous 
battle of June 25–26, 1876. See W. A. Graham, The Official Record of a Court 
of Inquiry Convened at Chicago, Illinois, on January 13, 1879 by the 
President of the United States upon the Request of Major Marcus A. Reno, 7th 
U.S. Cavalry, to Investigate his Conduct at the Battle of Little Bighorn, June 
25-26, 1876: Q.Q. 979 (Pacific Palisades, CA: Unknown, 1951). This book is 
a reproduction of the actual court transcripts of the hearings on the Battle of 
Little Bighorn. 
4 These characteristics are discussed at length in the Custer transcript, with 
hundreds of pages of testimony devoted to these very topics. Schwarzkopf 
talks of the same criteria in his discussion of the first Iraqi war. See Norman 
H. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero (Bantam Books: New York, 1993), 
343. 
5 John Geis II et al., Blue Horizons II: Future Technologies and 
Capabilities for the Air Force in 2030 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University 
Press, 2009). 
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observer. The decision-maker will no longer be able to be in the 
decision cycle but must build and monitor competent systems that will 
make the decisions for him. 
It is necessary, then, to understand the forces at work that alter the 
time available for decisions. Some factors are obvious. The speed of a 
weapon can rapidly diminish reaction time. The lethality of a weapon 
can alter the risk and consequences. Finally, the availability and 
reduced costs of such weapons can dramatically increase the number of 
people who have access to these systems.  
The speed of communication and our ability to command weapons 
has rapidly increased. For example, during the Civil War in the United 
States, it is estimated that the telegraph was able to move thirty words 
per minute, and this was considered quite revolutionary.6 By World 
War II, the radio had increased this speed to around sixty words per 
minute. In the Gulf War, the communications rate had jumped to 
192,000 words per minute, and today it is estimated to be equivalent to 
1.5 trillion words per minute—an amount roughly equal to the entire 
holdings of the Library of Congress.7 The ability to move so much 
information to so many people is having a profound effect not just on 
the military, but also on society at large.8 
Further, the accuracy of these weapons has become far better with a 
lethality progression that is no less startling. The U.S. Air Force has 
calculated that in World War II, it took 1,500 B-17 sorties to destroy 
one 60' × 100' target. That number was reduced in Vietnam to 176 F-4 
sorties to destroy that same target, and by Operation Desert Storm, it 
required just one sortie and one weapon.9 In the future, unmanned 
aircraft will have extended loiter time over the target and have single-
shot kill of targets no larger than a shoebox. Clearly the implications 
                                                     
6 “Telegraphy.” Encyclopedia Americana. Volume 26 (Albany, NY: J.B. 
Lyon and Company, 1920), 342. Most operators were capable of passing 25–
30 words per minute during the time of the Civil War. 
7 Martin Brown, “Rapid Knowledge Formation in an Information Rich 
Environment.” Paper presented at the 2004 Command and Control Research 
Technology Symposium, San Diego, CA, June 15–17, 2004. 
8 This speed issue is expected to get even worse as computer processing 
approaches and eventually passes that of the human mind. See Ray Kurzweil, 
The Singularity Is Near (New York: Penguin Books, 2005). 
9 A discussion of increasing lethality over this period is in Brigadier 
General David A. Deptula, Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of 
Warfare, (Arlington, VA: Airpower Education Foundation, 2001), 8.  
  
150  •  Hailes and Geis
 
for these advances are vast, and the United States will not have a 
monopoly on these systems. That the enemy will have similar 
capability obviously places great pressure on operational and tactical 
planning and can readily create actions faster than humans can generate 
responses. This becomes the crux of the problem.10  
When these three characteristics are combined, which is exactly 
what is occurring today, the threat substantially increases, and the time 
to react substantially decreases. Of particular interest then is to how to 
grapple with the underlying forces at work creating this challenging 
mix, illustrate how they affect the speed of decision-making, and then 
define the new role of the leader in the overall process. The leading 
element creating such changes is the exponential growth of technology 
and the increasing rate that new systems are being introduced to the 
battlefield. 
Although its essential nature and purpose may remain the same, 
war—what it is, how it is waged, its participants, and its effect on the 
state and the state system—is changing. In the first quarter of this 
century, the world is witnessing what amounts to a change in the 
physics of war. The relative importance of matter, energy, time, and 
information are all being transformed by emerging technologies. We 
are living in a messy interregnum period between a true Information 
Age and the rapidly passing Industrial Age. Cyber, which exists in a 
nanosecond world, is being slammed into an industrial-bound system, 
and it simply is not working.11 In just the last half century, decision 
transaction rates have moved from days in World War II, to 20 minutes 
in the Cold War (time of flight for intercontinental missiles), to a 
current 4-minute cycle based on missile defense, and soon, war at 
                                                     
10 This argument is based on the decreasing cost of technology, an 
exposition of which can be found in: General T. Michael Moseley, Blue 
Horizons 2007 “Horizons 21” Project Report, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air 
University Press 2008). 
11 The prediction that the Information Age would clash with the Industrial 
Age has been made by many authors. Alvin Toffler wrote a series of books 
that detail the likely implications of the transition to a new era: Alvin Toffler, 
The Third Wave: The Classic Study of Tomorrow (New York: Bantam Books, 
1980); Alvin Toffler, Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence at the 
Edge of the 21st Century (New York: Bantam Books, 1990); Alvin Toffler and 
Heidi Toffler, War and Anti War: Making Sense of Today’s Global Chaos 
(New York: Warner Books, 1993).  
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electronic speeds in the domain of cyberspace.12 Trying to insert people 
into this decision loop is becoming increasingly difficult, yet the 
expectation still exists that the human must stay in the loop. 
In a few aspects, a world already exists in which humans have been 
taken out of the decision loop; computers are now protected by 
antivirus and antispyware programs that act in milliseconds. Human 
intervention is impractical, as the speed of a virus or malware intrusion 
in a computer system is so fast that it is impossible for a human to 
sense the intrusion and react to stop it before the malicious software 
code is already loaded on the system. As a result, names like McAfee, 
Symantec, and Norton have become household words around the 
world, and the defense of most computer systems is now automatic. 
These same trends will spread rapidly throughout the military 
environment, moving—by necessity—more decision-making authority 
to machines.13 
In attempting to cope with exponential change, the risk of making 
poor decisions increases dramatically. This is an inevitable effect of 
linear thinking and will necessarily create surprise.14 Historically, 
surprise, in turn, has created the requirement to scrap existing concepts 
and programs, as well as decision-making processes, to meet the 
changing environment.15 Surprise is a natural outcome of rapid change. 
That the rate of technological change is increasing every year certainly 
suggests that surprise will be a major component of the environment for 
                                                     
12 The premise of the U.S. Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, to include the 
Airborne Laser System and the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Defense 
Programs, is to intercept these missiles in the boost phase. This phase lasts 1–3 
minutes for a Theater Ballistic Missile and 3–5 minutes for an Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missile. Dean A. Wilkening, “Airborne Boost Phase Ballistic Missile 
Defense,” Science and Global Security, 2004;12:1–67 
13 Kurzweil. The Singularity Is Near.  
14 Ibid., 4. Kurzweil acknowledges that this argument was made previously 
in another form by Douglas Hofstadter, who argued are brains are too weak to 
even understand themselves. See Douglas Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach: 
An Eternal Golden Braid (New York: Basic Books, 1979). Diagram is derived 
from Moseley, Blue Horizons 2007 “Horizons 21” Project Report. 
15 Lorber has analyzed several instances of this type of surprise in military 
operations. Either systems and/or doctrine must be scrapped or the side that 
adapts to the technological change loses in battle. For a detailed description of 
how and why this occurs, see Azriel Lorber, Misguided Weapons: 
Technological Failure and Surprise on the Battlefield. (Washington, DC: 
Potomac Books, 2002). 
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future leaders. The essential issue is that the human brain works in a 
linear fashion. This means that the more predictable the future is, the 
better the brain can deal with the issues presented. Because technology 
is on an exponential curve, the rate of change caused by new systems 
will be increasing, increasing the uncertainty of the future. The result is 
that, whereas in 1850 a 50-year planning horizon was not unreasonable, 
today a 5-year horizon is challenging. A point will be reached in the 
not-very-distant future at which the only surprise for a leader will be 
that he or she is not surprised (figure 1). 
Figure 1: Effect of Exponential Change on Linear Decision-making 
Modern military weaponry is becoming increasingly remote, 
robotic, cheap, small, and swift.16 Nanoscale particles, photons moving 
at the speed of light, molecular manipulation of the biosphere and life 
within it, the ability to create autonomous intelligent machines, and the 
replication of these machines in large numbers and at small cost all 
suggest major changes in war.17 It may no longer be about conquest 
                                                     
16 This is obvious in the domain of cyberspace, where the weapon of 
choice is a computer chip with less than 100 nanometers of transistor spacing. 
It has been true in other domains as well. In fact, Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates recently chided the Air Force leadership publically for not moving 
swiftly enough in this direction. U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript, 
“Secretary Gates Remarks at Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base, Montgomery, 
Alabama,” April 21, 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/ 
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4214 [Accessed April 13, 2009]. 
17 Author discussions with members of several Air Force and U.S. 
Government laboratories between August 2008 and April 2009. 
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involving large numbers of people engaged in precision, kinetic kill, 
but increasingly a continuing contest among machines that are 
nonlethal, nonkinetic, very precise, and/or volumetric (i.e., wide-area 
oriented) conducting attacks at great distance over long time periods, 
yet requiring decisions in milliseconds.18  
Everyone can play. The power of these emerging technologies is 
such that they can empower the weak and dispossessed to exert an 
inordinate effect. Some of the key forces driving technological change 
are societal demand, scientific discovery, corporate profits, ideological 
desires, and state and non-state envy and hatred of the “have” nations. 
These factors, not simply U.S. preferences, ensure progress for good 
and ill in warfighting technologies. These are available with increasing 
frequency and ease as reliance on commercial off-the-shelf technology 
grows.19  
All of these forces make recapitalization of people and expertise 
paramount. Accelerating technological change necessarily demands 
significant procedural and organizational change.20 The importance of 
educating and organizing the force to create an agile, adaptive, learning 
organization capable of contending with the array of adversaries and 
the pace of technological change that will challenge everything in the 
future cannot be overstated. Leadership is critical, and the skills 
demanded of that leader will require a fundamental understanding of 
rapid change and the willingness to alter processes that allow a more 
automated battlefield running at machine speed. The chief of staff of 
the U.S. Air Force has launched a multiyear research effort called Blue 
                                                     
18 Geis et al., Blue Horizons II. 
19 This process is enabled by decreasing costs of computer processing, 
ubiquitous access to geospatial location data, and the increasing number of 
weapons available via global arms merchants. For trends in computer 
processing and its associated costs, see Ray Kurzweil, The Age of Spiritual 
Machines: When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence. (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1999). Satellite pictures that once cost a nation millions of dollars to 
receive are now available for free on Google Earth or can be purchased for as 
little as £12. One can even get multispectral images from the European Space 
Agency; http://www.spotimage.fr [Accessed April 13, 2009].  
20 Lorber, Misguided Weapons. 
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Horizons to specifically tackle these issues from an air force 
perspective.21 
Blue Horizons: Where the Ideas Came From 
The concern about the role of technology is decision-making is not 
new; it has always been understood in the most general way. However, 
acknowledging influence and truly understanding effect are very 
different things. The Blue Horizons program provided an opportunity 
for extended research into the changes wrought through technology on 
the air force in 2030 and beyond. The ongoing process has illuminated 
many of the darker corners and provided, if not answers, a far clearer 
understanding of the challenges decision-makers will face in the years 
to come. Focusing on leadership and decision-making in general was 
never a specified task for research, yet it kept surfacing as a key 
component of the recommendations made, thus identifying the 
importance of this nontechnological issue. The journey taken to arrive 
at these conclusions over 3 years is worth covering, as it provides the 
basis for and validation of the conclusions to be presented.22 
The thesis for the first Blue Horizons Study was to evaluate the 
effect of exponential technological change and to extrapolate trends 
identifying capabilities that advance or constrain air power. Four 
critical areas of scientific research were selected to test the hypothesis 
for accelerating change: nanotechnology, biotechnology, directed 
energy, and cyber. A brief summary of the conclusions from this report 
follows.23 
• All boats rise on a rising technological tide. Maintaining 
superiority will become more difficult but is possible.  
• The key to achieving and maintaining lasting superiority that 
cannot easily be duplicated by adversaries lies in the 
integration of information, air, and space with the attendant 
investment in basic research. 
                                                     
21 Memorandum between General John D. W. Corley, U.S. Air Force Vice 
Chief of Staff, and Headquarters U.S. Air Force Research Management, dated 
May 17, 2006. 
22 Ibid. 
23 The conclusions follow from the final study report. See Moseley, 
General T. Michael, Blue Horizons 2007 “Horizons 21” Project Report. 
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• Information is no longer a staff function but an operational one. 
It is deadly as well as useful. 
• Superiority may derive as much from improved thinking about 
the employment of current capabilities and the rapid integration 
of existing technologies as from the development of 
technological breakthroughs.24 
• Courage and confidence in technology and our ability to deploy 
it quickly will enable many of the current missions performed 
today by manned aircraft to be performed in the future by 
uninhabited vehicles and space systems.25 
• The revolutionary information technologies of the future are so 
fast moving that they suggest the need for dramatic changes in 
planning, budgeting, and acquisition if we are to continue to 
compete successfully. 
• Increasingly, the U.S. Government will both voluntarily 
relinquish being the owner of militarily relevant technologies 
and become a user, licensee, and lessee of commercially 
developed systems with military applications. 
• A revolution in military education will be required if we are to 
achieve a revolution in military affairs. 
The results from the first Blue Horizons study established the nature 
of exponential technological change and provided illustrations of the 
game-changing aspects of future technology. It also introduced a 
nontechnological area that is of considerable interest: the changing 
nature of command relationships and the ability and manner for leaders 
to control the battlefield.  
Blue Horizons II had the task of building on the previous year’s 
study and “develop[ing] a prioritized list of concepts and their key 
enabling technologies that the U.S. Air Force will need to maintain the 
dominant air, space and cyber force in the future.”26 The study started 
with two key premises: first, that a short list of key technologies would 
enable a large percentage of future concepts/systems to be developed, 
and second, that preferred systems and underlying technologies would 
                                                     
24 The first excursion from technology to leadership issues. 
25 Dramatically altering the role of man in the decision loop 
26 Task received from Air Force Chief of Staff General T. Michael 
Moseley. Study purpose was confirmed by the authors in meetings with Air 
Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs Lieutenant General 
Raymond Johns.  
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vary with the type of warfare.27 The results from the study were 
supposed to allow the air force to focus its limited research and 
development dollars on the areas that would give the most value for the 
investment.28 As often happens, what the research generated was results 
and direction contrary with the extant expectations for the future. 
To understand the results, a brief description of the study format is 
necessary. The researchers were tasked to evaluate the effectiveness of 
fifty-eight future weapons systems in 2030 and to examine the 
underlying 172 technologies necessary to bring those systems to 
fruition. To accomplish that goal, four teams developed alternate 
futures in 2030 that would act as the testing ground for the new 
concepts. The four worlds developed were based on the U.S. National 
Security Strategy29 and included a Resurgent Russia, a Peer China, a 
failed state (Nigeria), and a well-financed and well-connected jihadist 
insurgency. Each world was designed to create different challenges and 
threats for the U.S. Air Force. A different value-focused thinking model 
was developed for each world, enabling each weapons system to be 
scored against the challenges in each world and allowing for the 
creation of a prioritized list of future systems that performed the best 
across all four alternate futures. The study then mapped the list of 172 
mutually exclusive, yet comprehensively exhaustive, enabling 
technologies to the fifty-eight concepts30 and then used a linear 
algebraic model to quantitatively score the enabling technologies. The 
research results contained a few surprises. 
• The synergistic effects of the underlying technologies were 
such that no short list for investment could be developed. The 
effect of nanotechnology, computational power, biotechnology, 
chemistry, and physics were so interwoven that a lack of 
research in any one area would disable the fielding of a large 
number of future systems or concepts. Future science and 
                                                     
27 Geis et al., Blue Horizons II. 
28 Meeting between the authors and Lieutenant General Johns. 
29 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States 
(Washington, DC: The White House, 2006). 
30 Full methodological details can be found in John Geis II, “Toward Blue 
Horizons,” paper presented at Exploring the Past; Anticipating the Future: The 
50th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New York, 
February 16, 2009. 
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technology investment is required across the whole of the 
science and technology enterprise. 
• Of equal surprise was that the capabilities required for major 
state-on-state conflicts are mostly the same as those required 
for counterinsurgent and irregular warfare. In short, at least for 
the U.S. Air Force, the notion that if you prepare for the worst-
case scenario of major state-on-state conflict, the lesser cases 
will be covered, appears to be correct. 
• The last point, germane to this essay, was that technologies are 
creating systems that were becoming increasingly unmanned, 
remote, small, fast, and very lethal, requiring a robust ability to 
predict, command, and control the battle space.  
Blue Horizons: Proofs 
The reality of exponential technological change, with its attendant 
implications for the future, are well understood today, but this was not 
the case just a few short years ago. Friedman and Kurzweil have altered 
the thinking and validated the implication of rapidly changing 
technology.31 There is now a host of books and substantial scientific 
work that cover this theme well and that established the legitimacy of 
accelerating technological change.32 Exponential change, ranging from 
such innocuous devices as the computer and color television to the 
Internet-enabled iPhone, has become part of our everyday lives.  
Yet understanding the consequences of such change is far more 
subtle, although equally important. These technologies are altering the 
calculus of war and, more to the point, challenging future leaders’ 
ability to act and direct actions. The increasing capacity to move 
                                                     
31 Thomas Friedman, The World is Flat; Raymond Kurzweil, The 
Singularity Is Near; and The Age of Spiritual Machines.  
32 Examining scholarly works alone, several hundred sources are available 
on the accelerating nature of technological change, with over 180,000 works 
written on technological change itself. Technological change is now so critical 
that the American Political Science Association recently initiated a new 
professional journal directly related to this topic, the Journal of Information 
Technology and Politics. One of the authors is among this journal’s reviewers. 
Another section of the association is exploring the effect of science, 
technology, and the environment on politics. See 
http://www.apsanet.org/content_4596.cfm [Accessed April 14, 2009].  
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information, and the increased precision and lethality of the weapons 
discussed earlier, are but two examples of this phenomenon.  
Whereas demonstrating that technology is creating rapid change is 
relatively straight forward, delineating the first-, second-, and third-
order consequences of such systems is more difficult. Applying these 
consequences to decision-making, however, is imperative. To that end, 
it is helpful to highlight several of the salient points from the Blue 
Horizons program that will end up influencing decision-making. The 
overall conclusion of these studies is that exponential change has 
created a globalized world that, at least technologically, is leveling the 
playing field.33 Further, the U.S. Government is now a relatively small 
player in the science and technology world, where well over 70% of 
U.S. investment in basic research is now in the hands of industry and 
academia—and this is a worldwide phenomenon not limited to just the 
United States.34 The result of this proliferation of technology has made 
systems smaller, cheaper, and more capable on a global basis, which is 
empowering nontraditional actors reducing available reaction times, 
and, as was demonstrated above, increasing the likelihood of surprise 
for the United States.  
Blue Horizons: The Consequences of Technology for 
Decision-making 
The advances in physics and chemistry are driving the introduction 
of entirely new concepts that have moved from the macro Newtonian 
world to a far-more-complex world of quantum affects. As a result of 
quantum pairs, adversaries will soon have access to “unbreakable 
encryption,” which may make intelligence gathering far more 
                                                     
33 For the effects of globalization, there are many studies beginning with 
Walter Wriston’s seminal work, The Twilight of Sovereignty: How the 
Information Revolution Is Transforming Our World (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1992). 
34 In 2004, the U.S. Government spent $20.26 billion on basic science and 
technology research. Industry in the United States spent $208.3 billion in the 
same year. Further, nearly 70% of global research and development is outside 
the United States. In 2004, Asia spent approximately $249 billion on research, 
and the EU-25 roughly another $210 billion. Thus, these continents nearly 
spent double what the United States spent before South America, Canada, 
Mexico, Australia, and Oceana are included. See National Science Foundation 
statistics. Available at http://www.nsf.gov [Accessed April 14, 2009]. 
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difficult.35 Nanomaterial coatings can make materials stronger, lighter, 
and/or more impervious to outside materials.36 Precise placement of 
individual molecules and/or atoms now allows the creation of carbon 
nanotubes (see figure 2) and the building of designer molecules. The 
former have the potential to radically improve computer speeds, with 
shorter computer transistor spacing using super- or near-
superconducting materials. The latter means that the world may soon 
enter an era of designer genes—a world with designer pathogens. The 
nature of the sciences of bio- and nanotechnologies is that the 
laboratories needed to create these materials are small: They can fit in 
an average garage. This means that in the future, the power enabled by 
these technologies will no longer be only within the purview of the 
nation-state, but also of the group and individual.37  
 
Figure 2: Carbon Nanotubes Placed to Create a Picture of “Bucky Badger”38 
                                                     
35 Roland Pease, “Unbreakable Encryption Unveiled,” BBC News, October 
9, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7661311.stm [Accessed 
April 14, 2009]. 
36 Nanophase Technologies recently announced coatings that improve 
resilience to radiation, including ultraviolet, and improve the strength of the 
materials to which they are applied. These coatings have become ubiquitous in 
other applications, including in wrinkle-free and stain-resistant shirts. 
Nanomaterials have the capacity to significantly change the properties of the 
base material to which they are applied. http://www.ceramicindustry.com/ 
Articles/Products/23c43d89dd9c7010VgnVCM100000f932a8c0 [Accessed 
April 14, 2009].  
37 Geis et al., Blue Horizons II. 
38 Created by Roger Hamers, Chemistry Department, University of 
Wisconsin–Madison. AIP Industrial Physics Forum, Boston, MA, November 
17, 2006. Each carbon nanofiber is less than 75 nanometers in diameter. For 
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These changes are turning the calculus of war on its head. In the 
past, conflicts of high consequence were infrequent—even rare. Only 
major global conflagrations had the potential to cause massive 
casualties or the destruction of a state, and events like World War I and 
World War II were uncommon. As we move forward in time, and as 
these technologies continue to mature, terrorist attacks and events 
triggered by small groups may become very high consequence events 
(figure 3). The result is change. Warfare, which has historically 
followed the diagonal gray line, may soon find itself off of its historic 
position, near the upper-right-hand corner of this diagram, where non-
state actors have the power to greatly affect our world. This has the 
potential to greatly increase the incidence of surprise and complicates 
the decision-making process immeasurably.  
 
Figure 3: Warfare is Moving off the Traditional Plot of Conflict39 
Decision-making in This World: The OODA Loop 
These technological concepts actually will affect the decision-
making cycle. A movement away from the decision-maker being in 
direct control and toward a scenario in which the decision-maker is 
                                                                                                                    
size perspective, over 9,000 of these nano-badgers will easily fit on the head of 
a pin without touching each other. 
39 General T. Michael Moseley, Blue Horizons 2007. 
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only indirectly in control is likely. Although war is—and will remain—
a contest of human will, machines will likely control many future 
engagements. What is clear with the increasing power of future 
weapons is that whoever can make valid decisions the fastest will have 
a significant operational and tactical advantage. Speed will increasingly 
be an important facet of warfighting. 
 
Figure 4: John Boyd's Observe-Orient-Decide-Act Loop 
One of the most useful architectures to model this decision-
making—the OODA loop—was created by U.S. Air Force Colonel 
John Boyd.40 Describing the process as a loop emphasizes the recurring 
nature of the decision cycle and emphasizes the importance of the time 
from the point of observation to the point at which a force is able to act 
(see figure 4). The goal is to have a loop shorter in time than one’s 
adversary—what Colonel Boyd referred to as “getting inside” the 
opponent’s loop. The logic is simple, and the concept has stood the test 
of time.  
New systems coming to the battlefield will dramatically alter the 
speed with which information is provided, how deeply it is fused, and 
the alacrity with which a response can be executed. There are 
innumerable subtle forces that can alter the speed and responsiveness of 
the loop. The number and type of adversaries on the field, the 
cultural/political context of the enemy, political constraints from the 
home front, and the complications that arise from joint and combined 
                                                     
40 The discussion comes from John R. Boyd, A Discourse on Winning and 
Losing (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, August 1987); and Grant T. 
Hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security (Washington, 
DC: Smithsonian Press, 2004). 
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operations are but a few. All these present challenges that can impede 
the ability of the leader to plan and execute a task. 
Yet the introduction of computer processing and human behavioral 
algorithms will soon yield predictive awareness—the ability to 
anticipate an adversary’s actions on the battlefield.41 As other new 
systems come online, they too will compress the decision cycle, 
shrinking the OODA loop to, quite literally, a point in time.42 It is this 
compression that will force the human out of the decision process and 
dramatically alter the places in which human involvement will occur 
when employing weapon systems. It will no longer be an OODA loop 
but an OODA point. The cyberworld is already working at machine 
speeds that preclude human involvement in the decision process.43 It is 
important to explore this phenomenon by discussing a few systems that 
will likely mature in the 2030 time frame and evaluating the second-
order consequences of those technologies on the decision-making 
process.  
In the observe phase of Boyd’s model falls much of what is 
currently labeled intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. For 
millennia, leaders have depended on sensors consisting of their eyes 
and ears—in short, their basic senses—to observe. As warfare 
increased in complexity and lethality, commanders found it necessary 
to expand the means for gathering information and developed systems 
that extended the range of their senses. The telescope and the telegraph 
enabled sharper vision and faster movement of data, which over the 
years enabled faster ways to move massive amounts of knowledge. In 
the fighter pilot world of World War I, the axiom, “first to see—first to 
kill” prevailed. Later, radar expanded this range further, enabling 
anticipation of attacks. In the last 60 years, the introduction of new 
                                                     
41 Although this awareness may not be perfect, great strides are possible in 
the near term. See Robert A. Piccerillo and David A. Brumbaugh, “Predictive 
Battlespace Awareness: Linking Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance Operations to Effects-Based Operations,” 2004 Command 
Control Research and Technology Symposium, San Diego, CA, June 15–17, 
2004. 
42 Geis et al., Blue Horizons II. 
43 As discussed earlier, this is how the antivirus software on a computer 
works. Because the human is too slow in his/her reaction time to incoming 
malware or virus software, the computer executes human intent (keep the 
computer free of interfering software), usually completely without human 
intervention.  
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sensors created from technological advancements has vastly increased 
the range, precision, and breadth of information from which decisions 
are derived.44 Technology, by reducing the size, weight, endurance, 
capacity, and cost of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
systems, has moved the sensors from space down into the hands of the 
lowest echelons of our combat forces, making information available 
more quickly and to more people than ever before. As long as nothing 
derails the technological innovation process, by 2030, commanders will 
have access to improvements that will be five to ten times better, which 
will have implications for how wars will be fought and who (or what) 
will be making the decisions.  
New intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance methods, 
programs, and systems will soon be making their way into the 
battlefield. One example at the tactical level is a nanoscale sensor 
network that covers the battle space with thousands of tiny sensors that 
detect and locate targets, assess behavior, and report “live” movement 
and change. They will work in the visible or infrared band, sense 
movement, detect the presence of chemicals or bioagents, and generally 
make the battlefield “transparent.” This will provide the capability to 
move against multiple small, fleeting targets requiring very fast 
reaction to be successful.45  
In the orient phase of the OODA model are even more startling 
systems defying many expectations of what can be known. Several 
programs are already underway, most starting with sophisticated 
computer data-mining processes that will assess and fuse vase amounts 
of information and turn it into executable knowledge. These will be 
combined with cognitive approaches that will move and display this 
                                                     
44 In fact, the totality of the information from satellites, backscatter radars, 
and airborne UAVs is already global.  
45 Fabrication of nanosensors will soon be reality. See Vincent T. Jovene, 
Next Generation Nanotechnology Assembly Fabrication Methods: A Trend 
Forecast, Occasional Paper 64 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Center for Strategy and 
Technology, 2008). The use of these smaller and more ubiquitous sensors will 
enable greater visibility on potential targets. For more on this topic, see Beth 
M. Kaspar, The End of Secrecy? Military Competitiveness in the Age of 
Transparency, Occasional Paper 23 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Center for Strategy 
and Technology, 2001); Kirk M. Kloeppel, “Pesky Critters,” and James M. 
Abatti, “Small Power: The Role of Micro and Small UAVs in the Future,” in 
Netted Bugs and Bombs: Implications for 2010, Marsha J. Kwolek, ed. 
(Maxwell AFB, AL: Center for Strategy and Technology, 2005).  
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knowledge in innovative ways. As trust in these systems grows, so will 
the drive to allow them to not only assess and predict but also to act. 
These systems will fuse air, ground, space, and cyber information, and 
they will mix these data with cultural, political, and geographic 
information, all to achieve a constant “knowing” of the adversary. The 
social software existent today provides only a hint of what will be 
accomplished over the next 20 years. These systems will allow for 
continuous evaluation of red, blue, and white forces, analyze 
capabilities, and assess intent.46  
If computers enable orientation, then the next steps in the loop are 
those of decision and action. In the area of cyberspace, computers 
already decide when to take some protective measures. As discussed 
earlier, most computer operators use a machine to execute the human 
intent of protecting the hard drive, and so will it be with future combat 
systems. As the fusing of data becomes better, computers will be able 
to recognize targets and threats with the same precision as the humans 
who now man the combat systems. Thus, in both decision and action, 
the fundamental question for the future is whether to let the computer 
engage the target on its own. Just as this is already happening on almost 
every electronic device, this practice will soon migrate to other 
domains as well.47  
In the action process, newer and faster weapons will shorten the 
loop even further. Directed energy weaponry, such as ground-based 
lasers relayed to the target via space-based mirrors, and hypersonic 
missiles and aircraft will shorten the targeting sequence to timescales 
eventually measured in fractions of a second.48 As Boyd points out, 
being able to get inside an opponent’s OODA loop is of enormous 
tactical advantage. When the entire cycle shrinks to well under a 
minute—perhaps even to fractions of a second—it has shrunk to a 
point. When this occurs, humans can no longer be allowed to remain 
“in the loop,” as they would slow this process to a level at which an 
opponent would gain significant, perhaps even decisive, tactical 
                                                     
46 Among the programs that will achieve this are those in the area of 
predictive battlespace awareness, cited earlier.  
47 John E. Marselus, “Who Pushes the Pickle Button?” in Netted Bugs 
Bombs. See also, Geis et al., Blue Horizons II, in which some of the top-rated 
systems, including “Pathfinder,” have autonomous attack capability. 
48 John Geis II, Directed Energy Weapons on the Battlefield: A New Vision 
for 2025, Occasional Paper 32 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Center for Strategy and 
Technology, 2003). Also, Geis et al., Blue Horizons II. 
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advantage. Although it may not be a desired outcome, placing the 
human in the position of monitoring the execution of this cycle may 
become a future necessity. 
Conclusion 
Being able to effect change on a molecular/atomic scale, using 
photons and electrons, navigating both outer space (our universe) and 
inner space (ourselves), and being able to fight and communicate “at 
the speed of light,” changes the distribution of power and threatens 
traditional military doctrine. That reality will alter combat waged in air, 
space, and cyberspace. To compete successfully in this radically altered 
environment will require a new way to prepare and immerse leaders in 
the new technologies and new ways to execute their plans.  
The dangers created by the accelerating introduction of new and 
powerful technologies are substantial. How those technologies will be 
integrated and employed, and their ramifications, will tax future 
leaders. The hardest piece for most to grapple with is the question of 
who or what will be making the combat command decisions in the 
future. The trend lines are clear: As the complexity and risks of new 
technologies vastly increase on the battlefield, the ability of leaders to 
make effective and timely decisions will decrease. The decision loop 
that once played out over days, weeks, or even months will be 
compressed into fractions of a second. This is already true in 
cyberspace, and will soon be true in other areas of the spectrum of 
combat. As new weapons with mass effects become common through 
the introduction or expansion of nano-, bio-, and nuclear technologies, 
leaders will have reduced time to observe events, orient themselves, 
decide on a course of action, and act. This process will, of necessity, be 
given over to machine interfaces. Although that moment has yet to 
arrive, it is visible on the horizon, and dedicated thought, debate, and 
identification of the critical questions of how best to make this 
transition are imperative.  
The easiest question to answer is whether science and technology 
can create these new systems. After 3 years of research, the answer of 
the authors is “yes.” On that, the research is clear.  
There are areas that require further work, however, and these are the 
harder questions to answer. Yet time is limited. We must begin to 
examine questions such as, What are the ethical issues of allowing 
machines to take lethal action? Who does society hold accountable if a 
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machine makes a wrong decision or, even worse, commits a war crime? 
How reliable is machine decision-making in a complex world? Can 
machine intelligence handle the nuances of political and cultural 
differences? The hardest question of all may be a very human one: 
How will humanity deal with such intelligent systems, and how will 
they deal with us? There are excellent studies and books starting to fill 
the shelves with thoughts, predictions, and horror stories of that world 
in 2030. The sooner the debate starts, the better the result and the less 
probable the horror scenarios. The shift from being the man in the 
cockpit to being the man in the loop to being the man on the loop 
appears to be inevitable. The necessity for machine speed may be 
unwanted, but it cannot be avoided. Those nations that accept and 





A Reevaluation of the “Kill 
the Leadership” Doctrine 
By Torsten Björkman 
 
Abstract 
The elimination of leaders has a long history. Analyses of such 
assassinations is a favorite among both historians, and “if-not 
historians”(What would have happened if Count von Stauffenberg 
had assassinated Hitler?). 
The “kill the leadership doctrine” takes on new meaning when 
applied to asymmetrical warfare. “Anarchist terrorism” targeted the 
leaders of the establishment. In “suicidal terrorism,” interest is lost 
in killing leaders and retargeted on ordinary people, but for 
counterinsurgency there is no killer to be killed in suicidal terrorism. 
Finding the leaders of the perpetrators becomes a paramount 
concern. The leaders of terrorist organizations know this and are 
developing defensive strategies to improve the capability of coping 
with the loss of leaders.  
Leavitt’s diamond is used as a frame of reference. The relative 
importance of people, process, organization, and technology is 
evaluated. The caliber of who is killed certainly matters. When 
someone is killed is extremely important, in particular in relation to 
process. The technologies have evolved, mainly strengthening the 
means of the perpetrator. Organization is estimated as the variable 
with the most potential in this context. At the end of the essay, the 
focus is on organizational transformation, and the relevance of 
Leavitt’s model is evaluated. 
Introduction 
orce transformation is to a large extent technology driven. The 
emergence of new asymmetrical adversaries—terror networks 
like Al-Qaeda and the Taliban—represents a second social and 
cultural challenge and driver to force transformation. What does it 
indicate that Bin Laden has not yet been caught or killed? Are these 
new adversaries in a traditional sense good at protecting their leaders, 
F
  
168  •  Björkman 
 
or are they themselves transformed and less dependent on leadership? 
If the latter alternative, of a more resilient organization, is closer to the 
truth, then killing the leaders of the adversary obviously will be less 
effective, and killing their leaders may not be a way to stop the 
transformation of their organizations—on the contrary, it might hasten 
it. The fate of Hamas is an illustration. Numerous successive top 
leaders of Hamas have been killed, but the organization has so far been 
able to replace them or in other ways made itself less vulnerable to the 
loss of leaders. The age-old offensive doctrine of the importance of 
killing leaders is at least ripe for renewed analysis, and maybe it is time 
for revision. The defensive doctrine of how to protect your leaders from 
being killed may also be ripe for revision. There are interesting modern 
alternatives to bunkers and bodyguards, such as network-centric 
organizations and the introduction of team- and co-leadership. 
Interpreting the Shooting Down of Yamamoto Using 
Leavitt’s Diamond 
Imperial Japan’s most revered military leader, Admiral Isoroku 
Yamamoto, was killed on April 18, 1943. His plane was shot down 
during an inspection tour of the Solomon Islands, east of New Guinea. 
The twin-engine bomber carrying Yamamoto was escorted by six 
Mitsubishi A6M Zeros. They had no chance of defeating an ambush by 
16 Lockheed P-38 Lightnings (the only U.S. fighter capable of flying 
700 km “on the deck” to make the interception). The interception was 
made possible by American codebreaking, which had obtained 
Yamamoto’s itinerary for the inspection tour. That hot piece of 
information went all the way up the chain of command to President 
Roosevelt, who gave his go-ahead order to Navy Secretary Knox, Fleet 
Admiral Nimitz, and Admiral Halsey, and down the chain of command 
to fighter squadron 339 at Guadalcanal. The squadron did excellent 
planning and delivered a surprise attack near Bougainville Island. 
Because it was vital to keep the American codebreaking secret, a 
deceptive story had to be invented and spread through the media about 
Yamamoto having been observed by some pro-American native people 
at Rabaul Island.1 
                                                     
1 Admiral Yamamoto was under hard pressure from Imperial Headquarters, 
and not least from Emperor Hirohito, to compensate for the loss of 
Guadalcanal by an offensive in the Northern Solomon Islands. See H. Bix, 
“The Ordeal of Supreme Command,” in Hirohito and the Making of Modern 
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If we use Leavitt’s diamond2 as a frame of reference for analyzing 
the killing of Yamamoto, it is obvious that the right kind of interplay 
among people, technology, organization, and process was critical to the 
outcome. Without people capable of codebreaking, there would have 
been no attack whatsoever. With a lesser fighter than the P-38, or fewer 
fighters, Yamamoto might have escaped. If the American chain of 
command from the Commander in Chief down to the hierarchy within 
the squadron had been only somewhat slower, the opportunity for 
killing Yamamoto would have been lost. In a chain of events, the 
weakest link tends to define the outcome. There was no weak link in 
the chain of events ending with the crash of Yamamoto’s bomber. 
History is filled with failed attempts, such as those to kill Hitler. 
The cost of such failures is not only that the “target” survives. In the 
case of Hitler, his conviction that he was chosen by destiny to rule 
(without listening to advisers) was very much strengthened after each 
failed attempt, in particular the one by Count von Stauffenberg, on July 
20, 1944. But what are the benefits of success? 
The consequences of success in killing Yamamoto are still debated. 
The importance of his death for the American public was in delivering 
a boost of morale and delivering part, but only part, of the revenge for 
Pearl Harbor. Now the highest commander of that infamous attack had 
been punished. There is also agreement among historians that the 
effects on Japanese morale were devastating. The news of Yamamoto’s 
death was kept secret in Japan for month, until May 21. On June 3, he 
was honored with one of the most-attended state funerals in Japanese 
                                                                                                                    
Japan (New York: HarperCollins, 2001). Bix’ Pulitzer Prize–awarded book 
presents a new and more militant portrait of the emperor than the traditional 
one.  
2 Harold Leavitt (1922–2007) was one of the most interesting proponents 
of the sociotechnical school of thought, with a PhD from MIT and being a 
professor at Stanford Business School for many years. The common 
denominators of the sociotechnical school are the holistic approach and the 
belief in organizational choice in opposition to technological determinism. The 
holism is often not broader than the two factors, the social system and the 
technological system, however. Leavitt has four factors—tasks, structure, 
technology, and people—in his famous “diamond,” first presented in 
Managerial Psychology (1964). I use the modification by Garstka (2008) and 
call the factors process, people, technology, and organization. See also essay 2. 
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history.3 His death was seen as a very bad omen and shook the nation’s 
collective belief in final victory. In the Japanese military hierarchy, no 
one could replace him intellectually. His standing in Japanese society 
has been compared to that of Marshall, Nimitz, and MacArthur 
combined.  
On the other hand, what was the value of his brilliance after the tide 
had turned in the war in the Pacific? His leadership had not saved the 
Japanese attack fleet from defeat at Midway in June 1942. Are time and 
timing general aspects of “process”? If not, Leavitt’s diamond is not up 
to the mark of explaining all the effects of this kill; if they are part of 
process, there is a pretty good fit between model and reality for this 
case.  
Four Murdered American Presidents and the Use of 
Leavitt’s Diamond as a Frame of Reference 
Four American Presidents have been assassinated while in office: 
Abraham Lincoln (1865), James Garfield (1881), William McKinley 
(1901), and John F. Kennedy (1963). Which factors decide the 
importance of these killings? Can we use Leavitt’s diamond of process, 
people, technology, and organization to gain a better understanding?  
The organizational context is an important key in analyzing the 
effects of the killings of the presidents. In the United States it is no 
enigma who will become the successor on the death of the president. 
The founding fathers determined, and later Amendments clarify, who is 
next in the presidential line of succession, the first person being the 
vice president and the second the speaker of the House of 
Representatives.4 This is, of course, an advantage over systems in 
which the succession is not predetermined. After the murder of Caesar, 
for instance, civil war raged for 17 years. The murderers believed they 
were saving the republic by stabbing Caesar. Instead, they helped bring 
imperial pretenders to power (via triumvirs defeating each other one 
after the other). Starting with Augustus in 27 BC, the Roman Empire 
was ruled by emperors for five centuries.  
                                                     
3 The funeral was filmed; part of it can be seen in the famous BBC series 
from the 1970s, “The World at War.” 
4 To be effective, it is important that the line of succession is well-known. 
It was rather shocking for the American media when Secretary of State 
Alexander Haig declared immediately after the failed attempt to kill Ronald 
Reagan in 1981 that he, Haig, was in charge. 
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Calling attention to the unintended consequences of murder, King 
Herod’s order to kill all male children in Bethlehem failed to achieve 
his objective to kill the newborn “king of the Jews.” Three decades 
later, the execution of Christ was not the end of Christianity, but was 
instead its birth as a world religion. The long trial of the 19-year-old 
Joan of Arc ended with her burning on May 30, 1431. Her execution 
did not ensure the victory of England and Burgundy in the Hundred 
Years’ War (1337–1453). On the contrary, it kindled French 
nationalism and changed the character of the war from one marked by 
dynastic turmoil about who was the true heir to the throne of France 
into one of national identity. The end of the war was also the end of 
British rule on the French mainland; the only remnants today of 
William the Conqueror’s Normandy possessions are the Channel Isles 
of Jersey and Guernsey.  
Killing is, of course, about people. What kind of person are you 
killing? The caliber of the one killed is thought to correlate closely with 
the effects of the killing, but killing leaders is using a double-edged 
sword, metaphorically speaking. What about the quality of the 
successor? The advantage of the American presidential line of 
succession is swift and orderly succession; for instance, within minutes 
after the death of Kennedy. The risk and drawback of the system is that 
the presidential qualifications of the vice president are often neglected 
when the presidential candidates are choosing a running mate for the 
election campaign. Andrew Johnson became president after the 
assassination of Abraham Lincoln. He was the only southern senator 
who remained loyal to the Union during the American Civil War. Apart 
from that merit in the election of 1864, however, he had few 
credentials, at least on a presidential level and is generally considered a 
failure as president. He is ranked 37th in a list of 40 ranked U.S. 
presidents.5 When he was impeached, the 10th article of the 
impeachment rather tellingly asserts, “Andrew Johnson has brought the 
high office of President of the United States into contempt, ridicule and 
disgrace, to the great scandal of all citizens.”6  
                                                     
5 J. Taranto, ed. Presidential Leadership (New York: Free Press, 2004). 
The ratings in this book are based on evaluations made by experts on 
presidential leadership. There are numerous other ranking lists on this very 
popular subject. The most striking differences between experts and public 
opinion concern 19th-century presidents, many of whom have been forgotten 
by the general public. 
6 Cited from Taranto, Presidential Leadership, 92. 
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James Garfield was only president for a few months, so he is usually 
not ranked at all. His successor, Chester Arthur, is thought of as being 
below average. William McKinley was succeeded by Theodore 
Roosevelt, who outshone McKinley and is considered to be one of the 
10 best Presidents ever. However, McKinley is held in high esteem 
among experts as the creator of the modern presidency and for 
presiding over a vast extension of U.S. influence from Puerto Rico and 
Cuba to Guam and the Philippines after the Spanish-American War.7 
John F. Kennedy is a legend. His successor Lyndon Johnson might 
have been one, based only on domestic politics, but that legacy is much 
overshadowed by his controversial role in and support for the Vietnam 
War. 
The process is also of grave importance—more precisely, when and 
where in the process. From a process perspective, the killings of James 
Garfield and William McKinley were not very fateful, whereas the 
killing of Kennedy, on the contrary, ended a very promising presidency 
that lasted only a thousand days.8 Lincoln was killed on April 14, 1865, 
with 3 years left of his second term and only 5 days after Lee’s 
surrender at Appomattox. What triggered his assassin, John Booth, was 
a speech Lincoln had delivered 3 days earlier in favor of voting rights 
for blacks. Booth succeeded in killing not only the president but also 
the process of reconciliation that had just begun, as well as numerous 
other promising initiatives by Lincoln. The negative effects of Booth’s 
intervention into history are generally estimated as enormous. It is 
doubtful if the concept of “process” is broad enough to mirror all these 
effects, and if so, Leavitt’s diamond must be judged as too simplistic in 
interpreting these historical events. 
Anarchist Terrorism 
William McKinley was killed by an anarchist. Anarchism means, in 
Greek, “without rulers.” Combined with another anarchist idea, 
                                                     
7 To cite just one of many experts on presidential leadership sharing this 
view, R. Dallek, To Lead a Nation: The Presidency in the Twentieth Century 
(New York: Barnes and Noble, 2004). In particular the first lecture: The Rise 
of the Modern Presidency. 
8 Referring to the legend of the Celtic King Arthur, Jacqueline Kennedy 
called the John F. Kennedy presidency “Camelot,” a characterization still in 
use. An indication of his legacy is the fact that “John F. Kennedy” is still, in 
2009, the biggest site on Wikipedia, in all categories.  
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“propaganda of the deed,”9 the conclusion might seem, consequentially, 
that killing rulers will contribute to a world without rulers, or at least to 
a world where rulers are less autocratic. Anarchist terrorism was 
practiced for at least 40 years. Tsar Alexander II was assassinated by an 
exploding bomb in 1881 after many earlier failed attempts. The liberal 
Alexander II, who among many other reforms abolished serfdom in 
Russia, was succeeded by his very autocratic son, Alexander III. The 
killing of Alexander II was, in other words, no proof of the validity of 
the anarchist “kill the rulers” theorem. French Prime Minister Carnot 
was assassinated in 1894. Spanish Prime Minister Canova was 
assassinated in 1897. Italian King Umberto I was assassinated in 1900, 
and Russian Prime Minister Stolypin was killed in 1911. This list could 
be made much longer by adding lesser “rulers;” for instance, chief 
executive officers in industry killed by anarchists, and could be made 
much, much, longer by the many failed assassination attempts. The 
successful killings never resulted in a country or an organization 
“without rulers.” In that sense the anarchists’ view of the world was 
proven utterly wrong. Invariably, their deeds resulted in a faster 
turnover of rulers, however, and their killings had various unintended 
consequences. 
The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and Countess 
Sophie in Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina on June 26, 1914, is 
maybe the most striking example of how hard it is to anticipate the 
outcome of a killing.10 The young royal couple was fired on by an even 
younger Serbian nationalist and anarchist, Gavrilo Princip. It is a matter 
of debate as to what extent this killing furthered Serbian interests. It 
certainly did not leave Austria-Hungary without a ruler, as Emperor 
Franz Joseph was still in power, or without heirs to the throne. What is 
certain is that Princip’s mortal shots in Sarajevo started an extremely 
complicated chain reaction leading to the Great War. In that war, more 
than 4 years long, some 60 million men were called up to military 
service, and some 20 million were killed. Three empires—the Russian, 
the German, and the Austrian—collapsed during and as a result of the 
Great War, not to mention countless other effects, among which can be 
counted World War II. Perversely, given Princip’s purpose, the Great 
War hit Serbia especially hard because of famine and an outbreak of 
                                                     
9 Many are referred to as having formulated this principle, one of the 
earliest and most influential being Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876). 
10 B. Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: Dell, 1963 [1962]). 
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typhus, which killed at least half a million civilians out of a population 
of 4.5 million. After that war, Serbia was enlarged and the people of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina experienced the mixed blessing of exchanging 
Austrian rule and dominance for Serbian control. We have recently 
witnessed a civil war in former Yugoslavia focused on liberation from 
Serbian dominance. 
It is often argued that the Great War would have come regardless of 
what Princip did or did not do. He struck a match, but he cannot be held 
responsible for the enormous accumulation of combustible material in 
Europe in the summer of 1914. One can say that Princip decided the 
timing. Who knows what a few more months or years of peace would 
have achieved. The first (1905–06) and second (1911) Moroccan crises 
were overcome and did not, as so many feared, lead to war. The Great 
War might have been postponed or might have turned into quite 
another war had not Princip fired those shots.11 Some even argue that it 
might have been avoided by negotiations similar to those ending the 
Moroccan crises and some similar encounters in the “Belle Époque.” It 
is asking a lot of Leavitt’s diamond to expect it to be a valid frame of 
reference for analyzing the effects of the shots in Sarajevo. The most 
decisive example in our evaluation of Leavitt’s diamond is these shots, 
however, and we will return to them at the end of this essay. 
Anarchism is not dead. There are many different kinds of 
anarchism, and the variation is striking. The term anarchism is not very 
telling. The militant form of anarchism, and in particular the terrorist 
form, has from time to time reemerged, however, as happened during 
the Spanish Civil War and in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. The red 
brigades, the BR (“Brigate Rosse”) in Italy and the RAF (“Rote Armee 
Fraktion”) in Germany, had the killing of “rulers,” mainly in business 
but also in politics, on their agenda. In both Germany and Italy, these 
organizations and their members were called anarchistic terrorists by 
the authorities when pursued by the police and when arrested and 
convicted, but it might be fairer to characterize them as of rather mixed 
ideological origins. For instance, they were obviously inspired by the 
urban guerrillas of Uruguay—the Tupamaros—as well as by many 
different communist groupings and fractions. 
                                                     
11 “If-not history” is a genre of its own. See J. Langdon, July 1914. The 
Long Debate 1918–1990 (New York: Berg, 1991) for many examples of that 
kind of analysis. 
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Well-known German bankers and industrialists were killed by the 
RAF in 1977. The Italian PM Aldo Moro was kidnapped in 1978 and 
was later killed by the BR. In 1975, there was an early attempt by the 
RAF to occupy the German embassy in Stockholm. In most respects it 
was a failure, but the occupants killed the German military and trade 
attachés. The RAF in particular tried, mostly in vain, to destroy 
American and NATO installations in Germany. One such RAF attack 
in June 25, 1979, targeted the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of 
that time, Alexander Haig; the guard car following him suffered heavy 
damage, but Haig was unharmed. The RAF was in a very obvious way 
anti-American and was heavily supported by the Deutsche 
Demokratische Republik, a fact not well known in the West in the 
1970s and 1980s.12 
Some Sniper History 
Three presidents were killed by point-blank fire. Kennedy was 
killed at long range by a sniper, if we believe the conclusions of the 
Warren Commission. This seemingly minor change in technology from 
close- to long-range fire has had far-reaching effects on the political 
culture in many countries, making high standards of security so much 
harder and costlier to achieve.  
Snipers and sniper technology have a long history of their own. The 
theoretical point of departure is the understanding, or shall we say 
belief, that killing leaders might change the outcome of a battle. During 
the Napoleonic wars, at least one French Navy captain, Jean Lucas, 
thought snipers had the potential of being decisive.13 He identified that 
the weakest point in the British Navy was its strong dependence on a 
well-functioning hierarchy on commanding captains in particular. 
During the battle of Trafalgar in November 1805, he was given the 
opportunity to test his ideas. His ship, Le Redoutable, was one of those 
in close fight with Nelson’s flagship HMS Victory. A bullet from a 
sniper high up in the mizzen-mast of Redoutable passed through 
Nelson’s spine, ending his life within a few minutes. That was a 
                                                     
12 The literature on the RAF is voluminous. One of the more inclusive 
works analyzing the RAF from various perspectives, even telling the story of 
the fight against them, is the one edited by W. Kraushaar (ed.), Die RAF und 
der linke Terrorismus (Hamburg: HIS, 2006). 
13 Page 76 and onward in J. Keegan, The Price of Admiralty. The Evolution 
of Naval Warfare (London: Penguin Books, 1988). 
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tremendous loss, killing arguably the greatest sea captain ever, but the 
battle was already won by the British at the time of his killing. The 
victory at Trafalgar changed world history and lay to rest Napoleon’s 
plans of invading the British Isles. It even meant the beginning of the 
end of Napoleonic rule over continental Europe. Once more we see the 
importance of process. Had Nelson been killed before he had had his 
planning meeting with his captains, introducing his new bold and 
innovative battle plan, the killing might have been decisive. Instead, the 
death of a hero was a great inspiration for at least a century of British 
Rule the Waves policy.14 
Snipers are nowadays a normal component of all armed forces. 
They seldom get world leaders in sight but are used for killing people 
of lesser importance. That makes quantity more important. The Finnish 
sharpshooter Simo Häyhä15 killed more than 500 Russian officers and 
soldiers during 3 months of fighting (November 30, 1939–March 13, 
1940),16 the so-called Winter War, including more than 30 Russian 
sharpshooters designated to kill him. On March 6, Häyhä was hit by an 
explosive bullet in his face but survived the war, although disfigured.  
The potential effectiveness of selective killings had been 
demonstrated already during the invasion of Poland in early September 
1939. German agents shot a substantial number of Polish pilots in their 
homes before they were able to mobilize. That was a severe blow to the 
Polish Air Force, as pilots are even harder to replace than officers. For 
example, their replacements might have had fewer than 100 flying 
hours and were thus easy prey in dogfights against more experienced 
adversaries. 
The Russian military learned the lessons taught to them by Häyhä—
not the least of which was the sniper’s importance for psychological 
warfare, in this case the constant threat of an unexpected bullet from 
some sniper far away. Häyhä was widely called the “White Death.” The 
Red Army used many sharpshooters during World War II, with German 
noncommissioned officers as their prime target; for instance, during the 
siege of Stalingrad. Some female sharpshooters became great heroines 
in the Soviet Union, such as Lyudmila Pavlichenko, who after 309 
                                                     
14 A. Herman, To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the 
Modern World (New York: HarperCollins, 2004). 
15 T. Saarelainen, The Sniper: Simo Häyhä (Helsinki: Apali Oy, 2008). 
16 Some, for instance Wikipedia, claim this is an unsurpassed record. 
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confirmed kills became a sniper instructor and was commemorated on 
stamps during and after the war. 
In Soviet military doctrine, the killing of leaders was central and 
was applied brutally. Executioners were treated as valid alternatives to 
snipers, with complete disregard for international law. The history of 
the Gulag archipelago is one of killings—mostly slow killings—of 
enemies of the state. Many of the secrets of that world of prisons and 
labor camps will most likely never be unveiled, as denials and 
disinformation were characteristic of the Soviet regime. For a long 
time, the Soviets blamed the Nazis for the “Katyn massacre,” which to 
Western eyes seemed to fit with all the other atrocities—crimes against 
humanity and genocide—that the Nazis committed in Poland during the 
years of the Holocaust. Compared with the seven million who were 
exterminated in the concentration camps, some thousands of killed 
officers was only a detail. Everything is relative, especially in 
comparison to the worst atrocities in human history. It was also well 
known that the Schutzstaffel, or SS, and Gestapo gave priority to 
killing political commissars and members of the Communist party, thus 
making it plausible that they would have killed imprisoned officers. 
However, seldom, if ever, has the doctrine of killing the leadership 
been applied on the scale of Katyn. Twenty thousand Polish prisoners 
of war, mostly officers, were killed, one at a time, by a shot through the 
back of the head. The killings went on day after day during April and 
May 1940 in the Katyn forest and some similar forests, with the aim of 
eliminating the Polish officer corps. Those killings dealt a severe blow 
to the whole of the Polish intelligentsia as well, as most Polish men 
with a university degree—engineers, lawyers, physicians, and so 
forth—were officers in the reserve. Many of them were quite recently 
mobilized and their units, in retreat, had been driven by the advancing 
German divisions toward the eastern part of Poland in the belief that 
that part of the country was safe.17 Beria, the head of the Soviet secret 
police, came up with the idea for this massacre, and Stalin gave the 
order. It remained unknown, however, until the mid-1990s, when 
                                                     
17 An ambitious interpretation of that massacre can be seen in a recent film 
by A. Wajda, “Katyń” (2007). The film has already received a dozen awards 
and an Oscar nomination. Apart from giving an account of the massacre, the 
film also portrays what happened to those Poles who opposed the Soviet 
falsification of what had happened. 
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documents showing these orders and signatures were released by direct 
command from Boris Yeltsin,18 thereby clarifying the quest for guilt. 
Stalin was, as we know, familiar with mass killings.19 For him, as 
well as for many other leading Bolsheviks, the French revolution was a 
benchmark. Stalin in particular feared that the Soviet revolution might 
end in “Bonapartism,”20 meaning that a new Napoleon would come to 
power. His way of dealing with that threat was paranoid: Kill all 
Russian officers with the slightest resemblance to Napoleon. The 
officers bearing that resemblance totaled more than 10,000. Although 
Marshal Tuchatjevskij was possibly as bright and innovative as 
Napoleon, any resemblance between Napoleon and most of the other 
executed officers was greatly stretched. For some, guilt warranting 
death was established by the mere knowledge of a foreign language. 
For others, it was established by having met foreign officers—for 
instance, during those years in the 1920s when the Weimar Reichswehr 
was allowed secret access to Russian training grounds. At the end of 
the 1930s, such officers were often high ranking but were still executed 
without mercy. 
Many see a strong correlation between the purge of the progressive 
Soviet military leadership and the disastrous lack of Soviet military 
leadership during the second half of 1941. During 5 months, a 
staggering 4 million Soviet soldiers were killed or taken prisoner, and 
the German invaders reached the outskirts of Moscow. The purge of the 
Soviet officer corps in the 1930s was a field experiment—unintended 
and very costly—in all meanings of the word, proving the importance 
of competent leaders. Hopefully, that lesson has been learned in more 
countries than Russia. During World War II, younger Soviet officers 
had to improve their capacity to command larger units very swiftly, and 
mostly under very demanding conditions. The failure rate was high. 
Quantitative superiority—two to one in manpower reserve—helped 
save the Soviet Union, but they used a lot of that reserve. 
                                                     
18 B. Fischer, “The Katyn Controversy. Stalin’s Killing Fields.” 
(Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of 
Intelligence, 2005). 
19 S. Montefiore, Stalin. The Court of the Red Tsar (New York: Alfred 
Knopf, 2004). 
20 Stalin borrowed his analysis of this phenomenon from Karl Marx. K. 
Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Moscow: Progress, 1937 
[1852]). 
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History contains many infamous uses of sharpshooters when sheer 
terror and not the targeting of leaders was the real aim. During the 
Serbian siege of Sarajevo, the Serbian snipers maintained “Sniper 
Alley,” 1992–1996, 80 years after the shots in Sarajevo. The Serbian 
snipers terrorized the inhabitants of Sarajevo for 4 years, wounding 
more than a thousand and killing a few hundred—among them more 
than 60 children.21  
In conclusion, the history of snipers and sharp shooters started with 
very important leaders, such as Nelson, being the target. For two 
centuries, quantity has gained in importance, with the elimination of all 
leaders of an organization, as in the Katyn massacre, as the other 
ideological extreme. 
Suicide Terrorism 
When the killer is suicidal, the rules of the game change. Applying 
the Leavitt diamond, we can start with people. The deterrent effect of 
the death penalty on a potential killer is a controversial one, but in 
suicidal attacks the killer has already dismissed it. Threatening him (or 
her, now) with a severe punishment is of no use, and thus a new kind of 
deterrent is required. You have to come up with some new deterrent. 
You have, for instance, to find and catch those backing the aggressor—
you have to target the organization behind the actor. The whole process 
is different, too; for example, an exit strategy for the aggressor is no 
longer necessary. This new option improves the odds for the killer, 
making him or her much more effective. The use of technology is 
changing as well. A bomb load might be delivered by a low-tech but 
intelligent targeting device: an adaptive human being with situational 
awareness.  
Suicidal killings had already been introduced during World War II, 
when the Japanese high command became desperate because of the 
very obvious turn of the tide of the war in the Pacific. The kamikaze 
pilots were usually not very well trained; the experienced Japanese 
pilots, who were also the more qualified instructors, had already died. 
The Kamikaze pilots were trained to dive bomb all the way into the 
target, thus eliminating the need for calculating a separate bomb 
                                                     
21 Simms gives a close account of the siege in his eighth chapter, “The 
Reckoning,” which includes the story of the final breakthrough under the 
leadership of Rupert Smith. B. Simms, Unfinest Hour. Britain and the 
Destruction of Bosnia (London: Allen Lane, 2001). 
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parabola. The principal target for kamikaze pilots was American capital 
ships. There was no specific doctrine on prioritizing leadership as a 
target, but since it was thought to be easier to attack the biggest ships, 
hitting command and control functions was often a side effect. 
Suicidal terrorism was reintroduced in the late 1960s with the 
hijacking of airliners. One of the earliest attacks was a Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine hijacking on July 23, 1968, of an El Al 
airliner bound for Tel Aviv from Rome, which was then forced to fly to 
Algiers instead. In the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, there was a rather 
steady number of aircraft hijackings. The main defensive strategy has 
been, as we all know, stricter passenger checks and surveillance at the 
gates, but they have not proven to be strict enough. The worst hijacking 
ever was the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon, in which passenger airliners were used 
as kamikaze planes. 
By and large, terrorists, have shifted emphasis away from killing 
leaders. The 1983 Beirut barracks bombing, which used a truck filled 
with explosives and resulted in 241 deaths, targeted ordinary marines, 
not leaders. The same day, the French Foreign Legion was attacked in a 
similar way, and 58 people were killed. The terrorists of today seem to 
prefer killing innocent people—the more the better. Explosive devices 
effectuate this goal, and because they are easily concealed beneath 
clothing, gain the advantage of surprise. Depending on the size of the 
bomb and the place where it is detonated, the effects might be far-
reaching. Blowing up people commuting on buses and trains is now a 
common act of terrorism. In an analysis of 600 acts of suicidal 
terrorism from December 1981 to July 2005, by Ami Pedahzur,22 some 
patterns become very obvious, such as hitting places where people 
gather—shops, malls, markets, mosques, churches, stations, airports, 
trains, buses, restaurants, nightclubs, hotels, and even a few hospitals.  
One possible explanation for this fundamental difference between 
anarchist terrorism and suicidal terrorism—targeting leaders versus 
targeting common people—is that at least two lessons have been 
learned. First, it is hard to succeed in killing leaders, because they are 
nowadays normally well protected by bodyguards and sophisticated 
technology. Second, if one succeeds in killing a leader, a new one will 
simply replace the killed one, and the second leader is often tougher 
against terrorists than the first one, as was the case when Tsar 
                                                     
22 Appendix in A. Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity, 2005). 
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Alexander III succeeded Alexander II. Killing does not create a “world 
without rulers,” as the naive vision of the anarchists promised. On the 
contrary, it often brings tougher leaders to power.  
Trying to kill ordinary people performing the most common of 
activities is much more likely to lead to actual killings, as these people 
are not as well protected as top leaders and never will be. It is 
impossible to create such a fool-proof, terrorist-free society. The 
question remains, What do the terrorists believe they are achieving by 
killing ordinary people? It is certainly not the way to win the hearts and 
minds of the survivors—the friends and relatives of the killed ones. 
What the killings do achieve is terror. The terrorists might think that 
their terror in the long run will lead to the breakdown of the existing 
society, at which point their organization will be ready to take 
command. This rests on the hypothesis that the terrorists have a shared 
vision, which is so far still just a hypothesis. 
In Iraq, the frequency of suicide attacks reached unprecedented 
levels after the initial success of the invasion. The attacks in Iraq follow 
a somewhat different pattern from suicidal terrorism in other countries. 
An early suicide attack took place on August 19, 2003, in which a truck 
filled with explosives was driven into U.N. Headquarters. In the blast, 
some 20 people were killed, among them the U.N. special envoy to 
Iraq, Sergio de Mello, and more than a hundred people were wounded.  
Many of the thousands of attacks that have followed have targeted 
coalition troops, and American soldiers at checkpoints in particular. 
They have also prioritized Iraqi police stations and queues of police 
applicants. A number of the attacks have also targeted rival religious 
groups when they are gathering at various religious sites. By and large, 
the attacks have been more warlike than the suicidal attacks in, for 
instance, Israel.23 
Killed Leadership and Organizational Resilience 
Osama Bin Laden still has not been caught, despite a reward of up 
to US$25 million. He is known under at least 10 aliases and is believed 
to be hiding in the mountainous region bordering Afghanistan and 
                                                     
23 An early analysis discovering this pattern is Thomas X. Hammes, The 
Sling and The Stone. On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, MN: Zenith, 2004). 
In the vast literature on the war and insurgency in Iraq, Thomas Ricks gives an 
overview of the first three years in Fiasco. The American Military Adventure 
in Iraq (London: Penguin Books, 2006). 
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Pakistan. We do not know for sure why he has not been caught as, for 
instance, Saddam Hussein was. The terrain mentioned is well-suited for 
hiding. He might be a skillful fugitive, or he might be dead—we do not 
know. My bet is that he is well protected a very loyal “band of 
brothers” and that the Al Qaeda organization will function even if he is 
killed.  
The “brotherhood” principle is not new. It has been practiced by 
some of the greatest leaders of the past.24 Horatio Nelson, for example, 
had a collegiate style of leadership toward his closest subordinates, the 
captains of his fleet. They were always invited to participate in his 
planning before major battles—a practice started before the Battle of 
the Nile, August 1, 1798, and made legendary after Trafalgar.25 Nelson 
knew his Shakespeare and brought his favorite play, Henry V, along on 
his voyages. He used the quote from the playwright’s famous St. 
Crispin’s Day Speech to characterize what he wanted from his 
captains—tactical independence and bold action: “We few, we happy 
few, we band of brothers.”26 The captains knew their commander’s 
intent and could and would go on trying to realize it. Earlier in this 
essay we introduced Jean Lucas, whose snipers managed to kill Nelson 
at Trafalgar, but Lucas was in the end disappointed—killing Vice 
Admiral Nelson did not prevent the defeat of the French-Spanish 
armada. In later battles, the most inspiring British signal became 
“Remember Nelson.” 
A model organization for many of today’s Muslim networks is the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, founded in the 1920s. That brotherhood 
is used to working underground and clandestinely, having been 
persecuted by the authorities. Now and then, their leaders have been put 
in jail or killed. Organizations like Hezbollah, Hamas, and Al Qaeda 
share the same fate: Many of their leaders have been killed. Israeli 
Defence Forces and Mossad, for example, have pinpointed the 
leadership of Hamas. In the spring of 2004, they killed both the top 
                                                     
24 This is not implying that Osama Bin Laden should be ranked as a great 
leader—he is far from that—but only that he is using the famous brotherhood 
formula. 
25 R. Knight, The Pursuit of Victory. The Life and Achievement of Horatio 
Nelson (New York: Basic Books, 2005). 
26 Shakespeare is imagining Henry V giving this inspired speech before the 
Battle of Agincourt on St. Crispin’s Day, October 25, 1415. Agincourt is the 
greatest English victory during the Hundred Years War and is most famous for 
the role played by English longbow archers against French knights. 
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leader Yassin and his successor Al-Rantisi within weeks. These 
organizations are often called networks, most commonly Al Qaeda. Do 
we know that they are networks? I have my doubts. What we do know 
is that they have survived the loss of many of their leaders, but the 
same has been true of most undercover organizations in history, 
including spy organizations, forbidden parties, partisan organizations, 
and resistance movements. 
The defensive trick used by these organizations is simple and age-
old: keep the organizational chart secret, in particular from the very 
members of the organization. Then they cannot reveal it, not even 
under torture. Once one can get the name of a contact from each cell, 
one can painstakingly map the organization. The French did that in 
Algiers in the late 1950s, uncovering National Liberation Front 
leadership, but certainly violating international law in the process. The 
French attempt seemed successful for some years in the middle of the 
1950s,27 but then the rebellion against French rule was resurrected, 
more forcefully than before, and Algeria gained its independence. The 
Algerian example is often referred to nowadays as proving that 
insurgencies can be crushed militarily. That argument misses the point 
that the Algerian insurgency succeeded politically only 2 years after the 
alleged military defeat.28 
However, if killing the leader is not enough, maybe killing the 
whole band of brothers is. That strategy is being tried right now by the 
Russians in Chechnya. It was also tried during the 1950s by the British 
in Malaya. The British victory over the communist rebellion in Malaya, 
a rebellion called the Malayan Emergency, a euphemism typical of the 
1950s, is certainly one of very few examples of a victory over a 
rebellion. But looked at more closely, the famous British “winning the 
hearts and minds” campaign led by Field Marshal Gerald Templar at 
that time seems rather similar to the old imperial divide et impera 
principle. It was not that hard to isolate the communist insurgents in 
Malaya, as they were Chinese, and the importance of the ethnic issue 
and the ethnic tensions was proven a few years later, when the Malayan 
                                                     
27 In the masterly Italian film ”Battle of Algiers,” by Pontecorvo (1966), 
the systematic elimination of the secret hierarchy of FLN by the French 
paratroopers under the leadership of General Massu is given a detailed 
account. 
28 In David Galula’s (1964) famous analysis of an insurgency, it is claimed 
to be 80% political, 20% military. David Galula himself was an extraordinarily 
successful field commander in Algeria during the French rule. 
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Federation was broken into two parties—the mostly Chinese Singapore 
seceded from the Federation in 1965, making Malaysia Malayan.29 
More or less indiscriminate killing is against international law. 
Using such an approach means you are losing the moral high ground. 
An alternative to indiscriminate killing was practiced early on in Iraq 
by the Americans in 2003 and 2004, exemplified in the distribution of a 
deck of cards of “most wanted” ex-leaders. The cards did not sentence 
the Hussein supporters to death but only proclaimed that they were 
wanted by the Americans. Some, like the notorious brothers Uday and 
Qusay Hussein, were killed when they refused detention. Others had to 
face prosecution and court proceedings. 
Underground organizations have to adapt to getting many in their 
leadership killed. If they do not succeed with that adaptation, they will 
most likely perish. However, according to the most recent studies of 
terror organizations, they are adapting, and quite successfully.30 Looked 
at more closely, Sageman’s thesis of leaderless organizations is a 
misnomer. They are not leaderless but, rather, good at succession and 
using what military experts would call Auftragstaktik (far-reaching 
delegation)—their organizations have become resilient. 
Amid Pedahzur31 concludes his analysis of suicidal terrorism with a 
pessimistic evaluation of the military options for eliminating the 
leadership of these organizations in the long run. Some other strategy, 
beyond a lone military one, is needed. Terrorism, even suicide 
terrorism, must be dealt with in a more comprehensive way. This much 
is evident at the present stage: the strategic alternative in demand will 
contain a number of civilian elements and endeavors. 
                                                     
29 John Nagl’s much acclaimed book, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife:  
Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2002), with its reverence for Lawrence of Arabia, 
underestimates the ethnic issue, in my view. I also think it overstates the 
lessons to be learned from a victory over 6,000 rebels in comparison to the 
civil war in Vietnam, where the some hundred times larger communist 
rebellion was supported by the well-organized North Vietnam and its regular 
army. 
30 I am specifically thinking of Marc Sageman’s latest book, Leaderless 
Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 
31 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism. 
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Summary 
Snipers and sharpshooters are still intact elements of modern 
armies, and suicide terrorism is far from wiped out. On the contrary, an 
increasing number of organizations are using it. Judging from the many 
bombings of recent years, the terrorists manage to find new recruits of 
willing assassins. Lone and mad murderers also must be added to this 
list. In short, killing leaders and leadership will go on in the years to 
come.  
The mindset of the assassins is often simplistic. The anarchists 
thought that killing leaders might in the end bring about a “leaderless 
world.”32 The suicidal terrorists of today have, in comparison with 
anarchists, more limited aspirations, but still far-reaching and often 
dramatic ones: the independence of Chechnya, the elimination of the 
state of Israel, an American military withdrawal from Iraq, or a 
triumphant Taliban movement. 
The Leavitt’s diamond is a model that might help us avoid 
simplistic analysis. It is a kind of checklist reminding us of the 
importance of process, people, technology, and organization. It is an 
important development compared with, for instance, “technological 
determinism,” which was much in vogue before Leavitt. Emphasizing 
the importance of four factors widens the applicability of his model in 
comparison with sociotechnical analysis—an analysis identifying only 
two factors: technology and the social system. The interplay of the 
factors in the diamond model might define the window of opportunity.  
We began by using the shooting down of Yamamoto as an 
illustration of skillful planning and execution considering all four 
factors (process, people, technology, and organization), but when we 
added examples of how and why leaders have been killed, the 
Yamamoto example got a new meaning as an extraordinary exception 
to the rule. In general, the most striking outcome of assassinations is 
the many unintended and unforeseen consequences. The assassins have 
not had enough foresight, but in most cases they have been in very 
good company, as unfortunately, no one else had foresight either. 
Princip was certainly not able to foresee the many processes set in 
motion by his shots in Sarajevo. Few—very few—seemed to be able to 
foresee these processes, and no one was able to change or stop them. 
Leavitt’s model is a model fit for middle-range processes, not grand 
                                                     
32 The original meaning of the word “anarchism.” 
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history. It is, however, hard to know when the first ends and the second 
begins. 
Confronted by a case of a killed leader—or worse, killed 
leadership—it might be useful to start analysis using Leavitt’s 
diamond. One advantage of such an exercise is that we do not forget 
the importance of organization and process. In an era of asymmetrical 
warfare, no one can afford forgetting the importance of these aspects. 
Some terror organizations seem to be more transformed 
organizationally than the counterinsurgency organizations supposedly 
teaching them a lesson they will never forget. Leavitt’s model can be 
used as a reminder of the challenges of transforming process, people, 
technology, and organization and managing a skillful interplay of these 
factors, but by and large, applying Leavitt’s model is only a start. A 
four-factor model is incapable of revealing a reality that is infinitely 
more complicated. What we experience as unintended consequences of 
a leader being killed might be caused by a factor x or n-factors that are 
not part of Leavitt’s model.  
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Outside-In and Inside-Out 
Approaches to 
Transformation 
By Richard L. Hughes and Andrew G. Stricker 
 
Abstract 
To be successful in the future, organizations will need greater agility, 
better complex collaboration across organizational boundaries, 
enhanced collective learning, and overall greater strategic synergy. 
Efforts to develop such capabilities rarely have achieved desired 
levels of success, in part because they invariably require real 
transformation, not just incremental improvement, and because 
insufficient attention—if any at all—has been given to the leadership 
and cultural dimensions of transformation. Ongoing research at the 
Center for Creative Leadership has identified a particular kind of 
leadership culture that is most naturally adapted to these 
capabilities—an interdependent or collaborative culture. The center’s 
work also suggests that success in transformation requires significant 
intentionality in implementing such culture change. 
One reason that intentionality is necessary is because new patterns 
of cultural interaction need to be encouraged persistently. Virtual 
simulations represent an opportunity to facilitate new cultural 
behaviors le collaborative learning and interactivity across different 
parts of functional areas or organizations, some of the very 
capabilities most organizations are attempting to develop. This essay 
explores the possible application of virtual reality simulations 
developed by the U.S. Air Force for individual and organizational 
learning as part of a transformation effort. Our particular interest 
here focuses on the optimal features of a simulation designed for 
practicing shared sense-making, collective learning, and complex 
collaboration.  
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Introduction 
he kinds of capabilities that organizations need to be successful 
in the face of changing competitive threats and opportunities of 
the 21st century include greater agility, better complex 
collaboration across organizational boundaries, enhanced collective 
learning, and overall greater strategic synergy. Developing these 
capabilities usually requires fundamental organizational transformation, 
not merely incremental improvement in current practices. 
In contrast, the record of successful organizational transformations 
over the past several decades is dismal (e.g., Beer & Nohria, 2000a, 
2000b; Hirschorn, 2000; Roberto & Levesque, 2005). An examination 
of many of these attempted transformations indicates that most 
involved either exclusive or primary emphasis on changes in 
organizational structure, systems, or processes. Typically there is 
insufficient attention (if any at all) to the leadership and cultural 
dimensions of transformation. In the corporate sector, for example, 
such inattention is considered to be the most common reason for the 
relatively small proportion of mergers and acquisitions that are actually 
performed at levels commensurate with original expectations and 
projections.  
It is not the case that changes in organizational structure, systems, or 
processes are unimportant, it is that they are rarely sufficient. If true 
organizational transformation is needed, then complementary 
approaches are called for involving what might be described as both 
“outside-in” and “inside-out” efforts. Outside-in efforts are changes in 
structure, systems, and processes that essentially involve conforming 
behavior to new external (to the person) demands. Inside-out efforts, in 
contrast, involve changing values, assumptions, and beliefs about how 
best to achieve effective direction, alignment, and commitment 
throughout the organization.  
One of the reasons that the importance of both outside-in and inside-
out approaches to transformation is underappreciated is that although 
senior leaders and executives invariably recognize the importance of a 
sound business strategy, few appreciate the critical role that a sound 
and coherent leadership strategy also must play in successful 
transformation. Leadership strategy should include at least two main 
components: an approach to developing the kinds of leaders needed in 
the “new” organization (e.g., what new competencies should leaders 
possess?), and an approach to developing leadership in the new 
T 
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organization that involves more than developing the competencies of 
individual leaders. For example, leadership development should 
address the kind of organizational context within which those 
individual leaders and teams will function (e.g., reward systems, 
information systems, culture, norms, etc.).  
This distinction is useful because for decades organizations have 
tended to focus their leadership development energies and resources on 
developing individual leader competencies, often via “leadership 
development programs.” Frequently, however, when individuals 
returned from such programs (whether offered in-house or via external 
vendors) to their workplace environments, numerous factors tended to 
subvert them in their efforts to implement newly learned behaviors. It 
has become progressively clear in recent years that if organizations 
want to nurture particular behaviors in leaders, they need to ensure that 
they have the kinds of formal and informal systems and practices that 
encourage and sustain (i.e., not just train) such behaviors. Leadership 
development can be thought of as addressing the fabric of leadership in 
an organization, and it must involve both outside-in and inside-out 
elements.  
The Role of Culture in Organizational Transformation 
One of the most challenging aspects of inside-out transformation 
concerns an organization’s leadership culture. In general, culture can be 
thought of as a set of unwritten rules or assumptions about “the way 
things are around here.” One thing that makes culture so elusive is its 
essentially implicit nature. For example, Paparone, Anderson, and 
McDaniel (2008, 435) write that: 
because mental models are often subconscious and ingrained from 
many years of indoctrination and socialization, changing these 
‘theories in use’ is not easy. Operators and non-operators alike have 
entrenched notions of what the military should look like, and each 
has a deep vested interest in the present way of doing things. 
Another factor that complicates an analysis of culture is that in 
virtually every organization, there are several qualitatively different 
cultures or mindsets about leadership that are simultaneously, if 
inharmoniously, present. Ongoing research at the Center for Creative 
Leadership has identified three particular orientations to leadership that 
characterize an organization’s leadership culture. 
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Conformer. This cultural orientation is broadly characterized by the 
assumption that only people in positions of authority are responsible for 
leadership. This assumption often leads to organizations that emphasize 
top-down control and deference to authority. In addition, decision-
making authority tends to be concentrated in a few senior positions, 
with seniority and position levels as an important source of status, a 
conservative approach to change, an emphasis on keeping things 
running smoothly, and the tendency to publicly smooth over mistakes 
(also described as a dependent culture). 
Achiever. This cultural orientation is broadly characterized by the 
assumption that leadership emerges as needed from a variety of 
individuals based on knowledge and expertise. This assumption may 
lead to decentralized decision-making, high demand for individual 
responsibility, strong reliance on experts and expertise, and competition 
among experts. Other characteristics of an achiever orientation include 
individual performance as an important source of success and status, an 
emphasis on taking calculated risks, open disagreement, and 
independent actions within functions or workgroups (also described as 
an independent culture). 
Collaborator. This cultural orientation is broadly characterized by 
the assumption that leadership is a collective activity requiring mutual 
inquiry and learning. This assumption may lead to the widespread use 
of dialogue, collaboration, horizontal networks, valuing of differences, 
and a focus on individual and collective learning. Other characteristics 
include the ability to work effectively across organizational boundaries, 
openness and candor, multifaceted standards of success, and synergies 
being sought across the whole enterprise (also described as an 
interdependent culture). 
To complicate things further, the same words may be used in these 
various cultures in reference to quite different kinds of behaviors. Take 
the very word used to describe the third culture above: collaboration. 
People in conformer and achiever cultures also obviously talk about 
collaboration, but they typically mean something essentially different 
from how it is meant within a true collaborator culture. For example, in 
conformer cultures, the word may be used to describe “mere” 
cooperation, such as making certain resources, materials, and so on 
available to other departments. It typically would not be used to 
describe cross-departmental, or even cross-organizational, efforts to 
create shared meaning in the face of ambiguous conditions, as such 
efforts would not likely even arise in conformer cultures. 
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A distinction between what has been called simple collaboration and 
complex collaboration may be helpful here. The distinctions are 
highlighted in table 1 (Mankin et al., 2004; Hughes and Palus, 2005). 
 
Simple Collaboration Complex Collaboration 
Well-defined task 
Two people 
With much in common 
Common goals 
Face to face 
High task uncertainty 
Multiple people 
Diverse 
Different goals and agendas 
Virtual 
Table 1: Simple and Complex Collaboration (Source: Mankin et al., 2004) 
In simple collaboration, tasks are routine and well-defined. They are 
predictable and manageable, and the procedures for addressing them 
are well understood. Complex collaboration, in contrast, is 
characterized by tasks that are nonroutine and highly uncertain. The 
simplest form of collaboration is between just two people, growing 
more complex as more people are involved. Furthermore, it is not just 
the number of people collaborating that changes the nature of 
collaboration; greater diversity among parties also increases 
complexity, whether it is diversity across points of view, personalities, 
values, loyalties, or other differences. Differences in goals and 
objectives significantly increase the complexity of collaborative efforts, 
and collaboration is simpler and easier when the parties can meet face-
to-face. When people in conformer cultures talk about collaboration, it 
is usually in terms of tasks involving simple collaboration; when people 
in collaborative cultures do so, it is more often in terms of tasks 
requiring complex collaboration. It is precisely because conformer and 
achiever cultures are not well suited to dealing with challenges 
requiring complex collaboration that many organizations are now 
striving to develop more collaborative cultures. 
In fact, complex collaboration itself may be thought of as just one 
particular manifestation of more fundamental organizational 
capabilities of collective learning and general adaptability to dynamic 
conditions. Behaving in strategically effective ways in an ill-defined 
yet rapidly changing context requires an adaptive learning capacity by 
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individuals, teams, organizations, and even networks of organizations. 
No longer is it sensible to think that behaving in ways strategically 
important to the organization means merely following deliberate 
strategic plans prescribing detailed supporting tactics and resource 
commitments. Increasingly, strategy itself (and by implication its 
development, communication, implementation, and ongoing 
refinement/revision) needs to be thought of as an ongoing learning 
process throughout the organization, rather than as a document (Hughes 
and Beatty, 2005). 
This is consistent with calls for transformation within the military’s 
approaches to strategic leadership (Paparone et al., 2008, 434): “In a 
turbulent environment, the hierarchically focused strategic leadership 
will suffice less and less because it cannot respond to changing 
circumstances in a timely manner. The environment demands the 
simultaneous adaptation of entire organizations rather than change that 
trickles down from higher authority.”  
Rather than placing primary emphasis on a document (“strategic 
plan”), it may be more helpful to emphasize the kinds of conversations 
that go on in the organization concerning continuously emerging and 
strategically significant information and ideas. In other words, “being 
strategic”—at whatever one’s level or function in an organization—
depends increasingly on the nature and quality of conversations that 
one has with others in the organization—conversations that need to be 
supported through information and other systems, as well as through an 
organizational culture that values and encourages interdependence and 
collaboration across boundaries. Effective leadership in the future will 
depend on continuous learning, and relatively less on what senior 
leaders know than on their ability to create conditions in which ongoing 
and pertinent information-sharing and learning throughout the 
organization is prized and practiced (Hughes and Beatty, 2005). To put 
it differently, having organizations that are adaptive in the face of 
dynamic conditions will require, in part, more adaptive forms of 
organizational culture.  
This is important in that the three orientations to leadership culture 
described here represent different points along a continuum of 
developmental maturity, such that, generally speaking, the greater the 
salience of the collaborator orientation in the mix, the greater that 
organization’s capacity is likely to be for coping effectively with 
complex, ill-defined, and dynamic environments (even when 
collaborating may not yet be the dominant orientation).  
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A look at the differing values and beliefs associated with these three 
distinct orientations helps shed light on the intuitive sense many people 
share that changing organizational culture is at best a challenging and 
long-term process (often characterized as taking several years, if not a 
decade). It is also easy to appreciate that this transformation is aptly 
thought of as an inside-out change because it involves changing 
assumptions, beliefs, and values. Some additional factors making 
culture change so difficult include the difficulty of changing behavior 
in an environment that outwardly has not changed; marginal levels of 
proficiency in new behaviors, which may discourage attempts to 
practice them in a public context; political risks associated with 
“different” leadership behaviors; and so on. 
Given this widely recognized difficulty of changing culture, it may 
be worth reconsidering the question of whether the cost is worth the 
gain. Perhaps not surprisingly, there are few empirical studies that shed 
definitive light on the question. It is worth noting, however, the 
findings of researchers at the Center for Creative Leadership, whose 
work on the nature of interdependent organizations provided the basis 
for the three types of organizational cultures described here. Although 
the nature of their research (exploratory case studies) prevented 
definitive conclusions about the causes of organizational performance, 
the researchers noted two findings that stood out across all the 
exemplar organizations they studied (McCauley et al., 2008, 43): 
• Organizational learning. A number of the interdependent 
practices fostered organizational learning. Across the 
organizations, more people had access to more information, 
more shared sense-making was created, improvements to 
systems and processes were generated, new solutions were 
created, and organizational change was facilitated. 
• Enhanced organizational capabilities. The researchers also saw 
examples of how interdependent practices contributed to 
enhanced organizational capabilities. Examples included an 
organization that turned around underperforming, newly 
acquired units; an organization whose new corporate identity at 
least partly has overcome its former negative brand identity; 
and an organization’s improved ability to address patient safety 
problems. 
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Using Virtual Reality to Facilitate Culture Change and 
Organizational Transformation 
Of all of the characteristics of a collaborative culture, perhaps the 
one most central to making a successful transformation is collective 
learning—valuing it and becoming proficient in it. In many ways, 
collective learning represents the essence of becoming a more 
collaborative culture. This is true both in the obvious sense that 
everyone in the transforming organization needs to learn (adapt to and 
buy into) new systems and behavioral norms, and also in the deeper 
sense that continuous collective learning is a hallmark of and core 
competency of a collaborative culture. This raises the question, then, of 
how best to describe and encourage desired new forms and patterns of 
interaction in the face of the kinds of barriers to successful culture 
change noted earlier.  
It is no small thing to even adequately describe desired new patterns 
of interaction, as everyday vocabulary often poorly conveys critical 
subtleties and nuances. For example, the word collaboration is familiar 
to everyone. However, the connotation of the word to people holding a 
predominantly achiever orientation may be more or less synonymous 
with (mere) cooperation, whereas it has a much richer and more 
complex meaning to people who fully embrace a more collaborative 
culture. In other words, most people might easily endorse the 
importance of collaboration, but different people might mean quite 
different things by their endorsement. 
One major challenge, then, would seem to be how best to convey to 
organizational members just what collaboration, collective learning, 
sense-making, and so on should look and feel like in the new, 
transformed culture while simultaneously minimizing the degree of 
personal and organizational risk associated with performing new 
behaviors in a clumsy or ineffective manner. One approach for doing 
that is suggested by recent uses of virtual reality in higher education.  
For example, one professor described a new approach to higher 
education as “virtual conversation,” which by its nature seems to “turn 
passive, knowledge-receiving students into active, knowledge-making 
students” (Robbins-Bell, 2008, 24). This professor’s contrast of the 
stereotypical lecture hall experience of education with what is 
happening now in virtual environments seems intriguingly similar to 
the contrasting natures of predominantly conformer versus collaborator 
cultures. Perhaps there can be an analogous application of virtual 
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reality to organizational learning, in which complex collaboration, 
shared sense-making, and collective learning are practiced in 
challenging—if simulated—environments. It would be even more 
valuable if such practice involved not just the opportunity to practice 
new patterns of interaction but also the very technologies people would 
be using in their “new” organization (e.g., information technology 
systems for virtual collaboration). 
It is no coincidence that the U.S. Air Force has been actively 
exploring innovative approaches to individual and organizational 
learning. Getting the mix of live, virtual, and constructive delivery 
methods right is essential, and the U.S. Air Force is moving forward 
quickly in the development of new virtual and constructive simulation 
capabilities by leveraging existing and emerging technology (Stricker 
and Clemons, 2009). One such development is the use of virtual worlds 
and immersive environments to facilitate learning. 
Designing a Virtual Simulation for Interdependent Leadership 
Virtual simulations represent an opportunity to facilitate 
collaborative learning and interactivity across different parts of 
functional areas or organizations. Our particular interest here focuses 
on the optimal features of a simulation designed for practicing shared 
sense-making, collective learning, and complex collaboration.  
One desirable design feature to achieve such objectives pertains to 
what might be called the simulation’s contextual flexibility. It would 
seem advantageous to have a virtual world area wherein avatars could 
freely move about and interact amid relatively lifelike terrain, 
buildings, and tools and equipment. It would also seem advantageous if 
the context could support adaptations to the simulation based on 
specific cultural–geographic or technological contexts, as well as 
adaptations based on participant performance (Stricker & Clemons, 
2009). 
A second desirable feature pertains to what might be called the 
simulation’s feedback richness. Individual and group feedback systems 
would be desirable for supporting such logistical and documentation 
requirements as assignments of team membership, performance 
tracking, voice and text communication within and across teams, video 
recording of activity, and various timing and feedback controls for use 
by simulation referees (Stricker & Clemons, 2009).  
The third desirable design feature pertains to our purpose here in 
facilitating organizational culture change, and particularly in 
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developing interdependent leadership. The simulation would need to 
present interactional and decision-making challenges representative of 
interdependent leadership that individuals and teams in actual 
organizations might confront. Furthermore, there would need to be 
scoring criteria or rubrics for assessing the relative level of 
interdependent (versus independent or dependent) leadership behaviors 
that occurred. For example, “beginning,” “intermediate,” and 
“advanced” benchmarks could be established by which formal 
observers of the simulation could assess interdependent leadership 
behaviors like these, as identified by McCauley et al. (2008): 
• soliciting diverse or fresh perspectives from others; 
• facilitating or seeking shared sense-making, co-constructing 
direction, alignment, and/or commitment; 
• engaging in dialogue to explore differences; 
• actively managing polarities of diverse perspectives; 
• openness to revision and change of strategy or approach; and 
• engaging in self-authorized decision-making. 
In fact, this is just what Stricker and his associates have done. Using 
the theoretical framework of interdependent leadership described here, 
they constructed a game sufficiently complex, ill-defined, and dynamic 
to create a valid laboratory for practicing collective sense-making, 
learning, and complex collaboration in the context of military decision-
making. Their goal was to simulate a naturalistic decision-making 
environment in which interdependent leadership practices could be 
experienced and assessed, given that an ill-structured problem or 
challenge is introduced, the best course of action (COA) is uncertain, 
competing goals are present, and time pressure and constraints are 
dynamically put into play. Multiple-event feedback loops are also 
introduced with unfolding game events, coupled with knowledge-rich 
sources of additional information presented to the participants by game 
leaders. The premise is that the key to a successful outcome to the 
challenge lies in the effectiveness of the participating team’s 
interdependent leadership practices in initially constructing a plausible 
COA, assessing unfolding events over time, and adapting the COA 
using a vigilant or hypervigilant decision-making strategy as the 
situation demands.  
Because the incorporation of vigilant and hypervigilant approaches 
to decision-making is so central to Stricker et al.’s simulation, it is 
worth exploring those concepts in a bit more detail. Table 2 depicts 
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differences between vigilant and hypervigilant decision-making 
strategies (Johnston et al., 1997). 
Stricker and his associates reasoned that during most of the 
simulation, it would be beneficial to switch appropriately between a 
vigilant and hypervigilant decision-making strategy, depending on 
changing levels of time pressure and other constraints. Their view was 
based on the work of Klein (1989), who introduced the recognition-
primed decision model.  
Vigilant Decision-making Hypervigilant Decision-making 
Decision-maker thoroughly scans 
all available information 
Decision-maker scans information 
in a systematic and sequential 
manner 
Decision-maker devotes a 
consistent amount of attention to 
each data point 
Decision-maker reviews all 
alternatives before making a 
decision 
Decision-maker scans only information 
needed to make an assessment 
Decision-maker scans information in 
any sequence 
Decision-maker rapidly attends to 
selected data points 
Decision-maker reviews needed 
information only when required 
Table 2: Vigilant Versus Hypervigilant Decision-making 
Klein (1989) argued that severe time pressures may mitigate against 
the use of analytic decision strategies, and the recognition-primed 
decision model describes how decision-makers can intuitively 
recognize a plausible COA without the use of a multiple options or a 
detailed analytic decision-making process when under time pressure. 
Research has shown that intuitive decision-making can result in higher 
performance than analytical processes (Johnston et al., 1997), and the 
critical skill seems to be the ability to adapt decision-making strategies 
to the situation at hand. The design of the simulation described here 
was based on the notion that a team’s successful switching between and 
use of appropriate decision-making strategies will rest largely on the 
use of interdependent leadership practices.  
The Simulation Scenario 
Dr. Andrew Stricker and his team at Air University have been 
developing an elaborate constellation of virtual reality “worlds” in 
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Second Life on the Internet. The part of greatest relevance to us here 
involves the simulation of an international terrorist hostage situation, 
and it might be helpful to briefly describe the rationale and nature of 
the simulation while keeping in mind that the actual scenario involves 
logistical, economic, political, and military complexities similar to 
those that an actual incident would involve, as well as—importantly for 
our purposes—both tactical and strategic dimensions. Of course, the 
specific context, in this case a hostage situation, is relatively 
unimportant. What is central to the issue of facilitating organizational 
transformation is creating a simulation that is sufficiently complex, ill-
defined, and dynamic to create a valid laboratory for practicing shared 
sense-making, collective learning, and complex collaboration. Here is 
the scenario in brief: 
A team of humanitarian workers was taken hostage while on a relief 
mission to a small island belonging to the country of Murma 
following a devastating typhoon. The team’s response to the crisis 
was delayed for weeks in no small part because Murma has been 
under military rule since World War II and has been isolated from the 
broader international community.  
A small team of relief workers went to find additional survivors in the 
island’s foothills, but they were taken hostage by a group of 
insurgents opposed to the ruling Murma government and taken to a 
location in the southern foothills of the island in what appeared to be 
a war-torn German wolfpack submarine base abandoned after World 
War II (see Attachment 1). It gradually became clear that the 
insurgents held ideological beliefs similar to Islamic insurgents. In 
fact, some of them had been trained and fought as a fundamentalist 
proxy military force for Al Qaeda. During the insurgents’ 
interrogation of the hostages, they learned that a physician who had 
been taken captive was the daughter of a very popular ruler of Murma 
during World War II, though she had fled Murma with her mother 
decades ago. Her importance to the insurgents increased significantly 
when her identity and national roots became known.  
The capture of the relief workers by the insurgents soon became 
known to Murma leaders, and they subsequently demanded that all 
remaining relief workers immediately leave the island in preparation 
for the arrival of a Murma military force to attack the insurgents. The 
Murma leaders expressed little concern for the physician, as she had 
now been identified as a descendent of the popular ruling family they 
had removed from power after World War II, and thus was considered 
a potential threat to the existing military rule.  
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Given the situational factors of the unfolding crisis, intense 
negotiations were held involving the Murma leaders, representatives 
of the United States, and other international leaders. The negotiations 
resulted in an agreement for a U.S.-led multinational force to land in 
Murma, prepared to attempt the rescue of the hostages before the 
planned attack by the Murma military on the insurgent stronghold in 
the foothills.  
This scenario includes both tactical and strategic dimensions, and 
different virtual reality simulations could be designed emphasizing 
differentiated learning outcomes appropriate to each. The tactical 
dimension could involve virtual participation as members of the 
hostage rescue team (HRT) itself, including specific assignments and 
constraints given it by the international strategic team overseeing and 
directing the HRT’s work. For example, the HRT could be scored on 
the basis of the amount of time it takes to rescue the hostages, 
situational awareness “on the ground,” minimizing casualties and 
collateral damage, HRT group dynamics and collective learning, and so 
on. 
Of greater relevance and interest for our purposes, however, is the 
potential to design a different simulation focusing on the team 
monitoring the HRT’s actions in Murma. Designing a simulation 
focusing on this latter team would seem to provide greater opportunity 
for participants to practice truly collaborative or interdependent 
leadership. That is because the challenges facing this team (relative to 
the HRT itself) seem inherently more ambiguous, dynamic, and 
boundary-spanning in nature. For example, it seems reasonable that 
strategic oversight of the HRT’s mission (e.g., to include a final “go” or 
“no go” on the rescue itself) should not be scored in quite so definitive 
a way as scoring for the HRT, as described above. Strategic oversight 
of the HRT mission could be placed in the broader context of other 
contemporaneous situations being monitored, as well as the effect that 
HRT actions in Murma might have on other near-term and long-term 
U.S. interests elsewhere in the world.  
Of course, there is nothing inherent in the specifics of a hostage 
rescue scenario that is necessary for simulating collaborative or 
interdependent leadership. Numerous other scenarios could also suffice, 
including civilian versions, such as managing complex sets of first-
responders in a widespread urban catastrophe. Furthermore, if separate 
tactical and strategic virtual reality simulations were constructed in this 
manner, whatever the context, it would need to be determined whether 
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the respective learning outcomes would be enhanced by the two 
simulations running concurrently (truly a “simulation within a 
simulation”) or independently and separately. 
So what might be some possible benefits of a virtual reality 
simulation like this (more specifically, the strategic version) for 
facilitating organizational transformation? We can think of several. 
Perhaps most obviously, such a simulation would create a practice 
field for interacting virtually as team members challenged with 
collective sense-making in a complex and critical, yet ill-defined, 
situation. It seems beyond question that one of the drivers of 
organizational transformation today is the need for greater effectiveness 
in virtual complex collaboration. Systematic feedback could be 
provided both to individual participants as virtual team members and to 
their virtual teams as teams, concerning multiple dimensions of their 
individual and collective effectiveness. 
For various reasons noted earlier, it is often difficult to convey in 
“mere words” what new behaviors and patterns of interaction are 
expected of people in a new culture or transformed organization. 
Virtual reality simulations are increasingly lifelike in multiple sensory 
dimensions, and the ability to create increasingly realistic patterns of 
social interaction in virtual reality make it possible to depict and 
practice what interdependent interactions in a transformed organization 
will look like. 
Because organizational transformation is a long-duration process 
that is inevitably somewhat emergent in nature, results from various 
“runs” of a simulation could provide useful feedback to the ongoing 
transformation effort itself. For example, certain kinds of 
organizational information-sharing practices and information 
technology systems could be developed and enhanced based on such 
feedback from the simulation. Of course, one might say, “Why not just 
get better feedback from the actual work processes of the organization 
itself? Why do you need a simulation when you can just learn from 
your actual interactions?” 
Perhaps, but in our experience, at least, well-designed simulations, 
when accompanied with effective debriefing, lead to insights that 
simply do not commonly arise and are even less frequently voiced in 
the context of work itself. Such simulation debriefings, which 
encourage public feedback and both individual and collective learning, 
can be a vital part of modeling and encouraging precisely the 
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interdependent leadership behaviors usually desired in a transformation 
effort. 
In the individual and collective learning that could result from the 
simulation, both facets of a comprehensive leadership strategy for 
transformation could be served: individual leader development and 
leadership development (e.g., strengthening key aspects of the desired 
culture). 
Of course, such benefits presume that virtual reality simulations can, 
in fact, mimic the belief systems and subtle patterns of interaction that 
are characteristic of the distinctive leadership cultures. Therefore, a first 
order of business would be to validate whether virtual reality 
capabilities can support the applications described earlier. Three 
particular questions would need to be answered in an action research 
project to validate virtual reality capabilities for this purpose: 
1. Can avatars in a virtual reality simulation (i.e., computer three-
dimensional versions of simulation participants) reliably 
portray subtle yet distinctive behaviors that are consistent with 
the conformer/dependent, achiever/independent, and 
collaborator/interdependent patterns of culture?  
2. Can participants in a virtual reality simulation learn to identify 
these patterns and control relevant aspects of their (avatar) 
interactions with others? 
3. Under what conditions, if any, does participants’ learning in a 
virtual reality simulation transfer to changed behavior in their 
actual work organization?  
Conclusion 
One of the most important elements of a viable and sustainable 
organizational transformation process is to ensure that organizational 
members have a clear understanding of the culture and leadership 
dimensions of the change, as well as to ensure that those valued 
patterns of behavior are encouraged both formally and informally as the 
transformation is being implemented. The culture change effort should 
include an in-depth exploration of the kinds of individual and collective 
behaviors valued in the new culture with supporting actions to ensure it 
becomes an internalized, “inside-out” process of personal and 
collective transformation, as well as an “outside-in” process of merely 
informing organizational members “how it will be.”  
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Toward those ends, organizations should develop leadership 
strategies describing the rationale for culture and leadership change, as 
well as offering training and development opportunities for deepening 
understanding of and practicing new leadership behaviors. The 
leadership strategy for culture change could include an exploration not 
only of what new behaviors are valued, but also why, and an 
opportunity to explore the implications of acting in the old versus new 
ways in the face of complex, ambiguous, and changing challenges. 
Depending on how the three questions posed above are answered, an 
organization’s leadership strategy for facilitating the culture and 
leadership dimensions of transformation might incorporate virtual 
reality simulations of shared sense-making, collective learning, and 
complex collaboration.  
This all suggests at least two implications for training and education 
in the military with regard to developing these capabilities. One of 
them is somewhat tactical in nature, and the other more strategic. The 
more tactical implication is that, assuming answers to the three 
questions warrant it, it would seem useful to develop a variety of 
training and education virtual reality scenarios representing distinct and 
targeted points along the range of challenging situations in which, for 
example, complex collaboration may be required. In doing so, it is 
likely to be the case that the categorization of collaboration into just the 
two types suggested in table 1 (simple and complex) is likely to be 
insufficient for robust training and education efforts. It is easy to 
imagine intermediate categories of task challenge requiring 
correspondingly intermediate degrees of individual and organizational 
collaborative capacity.  
A number of such virtual collaboration tasks in network-centric 
warfare were suggested by Alberts, Garstka, and Stein (1999). Consider 
one: providing virtual support services from centralized locations by 
moving information. It seems reasonable to describe that as an example 
of virtual collaboration on a relatively structured task. We can also 
imagine, however, scenarios requiring virtual collaboration on highly 
ambiguous, ill-defined, and dynamic tasks (e.g., the above hostage 
scenario). It seems likely that training and education efforts to develop 
individual and collective capabilities in the face of such challenges 
should need to progress systematically from simpler challenges to more 
intermediate ones, and only then to the most complex and demanding 
forms. If we are to use virtual reality effectively in the service of the 
goals cited at the beginning of this essay—enhancing agility, 
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encouraging better complex collaboration across organizational 
boundaries, enhancing collective learning and overall greater strategic 
synergy—then it may prove useful to design training and education 
experiences that systematically help students take steps through 
progressively more challenging kinds of organizational challenges. In 
other words, not merely design the most sophisticated, challenging, and 
complex virtual reality simulation possible and “throw them into it” 
but, rather, develop something like a suite of simulations composed of 
progressively more challenging conditions. 
On the more strategic front (and independent of virtual reality as a 
training methodology), we should recognize that developing 
capabilities like enhanced agility, collective learning, and such are not 
how most Department of Defense educational institutions have 
historically defined their measures of student success. As with most of 
higher education, they have tended to define student requirements and 
success in terms of completing a particular course of instruction (i.e., 
particular sets of courses with passing grades), rather than in terms of 
demonstrating particular kinds of individual or collective competencies 
or outcomes. Yet most of those same institutions are themselves in the 
midst of something like a sea change in the standards by which they 
will be held accountable for accomplishing their missions.  
Standards of accreditation across virtually all of higher education 
now include requirements to demonstrate enhancements in student 
outcomes that transcend particular courses or disciplinary boundaries 
(e.g., outcomes like critical thinking, oral and written communication, 
decision-making, teamwork, information literacy, etc.). So we end here 
with a transformation question for our schools: What would it mean to 
our Department of Defense educational institutions if they were 
required to design educational experiences less around which courses 
students need to take and more to demonstrate enhancements in 
individual and collective student outcomes? It would seem to mean that 
our educational institutions themselves are in need of transformation. If 
our educational institutions are to prepare their students to deal 
effectively with the challenges of transformation, then those same 
institutions probably need to change themselves both outside-in and 
inside-out. 
References 
Alberts, D.S. et al. (1999). Network Centric Warfare: Developing and 
Leveraging Information Superiority. CCRP Publication Series. 
  
206  •  Hughes and Stricker
 
Beer, M. & Nohria, N. (2000a). “Cracking the Code of Change.” Harvard 
Business Review, May–June, 133–141. 
Beer, M. & Nohria, N. (2000b). “Resolving the Tension Between Theories E 
and O of Change,” in Beer and Nohria, eds. Breaking the Code of Change. 
Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1–34. 
Hirschhorn, L. (2000). “Changing Structure Is Not Enough,” in Beer and 
Nohria, eds. Breaking the Code of Change. Boston, MA: Harvard Business 
School Press, 161–176. 
Hughes, R.L. & Beatty, K.C. (2005). Becoming A Strategic Leader: Your Role 
in Your Organization’s Enduring Success. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.  
Hughes, R.L. & Palus, C. (2005). “The Development of Effective 
Collaboration in Organizations.” A Connected Leadership Project white paper. 
Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative Leadership. 
Johnston, J.H. et al. (1997). “Vigilant and Hypervigilant Decision Making.” 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 82(4), 614–622. 
Klein, G.A. (1989). “Strategies of Decision Making.” Military Review, 56–64. 
Mankin, D. et al. (2004). “Developing Complex Collaborations: Basic 
Principles to Guide Design and Implementation,” in Complex Collaborations: 
Building the Capabilities for Working Across Boundaries, Beyerlein, M.M. et 
al., eds. Elsevier, 1–26.  
McCauley, C.D. et al. (2008). “Interdependent Leadership in Organizations: 
Evidence From Six Case Studies.” A Center for Creative Leadership Report, 
CCL No. 190. 
McGuire, J.B. et al. (2008). “Inside Out: Transforming Your Leadership  
Culture.” Leadership In Action, 27(6), 3–7. 
Paparone, C.R. et al. (2008). “Where Military Professionalism Meets 
Complexity Science.” Armed Forces & Society, 34(3), 433–449.  
Robbins-Bell, S. (2008). “Higher Education as Virtual Conversation,” 
EDUCAUSE Review, September/October, 24–34. 
Roberto, M.A. & Levesque, L.C. (2005). “The Art of Making Change 
Initiatives Stick.” MIT Sloan Management Review, 46(4), 53–61. 
Stricker, A.G. & Clemons, L. (2009). “Simulation Gaming for Education in 
MyBase: The Future of Air Force Education and Training With Virtual World 





What do Senior Leaders 
Need to Know About 
Cyberspace? 
By Jeffrey Caton 
 
Abstract 
Cyberspace can be an enabler for beneficial transformation, but it 
also can be exploited as a dark force to thwart such efforts. 
International entities cannot extract themselves from cyberspace. 
What must senior security leaders know about cyberspace to 
transform their organizations and make wise decisions? How does 
the enduring cyberspace process interact with and transform 
organizations, technology, and people, and, in turn, how do they 
transform cyberspace itself?  
To evaluate these questions, this essay establishes the enduring 
nature of the cyberspace process and compares this relative constant 
to transformation of organizations and people. Each section 
discussing these areas provides an assessment of their status as well 
as identifies key issues for senior security leaders to comprehend 
now and work to resolve in the future. Specific issues include viewing 
cyberspace as a new strategic common akin to the sea, comparing 
effectiveness of existing hierarchies in achieving cybersecurity 
against networked adversaries, and balancing efficiency and 
effectiveness of security against the universal laws of privacy and 
human rights. Finally, leaders need to scan the strategic horizon for 
potential cyberspace-related technological and societal trends and 
shocks and provide clear visions for success to their organizations.  
Introduction 
he growth of worldwide cyberspace-related capabilities is a 
double-edged sword. Cyberspace can be used as an enabler for 
beneficial transformation, but it also can be exploited as a dark T 
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force to thwart such efforts. 1 Senior security leaders must deal with 
both sides, and with increasing frequency and greater risks to their 
missions. Simply put, international entities cannot extract themselves 
from cyberspace. Given this, what must senior security leaders know 
about cyberspace to transform their organizations and make wise 
decisions? How does the enduring cyberspace process interact with and 
transform organizations, technology, and people, and in turn, how do 
they transform cyberspace itself? 
This essay addresses broad applications of the cyberspace process 
across diplomatic, informational, military, and economic communities 
worldwide. Although it discusses technological implications, it avoids 
detailed technical aspects that might detract from the strategic nature of 
the content. 
To evaluate the central questions posed here, this essay establishes 
the enduring nature of the cyberspace process and compares this 
relative constant to transformation of organizations and people. Of 
course, none of these dimensions exist in isolation—the analytical 
simplification of evaluating one variable at a time enhances focus and 
readability. Each section provides an assessment of the status of the 
dimensions and identifies key issues for senior security leaders to 
comprehend now and work to resolve in the future.  
Background 
The term cyberspace2 often carries an aura of mystery that may 
belie its fundamental nature. Many respected authors assert that 
cyberspace and its applications are revolutionary. Rather than argue 
this point, I posit that the basic process governing cyberspace is defined 
                                                     
1 The following definitions are used for this chapter: Cyberspace is (1) a 
global domain within the information environment consisting of the 
interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including 
the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded 
processors and controllers (England 2008) and their operators; (2) a new 
strategic common, analogous to the sea as an international domain of trade and 
communication (Cebrowski 2004). Transformation is a process that shapes the 
changing nature of competition and cooperation through new combinations of 
concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations (Rumsfeld 2003, 3) 
2 Science fiction author William F. Gibson is credited with coining the 
term “cyberspace” and popularizing it in his book Neuromancer (Gibson 
1984) 
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easily. Further, when viewed as a “strategic common,” cyberspace 
indeed shares many characteristics with the sea, but it also has unique 
ones as well (Cebrowski, 2004). These distinctive aspects relevant to 
security within cyberspace are the focus of this essay. 
In its simplest form, the cyberspace process consists of three 
elements—cognitive, informational, and physical (Woolley, 2006). For 
example, someone generates and articulates a thought (cognitive), and 
enters the thought into a communication device (physical), where it 
becomes a systematic representation of data (information), possibly 
represented digitally using electromagnetic means. Next, the data 
travels through a variety of physical lines of communication (e.g., 
telephone, cable, fiber optic line, radio, microwave, etc.), where it exits 
through a communication device to another user for cognitive use, or 
perhaps to a physical device to perform an operation (e.g., turn on a 
light, open a valve). 
What is cyberspace, then? It is the sum total of all elements required 
for cyberspace processes to occur. The fundamental structure of the 
cyberspace process is enduring, but the configuration of cyberspace 
itself transforms when specific elements of the basic process transform. 
This is an essential concept for the analysis of cyberspace 
transformation addressed in this essay.  
To illustrate this further, let us consider the evolution of the 
cyberspace process since the invention of electromagnetic transmission. 
As depicted in figure 1, the telegraph is an early example of the 
cyberspace process. An operator would read a message and enter it as 
data (Morse code) using a simple switch that sent pulses of electric 
current to a remote receiving switch, where a different operator would 
decode the taps into the original message. This basic process evolved in 
scope and complexity for over 100 years. In the mid-twentieth century, 
the process was transformed with the introduction of electronic 
transistor-based data-processing devices. 
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Figure 1: A Brief Timeline of Cyberspace Development 
I posit that although the cyberspace process has existed for 
centuries, cyberspace as currently envisioned came into existence with 
the introduction of the personal computer (circa 1975), the Internet 
(circa 1982), and the World Wide Web protocol (circa 1989). The 
synergy of these events established cyberspace as a new strategic 
common analogous to Mahan’s theories in which the sea is described as 
“a wide common” that was the international domain of commerce and 
communication (Cebrowski, 2004). Similarly, cyberspace can be 
mapped using techniques that clearly show its lines of communication 
and critical nodes with tactical, operational, and strategic implications 
for their control.3 The Cooperative Association for Internet Data 
Analysis in San Diego, California, is pioneering the macroscopic 
measurement and analysis of Internet performance, developing several 
practical maps of topology, security, routing, and other aspects (Claffy 
et al., 2008). When combined with innovative graphical depictions, 
these maps clearly show nodes and choke points—the cyberspace 
equivalent of the Straits of Hormuz or Malacca (Cooperative 
Association for Internet Data Analysis, 2009). The security of these 
critical nodes—some of which may be physical, others informational—
                                                     
3 Dodge and Kitchin (2001) conducted a 5-year study of cyberspace maps 
and spatializations created by academic and commercial organizations and 
compiled their results in Atlas of Cyberspace.  
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should be of great interest to anyone attempting to protect or exploit 
cyberspace.  
Given such similarities among the two strategic commons, 
cyberspace has at least five unique characteristics of concern to senior 
security leaders. First, the cost of entry and routine access to 
cyberspace is extremely low—basically the cost of a laptop and 
Internet café fee. Second, cyberspace offers a degree of anonymity that 
greatly challenges efforts to detect, track, and target a user who desires 
to hide in the common.4 Third, cyberspace provides the ability to 
initiate a wide variety of physical effects across vast distances at almost 
instantaneous speeds. Fourth, cyberspace is an ever-growing 
common—every new computer server or Internet-capable cell phone 
expands its boundaries. Finally, cyberspace does not have traditional 
dimensions of height, depth, and length, but it does have unique metrics 
that can be used to map its boundaries and operations.5 
What types of threats exist in this new common? In general, attacks 
in cyberspace fall into one of three categories—the interception, 
modification, or denial of information (Woolley, 2006). Attacks may be 
overt or covert, with kinetic or nonkinetic effects. The damage inflicted 
varies greatly, from defaced Web sites to multi-million-dollar financial 
losses, and even to actual physical damage to equipment, the control of 
which is connected to cyberspace. How do leaders transform their 
organizations to address these challenges? 
Organizations and the Cyberspace Process 
The United States clearly recognizes that cyberspace security (also 
called cybersecurity) is essential to its overall national security and that 
it has implications across all instruments of national power—
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. The U.S. strategic 
                                                     
4 Some may argue that individuals may hide in physical space among a 
population of billions with equal anonymity, such as that offered by 
cyberspace. Although a full debate exceeds this chapter’s scope, some of the 
unique features facilitating anonymity in cyberspace include the ability to 
enter and exit the common, the ability to create and control multiple versions 
of the user’s presence, and the ability to take over another user’s identity 
(usually without their consent or knowledge)—all accomplished with no 
change to the user’s actual physical attributes. 
5 Note that this is one area where the author disagrees with Cebrowski’s 
view that the cyberspace common is dimensionless (Cebrowski 2004). 
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objectives for accomplishing this security are to prevent cyberattacks, 
reduce national vulnerability to cyberattacks, and minimize damage and 
recovery time, should attacks occur. Equally important, the need to 
have a secure cyberspace involves the international community. The 
United States explicitly states this in two of its five national priorities 
for its cyberspace strategy—securing governments’ cyberspace and 
international cooperation (Bush, 2003). 
This section addresses how organizations interact and innovate to 
transform their own structures to meet the security challenges of 
cyberspace. The discussion steps though each of the four major 
instruments of national power to assess their status and identify issues 
for senior security leaders to comprehend and work to resolve. 
Diplomatic 
How should countries interact in cyberspace? Does this new 
common require entirely new standards of conduct? As independent 
governments, they have an international obligation to act in good faith 
and settle disputes with other states by peaceful means. If conflict 
should occur, the right of using proportional force in self-defense is a 
cornerstone of international security. Sharp (1999) argues that “it now 
seems almost universally accepted that a considerable body of 
international law does indeed apply to the use of force by states in 
CyberSpace.” 
However, the widely distributed nature of cyberspace does not 
necessarily recognize national boundaries, and new provisions to 
address this reality seem prudent. Arguably, the most significant event 
moving us toward defining acceptable cyberspace interactions is the 
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, a formal agreement 
among 43 countries “to better combat cybercrime by harmonizing 
national laws, improving investigative abilities, and boosting 
international cooperation” (Archick, 2006, 1). The convention began in 
1997, was opened for signature on November 23, 2001, and has been 
ratified by at least 16 countries. Its provisions include definition of 
criminal offenses in four categories (fraud and forgery, child 
pornography, copyright infringement, and security breaches), as well as 
methods to address these crimes, such as investigation and extradition 
procedures (Archick, 2006). 
The U.S. Department of Justice has arrested and convicted domestic 
and international individuals and small groups committing cyberspace-
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related crimes since 1998.6 The department determines whether the 
crime targeted a private individual or corporation or a government 
agency, as well as whether the crime posed a threat to public health or 
safety (e.g., power grids, air traffic control) (U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2009). The attackers included citizens from China, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Israel, and the United Kingdom. In some cases, extradition 
requests were pursued per the Convention on Cybercrime (Anonymous, 
2009). 
Informational 
How can information be stored safely in cyberspace? The U.S. 
Government views information technology as one sector of the nation’s 
critical infrastructure and has tasked the Department of Homeland 
Security with its protection. In turn, the Department of Homeland 
Security created a National Cyber Security Division in June 2003 to 
serve as a focal point for cybersecurity issues. Working to avoid 
information-sharing failures such as those that contributed to the 
September 2001 terrorist attacks, the Department of Homeland Security 
conducted 16 major cyber exercises between 2004 and 2008. To 
practice and enhance collective responses to cybersecurity scenarios, 
the exercises included participants from federal, state, and local 
governments, as well as participants from private industry, academic 
institutions, and foreign governments (U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, 2008).7  
In January 2008, President Bush signed Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 23, better known as the Comprehensive National 
Cybersecurity Initiative. The initiative is a classified document, but 
three of its major “public” priorities directly support the access points, 
data traffic, and security protocol for information traversing U.S. 
                                                     
6 The fact that the U.S. Department of Justice claims jurisdiction for 
cyberspace crimes having physical effects on U.S. individuals and 
organizations is not the same as suggesting there is a “U.S. cyberspace 
boundary.” The details of physical and virtual national sovereignty deserve 
further debate.  
7 Cyber Storm II description: Sponsored by the Department of Homeland 
Security, this exercise was to improve national incident response and 
coordination capabilities by simulating physical and cyber attacks against the 
transportation, information technology, and chemical critical infrastructure 
sectors. Participants included federal, state, and foreign governments and 
private industry (General Accounting Office, 2008).  
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Government agencies’ computer networks. First, the Trusted Internet 
Connection effort is simply a way to prevent cyberattacks by reducing 
the number of access points. Next, the Einstein II program 
automatically monitors the data traffic within the networks and Internet 
access points. Third, the Federal Desktop Core Configuration program 
mandates a common security protocol for government desktop 
computer systems (Lake, 2009).  
Military 
How are traditional military organizations embracing operations 
within the cyberspace domain? In his recent testimony before the U.S. 
Congress, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (2009a, 8) acknowledged 
the extent of the threat: 
With cheap technology and minimal investment, current and 
potential adversaries operating in cyberspace can inflict serious 
damage to DOD’s vast information grid—a system that encompasses 
more than 15,000 local, regional, and wide-area networks, and 
approximately 7 million [information technology] devices. 
To address this issue, Secretary Gates designated cyberspace as one 
of the four focus areas in the recent Quadrennial Roles and Missions 
Review (Gates, 2009b), a reinforcement of tenets in his 2008 National 
Defense Strategy (Gates, 2008). The goal is to establish the foundation 
for developing capable cyberspace forces; structure the forces, as well 
as their processes and procedures; and then employ these forces to 
achieve desired effects across the full range of military operations. The 
study’s Cyber Issue Team emphasized the need “to learn from new, 
innovation capabilities and experiences of our counterparts across the 
U.S. Government, in the private sector, and internationally” (Gates 
2009b, 16).8 
In April 2007, the Estonian government, commercial, and private 
organizations endured 3 weeks of cyberattacks. Responding to a 
historic request by a member state of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) in defense of its digital assets, the United States 
sent computer security experts to Estonia to help with recovery efforts 
                                                     
8 The stated Department of Defense vision is to develop cyberspace 
capability that provides global situational awareness of cyberspace, U.S. 
freedom of action in cyberspace, the ability to provide warfighting effects 
within and through cyberspace, and when called on, provide cyberspace 
support to civil authorities (Gates 2009b, 14). 
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(Geers, 2008). The aftermath of this attack included the creation of two 
new cybersecurity organizations. First, at the operational level, the 
Cyber Defence Management Authority was established in Brussels, 
Belgium, to provide a centralized bureau for coordinating Alliance 
response to any further cyber attacks (Hughes, 2009). Second, at the 
strategic level, the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 
was established at Tallinn, Estonia, with a mission “to enhance the 
cooperative cyber defence capability of NATO and NATO nations, 
thus improving the Alliance’s interoperability in the field of 
cooperative cyber defence” (Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence, 2009). 
Economic 
What are the costs to industry of cybersecurity breaches? How can 
these costs be quantified and evaluated so business firms can adopt the 
measures that provide the most cost-effective solution? The stakes are 
high—a recent report surveying senior information technology 
decision-makers from over 1,000 large businesses and security firms 
estimated that companies lost an average of US$4.6 million worth of 
intellectual property in 2008 (McAfee, 2009). The latest Annual Threat 
Assessment of the Intelligence Community estimates total cyber-related 
business losses in 2008 to be US$42 billion for the United States and 
US$140 billion globally, as well as possibly US$1 trillion worth of 
intellectual property lost globally (Blair, 2009). Even determining when 
an attack occurs in business is difficult, and it is even more challenging 
to measure the cost of attacks. However, investigations into effects on 
stock price following cyberattacks indicate that targeted firms suffer 
short-term losses of 1% to 5%, which could translate into shareholder 
losses of as much as US$200 million (Cashell et al., 2004). 
Three major market forces compel businesses to manage their 
cybersecurity—competition, liability, and insurance. Firms that 
establish best practices for cybersecurity will be rewarded in a 
competitive market. Reduced cyberattacks lead to increased consumer 
confidence, as well as a healthy net profit. If these benefits are not 
sufficient, then liability, specifically the prospect of potential legal 
actions for compromised confidential consumer information, is a strong 
motivation. Finally, profit opportunities are emerging for cyber-risk 
insurance. Both the company buying such insurance and those 
supplying the service stand to profit, as they have in similar economic 
ventures (Cashell et al., 2004).  
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Cyberspace Issues for Organizational Transformation 
How should senior security leaders address the challenges posed to 
current organizations by the dynamic activities in cyberspace? Will 
traditional approaches and structures suffice, or are new organizations 
required? Rather than delve down to the tactical level, let us address 
these questions at the strategic level, focusing on three tenets—
credibility, balance, and hierarchy of organizational transformation to 
incorporate cyberspace. 
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that security in cyberspace 
is an issue affecting all instruments of national power. The recent 
report, Securing Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency (Langevin et al., 
2008, 15), lists as one of its three major findings that, “The United 
States must treat cybersecurity as one of the most important national 
security challenges it faces. … This is a strategic issue on par with 
weapons of mass destruction and global jihad.” 
If organizations are to achieve credibility in such security efforts, 
then they need to articulate the expressed risks in consistent and 
objective terms. For example, when cyberspace is viewed as the new 
strategic common, comparing security in cyberspace to issues like 
weapons of mass destruction is no more applicable than a comparison 
with security of the sea. Perhaps a way to articulate security issues for 
cyberspace more effectively is to couple the strategic common 
construct with the current U.S. model of challenges—traditional, 
irregular, disruptive, and catastrophic (Rumsfeld, 2006). Although there 
are, no doubt, potential “nightmare scenarios” that can be constructed 
within cyberspace, their roles need to be assessed objectively by 
considering the possible outcome in concert with its feasibility and 
probability of occurrence. Then the concern expressed in the previous 
quotation can be reworded to achieve credibility of purpose; “Although 
unlikely, the catastrophic cyber attack on our military networks is a 
strategic issue on par with weapons of mass destruction.” 
Unlike the other strategic commons, cyberspace has direct and 
regular interface with a vast numbers of people in over two hundred 
countries (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008). At a United Nations 
Internet Governance Forum in November 2007, a key participant noted, 
“the dilemma between Internet freedom and Internet regulation could 
be resolved by striking a balance among the various competing 
interests” (U.N. News 14 November 2007). In this context, the 
opposing sides of the scale are security versus personal privacy. 
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Despite the international security benefits achieved by the Cybercrime 
Convention, some organizations petitioned U.S. senators to oppose its 
ratification, asserting it “lacks adequate safeguards for privacy” and has 
“insufficient recognition of international human rights obligations” 
(Rotenberg & Laurant, 2005). Although this opposition did not prevent 
ratification, its espoused principles deserve continued attention by 
strategic leaders as they transform organizations. Consistent with this, 
the October 2007 U.S. National Strategy on Information Sharing 
specifically establishes “Protecting Privacy and other Legal Rights” as 
its foundation, which includes foreign partners in this tenet. In addition, 
it explicitly links these principles to the pursuit of other national 
strategies, including homeland security and combating terrorists (Bush, 
2007).  
How should senior security leaders organize their resources to 
address the full spectrum of cybersecurity challenges? In an ironic 
twist, a recent report (Langevin et al., 2008) recommended in general 
terms that the U.S. Government move toward an information-age 
government that uses cyberspace and social networking, yet the report 
also recommended at least five new industrial-age organizations in the 
short term. Conti and Surdu (2009) argue for a new cyberwarfare 
branch of the U.S. military but fail to articulate what mission it would 
fulfill. It is doubtful that such traditional bureaucratic structures can 
keep pace with the rapidly evolving nature of cyberspace. Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt (2001, 15) are direct in their assessment: “hierarchies have a 
difficult time fighting networks,” and groups organized in networks 
pose many of the challenges in cyberspace. Although more responsive 
and better suited for countering dynamic threats, transforming current 
security organization into network-based structures requires leaders 
who are comfortable with flexibility and dispersed authority.  
People and the Cyberspace Process 
Having looked at the various organizations and instruments of 
power at work within cyberspace, let us consider the individuals who 
operate there. This section first focuses on people who choose to 
conduct illegal activity in cyberspace. Next, it examines the 
connectivity and attitudes of people using cyberspace and concludes 
with a look at various factors affecting the mutual transformation of 
people and the cyberspace strategic common.  
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Wrongdoers in Cyberspace 
Who are the perpetrators of illegal activity in cyberspace? To 
analyze the diversity of cyberspace lawbreakers, let us consider four 
categories of these individuals (who may also work in groups)—cyber-
delinquents, cybercriminals, cyberspies, and cyberterrorists. Each set of 
perpetrators differs in attitudes and actions regarding ideology (e.g., 
political or religious), monetary gain, attribution, knowledge-sharing, 
and destruction of societal structures. One common interest among all 
but the most extreme individuals (e.g., anarchists) is the preservation of 
cyberspace infrastructure—they all have a vested interest in 
maintaining the domain from which they derive power. 
Think of cyber-delinquents as the thrill seekers of cyberspace. Their 
primary motivation is to cause trouble that is highly visible in 
cyberspace, and perhaps in the world in general as well. To 
demonstrate their brilliance and “share the fun,” they are more likely to 
provide their trade secrets for beating cyberspace security. Ideology 
and monetary gain may play a role in their psyche, but they do not 
dominate. Although not their intent, some of their pranks may 
inadvertently endanger public safety (e.g., changing traffic signals) or 
violate very severe laws, such as possible child pornography in the 
recent cases of “sexting” among teens (Hamill, 2009). In the grand 
scheme of cyberspace security, cyber-delinquents are regrettable 
nuisances. 
In contrast, consider cyber-criminals, operators focused primarily on 
monetary gain. They have little regard for ideology and destruction of 
societal infrastructure unless they are acting in a mercenary role. 
Obviously, they do not want to be known, as that increases their 
probability of arrest, and they are not apt to share the techniques they 
use to turn a profit. In strategic terms, they are a growing threat to 
economic power. The 2008 CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey 
noted the disturbing trends of cybercriminals becoming more 
professional in their crimes, clearly separating themselves from cyber-
delinquents’ pursuit of “bragging rights.” Cybercriminals have become 
stealthier by exploiting the inherently reactive nature of defensive 
security measures, as well as more sophisticated in the targeting of their 
attacks. The most expensive attacks were those of financial fraud, with 
an average reported cost of over US$463,000 per incident (Richardson, 
2008). In broader terms, criminals stole data from over 47 million 
credit and debit cardholders by hacking retail marketers (Housman, 
2009).  
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Next are the cyberspies—operators driven by ideology, usually of a 
specific government. Similar to the cybercriminals, they seek to remain 
anonymous in their deeds and capabilities, but they may share 
information with other cyberspies for mutual benefit. They may cause 
no overt damage in their activities, opting to monitor information rather 
than intercept it. By constantly probing and scanning critical nodes of 
other countries’ cyberspace infrastructure, they can identify 
vulnerabilities to be extorted or exploited during a time of crisis or 
conflict. The scope of such activity is staggering. Wilson (2008) cites 
U.S. Department of Defense officials’ estimates of the military global 
information grid experiencing more than three million daily scans, as 
well as counterintelligence officials’ estimate that 140 different foreign 
intelligence agencies regularly attempt to hack into U.S. commercial 
and government computers.9 
Finally, there are the cyberterrorists, who are motivated by political 
or social ideology but also by the desire to be recognized for their deeds 
to aid in recruiting followers or gaining perceived legitimacy (including 
possible state sponsorship). They work effectively in a network 
structure and are likely to share much of their knowledge regarding 
how to conduct terrorist operations in the hope of spreading their 
influence. Monetary gain through cyberspace crimes may not be a 
direct motivation for cyberterrorists, but it may help fund their activist 
agendas. Because they can exercise significant power and influence 
though cyberspace, one could argue that it is unlikely that they will 
cause widespread damage to its supporting infrastructure. 
Connectivity 
Innovations in computer technology have greatly enhanced the 
ability of the average citizen to operate freely in cyberspace. Data 
processing speeds and digital storage media continue to grow 
exponentially (Ekman et al., 2004), with competitive markets that drive 
sales prices down. The United States accounts for over 22% (over 264 
million) of all personal computers in the world (over 1.19 billion; 
Computer Industry Almanac, 2009), but China recently surpassed the 
United States in the number of Internet users (253 million versus 220 
                                                     
9 In April 2009, the Wall Street Journal reported alleged activities in which 
cyberspies from China, Russia, and other countries “were believed to be on a 
mission to navigate the U.S. electrical system and its controls. The intruders 
haven't sought to damage the power grid or other key infrastructure, but 
officials warned they could try during a crisis or war” (Gorman 2009). 
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million; Anonymous, 2009). With 222 countries having Internet access, 
86 of which have at least one million users (Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2008), it is becoming difficult to find any place in the world 
not affected by cyberspace. In fact, the United Nations recently 
sponsored an Internet governance conference with attendees from over 
100 governments, with two of the five main topics focused on 
“reaching the next billion with Internet access” and “the Internet of 
tomorrow” (U.N. News, 2008b) 
Because the cyberspace process includes physical elements, it is not 
surprising that industry and government leverage the ability of 
cyberspace-based remote access to control infrastructure. Usually 
called Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, 
these control processes increase operational effectiveness and 
efficiency for many applications to include such systems as electric 
power, oil, gas, transportation, and telecommunications (Varnado, 
2005). Often, older SCADA devices were designed and installed 
without regard for security, and most new SCADA systems use the 
Internet to pass control information. As the worldwide population of 
Internet users pushes toward two billion, it is wise to pursue better 
security promptly for any physical systems accessible via that portion 
of cyberspace.10  
Attitudes 
Is the increasing individual and collective access to cyberspace 
creating its own unique cyber-ethos? How is this transforming the 
interactions among people and groups? Certainly, the current 
generation of Internet users is diverse, but many are using cyberspace 
to bridge gaps in language and culture. Social networking Web sites, 
such as Facebook and MySpace, attract around 115 million unique 
visitors each month, demonstrating a willingness to place personal 
information online (Arrington, 2008). There are also many new 
avenues of immediate communication available to users—such as 
instant messaging, blogs, and Twitter—that are accessible through a 
myriad of hard-wired as well as wireless devices (e.g., cell phones, 
personal digital assistants, laptops, etc.).  
                                                     
10 The U.S. Department of Energy reported on recommended changes to 
power-generation facilities resulting from a U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security experiment in March 2007. The test demonstrated the ability to cause 
catastrophic physical damage to an industrial turbine via commands sent 
through its SCADA system (DOE 2007). 
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The ubiquitous nature of the virtual social world facilitated by these 
devices often causes problems in “real” society. In the interest of public 
safety, many U.S. states outlawed the use of cell phones for motor 
vehicle drivers, and sometimes the law specifically restricts text 
messaging (Governors Highway Safety Association, 2008). The 
potentially devastating effects of “cyber bullies” are also being 
scrutinized, especially in light of tragic events where it may have 
contributed to an individual’s death, such as a recent teenage suicide in 
Missouri (CBS News, 2008). It is reasonable to expect new social and 
ethical issues for the cyberspace common as it continues to expand into 
global society. 
Cyberspace Issues for Transforming People 
Does the transforming nature of cyberspace present new challenges 
for senior security leaders in their interactions with people, or will 
status quo interpersonal dynamics suffice? To evaluate this, let us focus 
on three strategic topics—trends, leverage, and synthesis of 
technologies and individuals—and the implications of transforming 
their interactions in cyberspace. 
At risk of stating the obvious, it is important for senior security 
leaders to realize and embrace the future trends of cyberspace. With 
regard to people, they must fully understand the ramifications of the 
current generation of students entering university. Given the start of 
modern cyberspace posited in this essay, these students know no other 
world than that of billions of computers and Internet users. What is a 
revolution for senior leaders is status quo to them. 
Consider the recent U.S. presidential election. BBC News 
(Schifferes, 2008) reported on Barack Obama’s campaign success in 
using the Internet for fundraising and communication as representing a 
sharp departure from traditional phone call tactics. Although viewed as 
innovative among older voters, newly registered voters may respond 
simply, “Of course these techniques were used—how else do you 
communicate?” This example illustrates how different generations view 
and apply readily available cyberspace tools. As senior leaders seek to 
recruit and develop people in their organizations, they should not limit 
their focus to fulfilling the needs of today’s cyberspace activities but, 
rather, should look at least several decades into the future to envision 
and pursue the talents and skills required for a transformed cyberspace 
common. However, they need to remember that not everyone operating 
in cyberspace has lawful motives. 
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What types of skills and technology can people leverage to their 
advantage within cyberspace? Individuals in the four broad categories 
of cyberspace wrongdoers may interact for mutual benefit, or they may 
exploit law-abiding operators. Wilson (2008) identifies cases in which 
cyberterrorists employed cybercriminals to steal credit card information 
and support drug traffickers, all toward the goal of funding traditional 
terrorist operations. Another lucrative business is the marketing of 
“botnets”—virtual armies of compromised computers that can be 
controlled remotely over the Internet by a “botmaster.” Botnets may 
exploit hundreds of thousands of computers, usually without the 
owners’ knowledge (Wilson, 2008). An adversary with such capability, 
if coupled with a network structure, could achieve swarming attacks 
and defenses—in cyberspace as well as other strategic commons—that 
challenge the “traditional mass- and maneuver-oriented approaches to 
conflict” (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001, 12).  
As the cyberspace capabilities increase, the methods used to develop 
individual skills to leverage these capabilities transform. User 
interfaces have progressed significantly over the past two decades, 
incorporating visual icons and common menu structures that allow even 
novice users the ability to master new applications in hours, if not 
minutes, without any formal training. If problems occur, the “help” 
menus offer advice and tutorials, often supported by extensive online 
databases. Unfortunately, not all “self-help” is benevolent. Cyber 
wrongdoers can develop and enhance their illegal skills using online 
“how to” information that may be updated rapidly to counter new 
security measures. To meet this challenge, senior leaders may need to 
transform traditional education, training, and certification programs for 
their cybersecurity workforce and emphasize continuous training using 
decentralized network techniques. As Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001, 15) 
concluded, “whoever masters the network form first and best will gain 
major advantages.” 
How will people and their leaders cope with the cyberspace 
common’s expansion, as well as its supporting technologies that grow 
at geometric rates? Although existing WiFi and Bluetooth technologies 
have removed the bonds of cables and lines for many users, ongoing 
research and development offers further possibilities for removing 
cumbersome computer display and input devices. This ultimate degree 
of connectivity with almost no personal physical infrastructure is still 
ahead, perhaps in the near future.  
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Consider the synthesis of combining proven and feasible 
technologies to enhance the human–machine interface. Over 112,000 
people worldwide have cochlear implants—a transmitter and receiver 
device that stimulates the auditory nerve in deaf patients to simulate 
nature hearing processes (National Institute on Deafness and Other 
Communication Disorders, 2007). Similar principles were used to 
develop a self-contained artificial silicon retina microchip, which is 
implanted in the human eye to help mitigate retinal degeneration 
(Optobionics, 2008). Starner and Paradiso (2004) present several viable 
options for human-generated power for operating mobile electronics, 
most based on normal body motion (e.g., walking, breathing, body 
heat, etc.). By combining these technologies and adding fingertip 
sensors for data entry purposes, it is conceivable that their synthesis 
could result in people who have a fully self-contained direct interface to 
cyberspace. Certainly, this could raise even more challenging issues of 
security and privacy, given the potential for every individual with 
optical implants to become a walking Web camera.11  
If this ultimate connectivity comes to fruition, it may have 
pronounced effects on many individuals. A survey by Anderson and 
Rainie (2006) postulates it may exacerbate two extreme attitudes within 
the population—addicts and luddites. The addicts are those individuals 
who devote most of their time to living in synthetic worlds. Often 
disguising their true nature and characteristics by appearing as self-
designed “avatars,” the prospect of almost complete sensory immersion 
into cyberspace may cause them to retract further from real-world 
society. In contrast, luddites are individuals who oppose technological 
change. The radical measures of achieving ultimate connectivity may 
create such a change in society as to compel violence from such 
individuals who refuse to participate. Some in the survey also worried 
that technology may eventually create machines and processes that 
move beyond human control. Although this notion has been the theme 
of many works of fiction over more than a century, the continued rapid 
growth of cyberspace systems’ capability and complexity now makes it 
a legitimate concern for organizational leaders.  
                                                     
11 Perhaps the most radical approach in such an environment would be to 
adopt a doctrine of total transparency—basing plans and operations on a 
central assumption that all users can see all information at any time. Although 
thought provoking, the implications of this concept are beyond this chapter’s 
scope. 
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Conclusion 
Clearly, the dawn of modern cyberspace introduced a myriad of 
challenges, only a small sample of which were discussed in this essay. I 
offer five closing thoughts on the central theme of what senior security 
leaders must know about cyberspace to transform their organizations 
and make wise decisions. First, they should avoid the mystery 
surrounding cyberspace and embrace it as a new strategic common of 
communication and commerce akin to the sea. They should recognize 
and plan for its security across all instruments of national power—
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Next, it is doubtful 
that existing hierarchies will be effective in achieving cybersecurity 
against networked adversaries. Leaders need to consider adopting 
similar dispersed network principles to transform their organizations to 
be more agile and less vulnerable. Third, leaders should not lump all 
adversaries together but, rather, recognize that they may have common 
motivations and self-imposed restrictions regarding how they operate in 
cyberspace. These groups have the capability to interact over vast 
distances with each other as well as to exploit unwilling users in ways 
that increase their collective ability to affect cyberspace operations. 
Next, although there is a trend toward greater sharing of personal 
information via social networking, the measures that leaders direct to 
meet cyberspace challenges need to balance the efficiency and 
effectiveness of security against the universal laws of privacy and 
human rights. Finally, leaders need to scan the strategic horizon for 
potential cyberspace-related technological and societal trends and 
shocks and provide clear visions for success to their organizations.12  
                                                     
12 Since the original presentation of this essay, three significant events have 
occurred in the United States. First, on May 29, 2009, President Obama 
announced the creation of a new White House office led by a Cybersecurity 
Coordinator as well as five key areas for action. The coordinator will be a 
member of both the National Security Staff and the National Economic 
Council. It is interesting to note that President Obama mentioned that his 
staff’s computers were hacked during the general election campaign (Obama 
2009). Second, on June 23, 2009, Secretary of Defense Gates directed the 
development of a new national strategy for cybersecurity as well as the 
establishment of U.S. Cyber Command as a subordinated unified command 
under U.S. Strategic Command. He specified an initial operating capability not 
later than October 2009 and full operating capability by October 2010 (Gates 
2009c). Third, on July 4, 2009, there was a wave of cyberattacks aimed at 
American and South Korean government and commercial Internet sites. 
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Integrating Military Planning with 
Interagency Implementation 
By Jon W. Stull 
 
Abstract 
Despite expectations of a “New World Order” at the close of the 
20th century and the potential for transformational innovation in the 
current century, the challenge of responding to international crises, 
and specifically complex contingencies, persists. Rapidly changing 
global environments, coupled with technological advances, require 
large institutions to significantly change their approach to solving 
complex new problem sets by transforming their organizations and 
processes. Both the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. 
Department of State worked to transform their institutions to achieve 
tighter integration of their respective efforts and those of other 
agencies to conduct complex operations abroad, especially 
reconstruction and stabilization. Despite significant progress in 
establishing a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach in 
implementing national policy, there remains the sense that the two 
major players are operating in parallel, not intersecting or 
integrating their planning efforts. As the military and diplomatic 
communities revise and refine the manner in which they plan, they 
have developed procedures that are asynchronous and difficult to 
integrate. However, embedded within recent initiatives are linkages 
that can assist whole-of-government and military planners to 
improve comprehensive approaches to more effectively deal with 
challenges of bringing failed or failing nations back into the fold of 
functioning global community.  
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Introduction 
he last century closed with the unfilled promise of a “New 
World Order,” and the new century has extended opportunity—
and confusion—with the nexus of globalization and the rise of 
the Information Age. This dynamic of undefined and rapidly changing 
global environments, coupled with technological advances, has 
required large institutions to significantly change their approach to 
solving complex, new problem sets by transforming their organizations 
and processes. Seven years ago, the president of the United States 
challenged the nation to “transform America’s national security 
institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first 
century” (Office of the President of the United States, 2002, 2), and 
later charged national security institutions to “[improve] the capacity of 
agencies to plan, prepare, coordinate, integrate, and execute responses 
covering the full range of crisis contingencies and long-term 
challenges” (NSS, 2006, 45). To that end both the Defense Department 
and the State Department worked to transform their institutions for 
tighter integration of their efforts and those of other agencies to conduct 
complex operations abroad, especially reconstruction and stabilization. 
President Obama has continued and renewed the drive to “strengthen 
interagency coordination” and “ensure seamless integration” of 
interagency coordination (Presidential Study Directive 1, February 23, 
2009). 
Despite significant progress in designing organizations and 
processes to establish a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach 
to implementing national policy, there remains the sense that the two 
major players, Defense and State, are operating in parallel but are not 
intersecting or integrating their planning efforts. As the military and 
diplomatic communities revise and refine the manner in which they 
plan, they have continued to develop procedures that are asynchronous 
and difficult to integrate, resulting in waste and duplication while 
delaying desired effect and effectiveness. A military commander will 
likely analyze the operating environment and conceptualize lines of 
operation (LOOs) and decisive points in a concept plan well before the 
Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (National Security 
Presidential Decision 44, December 2006) proposes a policy planning 
template for reconstruction and stabilization (U.S. Joint Forces 
Command, 2005, 21). This essay discusses how to glean appropriate 
T 
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guidance from national strategy or international mandate so that 
implementation can be integrated in a comprehensive manner, thus 
establishing “sufficiency-of-government” (C. J. Cunningham, personal 
communication, February 19, 2009) that can couple with other enablers 
to more effectively deal with challenges of bringing failed or failing 
nations back into the fold of functioning global community.  
What makes complex operations, emergencies, or contingencies 
complex? Many situations to which the world community is expected 
to respond are complex because they share three basic characteristics. 
First, the requirement is time-sensitive, thus necessitating an immediate 
or near-immediate response. Second, the nature of the exigency 
requires response from several agencies or departments, not just the 
State Department and the U.S. Embassy, and not just Department of 
Defense organizations and commands. This leads to a third factor: 
security. Because of security concerns in any given scenario, a 
significant player in complex contingencies will be a uniformed 
military presence, both for security and for support in alleviating the 
suffering. This is evident in many natural disasters, where the effect of 
natural or manmade events far exceeds the capabilities of the affected 
nation, or in the wake of war or widespread hostilities, where 
reconstruction efforts and stabilization operations are needed to prevent 
further deterioration of government or infrastructure. Integrating the 
activities of several U.S. Government agencies within the 
comprehensive planning effort typical of military operations has been 
confounded by differences in organizational structure and culture, 
planning processes, and capabilities.  
A Persistent Challenge 
Lack of order following regime change has consistently been 
identified as a major challenge in the wake of operations Just Cause in 
Panama, Provide Hope humanitarian intervention in Somalia, and 
Uphold Democracy in Haiti, and most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq 
during operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Repeated 
lessons were identified, focusing on the lack of order after regime 
change had occurred. Despite efforts, some significant, by many 
planners in several agencies (most notably the Departments of Defense 
and State) over the last two decades, the U.S. national response to 
complex contingencies continues to be marked by a lack of 
coordinated, integrated planning and execution that hinders progress 
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and aggravates cost. These deficiencies are manifest in inefficient or 
duplicative use of funds, inconsistent or insufficient allocation of 
manpower, decreased progress or effect in the affected country, and 
ultimately loss of national stature. 
Can this persistent challenge be mitigated? Much discussion, some 
analysis, and steadily increasing awareness of need within the primary 
agencies involved led to some increase in the presence, and hence 
potential integration, of senior staff planners into the Department of 
Defense senior-level schools. Likewise, the Department of Defense has 
increased its presence in many Foreign Service Institute courses, and 
has increased its presence on Department of State staffs. In some 
focused activities, such as in the Office of the Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization, collaboration may even be said to 
have increased significantly.  
Two factors reduce the effectiveness of these efforts. First, the State 
Department and other non–Department of Defense departments and 
agencies have historically not been resourced (personnel and money) 
for such “educational” commitments and are reluctant to divert 
resources from statutory mission requirements to educating employees. 
Second, senior service schools and the Foreign Service Institute tend to 
address the challenge of developing a comprehensive approach to 
implementing policy at the strategic level of planning. Lack of 
participation and failure to focus on coordination at the operational 
level of planning will continue to plague U.S. national planning, and 
practitioners will thus fail to address or solve shortcomings. 
Even if the resource issues were resolved, an operational disconnect 
will persist because various department and agency planning efforts run 
near simultaneously and in parallel, with no formal intersection or 
nexus. In reviewing the lessons identified from operations such as those 
mentioned above, it was failure to coordinate the actions of planners at 
the operational level, not the strategic level, that has resulted in delayed 
or inefficient application of national assets in resolving crises (Hayes & 
Wheatley, 1996). Therefore, this integrated planning dilemma is not 
ultimately a resource issue (although increased resources for civilian 
engagement in whole-of-government contingency planning would be 
most constructive). 
A transformation of agency resourcing and organization is required 
to address problems from a whole-of-government or comprehensive 
perspective, including how agencies process, coordinate, and share 
information to “operationalize” a strategy, not just establish policy. 
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Most difficult of all, it will be necessary for large bureaucracies and 
organizations to influence their respective cultures to adopt and value 
the nature of proposed changes toward whole-of-government planning 
for response to complex contingencies. 
Complex Contingency Operations 
What are these complex contingencies? The term “complex 
contingencies” and its associated term “complex emergencies” 
(Bennett, 2002, 9) have been used to refer to those national and 
international operations that address significant humanitarian assistance 
to mitigate suffering and hasten recovery from natural disasters such as 
earthquakes, severe flooding, drought, and crop failure or from man-
made exigencies generated from civil war, ethnic cleansing, and other 
government failures that create significant numbers of displaced 
personnel and refugees. The nature of these operations requires great 
effort for humanitarian relief and disaster assistance and, additionally, a 
significant presence of military (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2001, 86). This military presence is intended not only to bring unique 
capabilities to support the humanitarian aspects of the operation but 
also to maintain order and establish security to enable effective relief, 
as well as to discourage exploitation of the crisis by dissident factions’ 
efforts. Many times the security requirement exists as a result of natural 
disaster, as in response to earthquakes or flooding where looting or 
individual quests for food and water make areas unstable. Military 
presence, if immediate, can effectively counter the impromptu 
deterioration in civil order. Of much more challenging nature are those 
emergencies caused by political displacement of populations. Regime 
change, civil war, peacekeeping operations, and population migrations 
establish a need for a more persistent and comprehensive military 
presence. It is during these latter operations that the tasks required 
during complex contingencies, mentioned earlier, merge with the types 
of activities associated with the current term “reconstruction and 
stabilization.” 
Military Process and the Operational Continuum 
For either of the operations mentioned earlier—military support for 
complex contingencies or emergencies—military planners will 
generally conceptualize and initiate planning in a manner similar to that 
used in anticipation of major combat operations. Most U.S. military 
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planning is done within the Joint Operations Planning and Execution 
System, which is now rapidly evolving as the Adaptive Planning and 
Execution System (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006a). The 
decision-making process resident within this system is the Joint 
Operating Planning Process. Regardless of how one views the overall 
military planning system, this decision-making process is certainly not 
unique to joint operations (operations that include military services 
from more than one department, e.g., both Army and Air Force). Each 
of the military services and many multinational partners have similar 
planning systems, as do some large corporate entities. Presented a 
problem or dilemma, most successful organizations will define the 
problem, assess the operating environment and factors bearing on the 
problem, propose options, analyze the potential benefits and risks of 
each of the options, recommend the option to implement, and submit a 
plan for implementation of the selected recommended option. Although 
most agencies and organizations conduct their decision-making along 
similar methods, it is the analysis of the problem and the design of the 
proposed solution that warrant a more detailed examination and that 
could be the nexus of planning, not just among militaries but across 
governments and multinational organizations.  
Designing LOOs to Unhinge a COG 
Given a task to accomplish (or support to be rendered), most 
militaries will initiate a period of assessment and analysis in which the 
nature of the task is clearly defined, the complex nature of the operating 
environment is thoroughly examined, and contributing factors that must 
be addressed to effectively accomplish the task are identified. Military 
planners call this initial examination “mission analysis” (Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007, III-20-21). In large and complex 
operations against a significant threat or declared enemy, the military 
will examine critical factors and attempt to identify a “center of 
gravity,” or COG (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007, IV-8) of the adversary, 
which, if attacked, can cause significant dislocation of the adversary’s 
ability to continue to operate. Once a COG is identified, then operations 
are designed to bring international or national elements of power to 
bear on unhinging the enemy from the COG. Because most COGs are 
not exposed or vulnerable to our initial operations, other 
subordinate/intermediate objectives need to be identified with 
appropriate plans to muster assets, establish constraints, and provide 
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restraints to create desired conditions within the operating environment 
or modify the behavior of belligerents. Those subordinate/intermediate 
objectives are determined by analyzing the critical factors of the 
adversary or hostile environment and then determining which decisive 
points (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007, IV-16) should be achieved to 
exploit critical vulnerabilities, which may in turn expose the COG. In 
determining what constitutes a decisive point, the commander and his 
staff will identify what conditions need to exist to achieve the 
strategic/operational objective and what accomplishments are necessary 
to effect achieving the main (strategic/operational) objective. Attaining 
or seizing each of the intermediate objectives (which have been 
identified earlier as decisive points) will establish conditions and 
effects that are necessary to achieve subsequent operations and 
reduction of the COG. The connecting of these decisive points thus 
becomes what is known as a LOO (depicted in figure 1, as a modified 
version of figure 4 from doctrine on Joint Operation Planning; 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006b, IV-12-13).  




Figure 1: Lines of Operation With Author’s Annotation (Red). (Source: 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006b, IV-13)  
A commander of any major operation will develop any number of 
LOOs and control numerous decisive points in an effort to affect the 
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adversary’s COG. These LOOs may be strictly geographic features or 
key physical points, as depicted in a physical LOO, or may be more 
focused on functions and conditions, as illustrated by a logical LOO. It 
is likely in any given major operation or campaign that a commander 
may design a combination of both physical and logical LOOs. It is this 
analysis for designing a campaign or a major operation that is known as 
operational art and is the realm of the major military commands and of 
the U.S. Combatant Commanders. The exercise of operational art and 
the design of a major operation, whether it is combat or military 
support to other agencies or organizations, does not occur within a 
single military or physical dimension. 
Today’s operating environment is increasingly complex. That 
complexity is magnified in complex contingency operations because of 
the diversity various players and components bring to the operation. 
Achieving an objective within one aspect of the operating environment 
will likely have an effect or create an effect in another aspect. When the 
military commander destroys a bridge to deny exposure of his flank to 
the enemy, this action initially appears to support a legitimate military 
objective. If the consequence or effect of destroying the bridge results 
in the inability of the local population to conduct trade and support 
their families, leading to local frustration, unemployment, and social 
unrest, local election results might be influenced so that a regime 
predisposed to achieving desired original policy goals fails to come to 
power. This failure is inconsistent with an original, more important, and 
broader mission of stabilizing the region. 
Interconnected Complex Environments 
Breaking down the complex operating environment into various 
generic systems helps to envision the potential interconnectedness of 
the operational environment. Present joint doctrine identifies the 
possible systems within a complex operating environment as political, 
military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006b, IV-4–5). The example above of the 
destruction of a bridge clearly illustrates how an action within the 
military arena could affect transportation infrastructure, which 
aggravates poor economic conditions, which may, in turn, generate 
social dissatisfaction and influence desired political end states.  
  




Figure 2: The Interconnected Operational Environment (Source: Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006b, IV-5) 
This is not to say that each decisive point achieved or objective 
taken generates effects that can be extended out to other systems with 
certainty. However, this does suggest that the operational environment 
for complex contingencies and stabilization operations, where many 
agencies can exert elements of national and international power, is an 
environment in which one agency’s actions can establish a condition, 
intended or unintended, that may affect other activities or systems, and 
consequently the actions, outcomes, and effectiveness of other 
agencies.  
This operational level of planning is not unique to the military but is 
resident in some large corporations and bureaucracies as well. 
Whenever there is a level of planners who must interpret a strategy, 
issue guidance, and provide resources to a subordinate level of planners 
(who are then responsible to execute the operation), you have 
established an operational level. To “operationalize” a policy or a task 
established by higher authority means that the operational-level planner 
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must define the task so it can be understood and quantified by those 
who will carry it out. In addition, in doing so, the operational-level 
planner needs to scope the problem establishing limitations and 
identifying resources to be used. If the subordinate organization, which 
is to execute the task, needs support from outside their organization, 
then that too must be identified, and how that supporting relationship is 
to be managed must be described. In addition, and critical to the 
success of achieving the mission, performance measurements or 
metrics (U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2005, 21) must be identified to 
determine progress and ultimately success. This interpretive level of 
giving planning substance to relatively broad, if not vague, strategic 
visions for subordinate levels to execute is the guts of what is expected 
at the operational level. Although this process is carried out in most 
departments and agencies, it is normally done within the agency and 
has not, in the past, been structured to be done in a comprehensive 
manner across agency or department organizational boundaries at an 
operational level of planning.  
Transforming Interagency Coordination 
A comprehensive review of the many departments and agencies that 
are involved in complex operations is well beyond the scope of this 
article. An examination of the political and military departments that 
are or should be at the center of whole-of-government solutions 
illustrates the challenges in coordinating a comprehensive approach to 
complex operations. There have been several recent initiatives that, if 
considered by the Obama administration, will be able to give a solid 
foundation for further transformation in planning whole-of-government 
approaches to policy implementation. In the wake of the U.S. 
experience in Somalia 1992–93, followed closely by involvement in 
Haiti in 1994–96 and continuing challenges in the Balkans, both 
civilian and military planners created a format for a generic political–
military plan in responding to complex contingencies. In May 1997, the 
Clinton administration promulgated Presidential Decision Directive 56, 
Managing Complex Contingency Operations. This document directed 
and required a political–military implementation plan that would 
“outline an integrated concept of operations to synchronize agency 
efforts” (Presidential Decision Directive 56, 1997) This initiative to 
establish an acceptable interagency method for improving the planning 
process was followed by the Bush administration’s desire to establish 
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organizational structure that may better enable an integrated agency 
approach to planning. On December 7, 2005, National Security 
Presidential Directive 44, Management of Interagency Efforts 
Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, was issued by the Bush 
administration. This directive established an interagency entity within 
the State Department known as the Office of the Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization for the purpose of integrating the 
efforts of U.S. Government agencies, as well as harmonizing 
government efforts with those of the military (National Security 
Presidential Directive National Security Presidential Directive 44, 
2005). 
Once established, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction 
and Stabilization, in coordination with the Department of Defense, and 
more specifically the U.S. Joint Forces Command, collaborated in 
developing the U.S. Government’s Draft Planning Framework for 
Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation (U.S. Joint 
Forces Command, 2005). This planning framework was instrumental in 
establishing a planning process and, in short, effecting a strategy with 
which to operationalize policy. Historically, policy, once stated, was 
forwarded to the various departments and agencies in the field for 
implementation, with the lone coordinator for interagency integration 
being the ambassador and the country team. This was insufficient to 
effectively implement policy that should be expeditiously resourced 
and assessed. Based on experience gained from U.S. involvement in 
international efforts to relieve complex emergencies in the Balkans, a 
forerunner of this planning framework was noted by Len Hawley in his 
discussion of “advance political-military planning” with the aim to 
“harmonize the many diverse civilian and military efforts as a 
comprehensive strategy” (Covey et al., 2005, 37–76). The 
establishment of a structured planning process created a common 
planning document that permitted various agencies and departments of 
the government to integrate their respective efforts and harmonize 
civilian activities with those of the military. The framework details a 
process that calls for interagency participation in the formulation of an 
overall policy goal stated as an outcome (U.S. Joint Forces Command, 
2005, 21). Although talented and well-meaning players from all 
departments and agencies would do their best to coordinate “on the 
ground” once face-to-face, this proved to be insufficient, time-
consuming, and wasteful of limited resources. To mitigate the 
challenges of operationalizing policy, the Draft Planning Framework 
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(U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2005, 14) defines a strategic level of the 
planning process in which major mission elements (MMEs) are 
identified. These MMEs are identified at the policy-making level and 
are large accomplishments that are individually necessary to achieve 
the overall goal, and which, taken together, are sufficient to reach the 
overall desired outcome of the policy. Once the overall policy goal and 
the required major outcomes (MMEs) to achieve the goal have been 
identified, the organizations and commands in the field establish sub-
objectives and tasks that they can achieve that will, in turn, affect the 
desired outcome of respective MMEs. The overarching policy goal, the 
various major accomplishments (MMEs), and the sub-objectives and 
tasks necessary to attain the MMEs are all written as outcomes, not as 
tasks (U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2005, 21). A representative sample 
of this hierarchical format for strategic guidance is depicted in figure 3 
and is based on the discussion generated for responding to a 
hypothetical complex contingency.  
Conflict Transformation Goal 
Exampleville is at peace with a government 
responsive to the basic  humanitarian needs 
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Figure 3: Annotated Extract of S/CRS Planning Template based on Sample 
Planning Template (USJFCOM, 2005, p.43). 
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Even with the initiation of a standardized transformation of the 
planning process for integrating multiple government agency planning 
activities, the capacity to harmonize similar efforts with the potentially 
substantial footprint of the military remained problematic. For the U.S. 
Government, policy formulation is done at the highest strategic level 
within the National Security Council structure. Once determined, the 
operationalizing of that policy is forwarded to the field or the 
ambassadors and their country teams to coordinate the implementation 
of that policy. Harmonization of efforts with the military was then done 
at the field implementation level with the country team. However, as 
stated earlier, many of the operational-level decisions for the military 
are made by the theater or unified commanders at a distinct operational 
level of planning. 
To mitigate this disconnect between nonmilitary and military 
planning, in the National Military Strategy (2004, 21), the Department 
of Defense established Joint Interagency Coordination Groups at most 
of the unified commands in an effort to improve cross-agency 
coordination and sharing of information. This originally was instituted 
with a focus on countering terrorism and has since evolved to 
encompass most military operations that have other agency or 
international participation. This structure, however, was not universally 
accepted by the various unified commanders’ planning staffs and 
encountered significant difficulty being staffed by several agencies 
from outside the Department of Defense. Accordingly, the ability to 
coordinate planning at the operational level was never optimized.  
To remedy this gap at the operational level of planning, the National 
Security Council Reconstruction and Stabilization Policy Coordination 
Committee published a concept (National Security Council, 2007) to 
establish an Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization that would augment field planners at the embassy and fill 
the gap for coordination with the unified commanders at the operational 
level of planning. Once activated, the Interagency Management System 
would establish a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group to 
conduct detailed strategic level planning, and augment embassy country 
teams with advance civilian teams to assist in comprehensive 
integration at the implementation level, as well as field advance civilian 
teams that would displace forward into regions to conduct the 
implementation of the policy. At the operational level, where 
previously no one other than a major military command would be 
coordinating or planning, an integration planning cell was designed “to 
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support integration of civilian and military planning at a GCC, or at an 
equivalent multi-national headquarters” (National Security Council, 
2007, 11). However, even with the establishment of a transformed 
process and newly established innovations for organizations, 
comprehensive planning efforts are still likely to be parallel efforts that 
find integration difficult. 
Policy guidance  (informational reporting feedback loop)
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Country Reconstruction and 
Stabilization Group (CRSG)
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Figure 4: Interagency Management System (Source: NSC, 2007, 3) 
The Nexus of Cross-Department/Agency Planning 
Operational level planners, regardless of department or agency, 
whether civilian or military, design their operations in similar yet not 
identical manners. This level of planning should focus on where the 
different systems intersect to integrate or harmonize a comprehensive, 
whole-of-government approach to implement policy. Present initiatives 
affecting the two main entities of military and policy planners have 
established conditions favorable to this nexus of strategic guidance and 
operational planning. As previously discussed, military planners 
anticipate requirements and construct possible concept plans for the use 
of significant military resources. In designing these operations, 
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planners identify decisive points and intermediate objectives that must 
be achieved to accomplish the mission. The planner will postulate what 
conditions are required to achieve the objectives. Thorough analysis by 
military planners reveals that achievement of these decisive points and 
the taking of intermediate objectives will require either that certain 
conditions be established beforehand or that certain effects will be 
generated as a consequence. The example identified earlier in figure 1 
showed both physical and logical LOOs. At times, achievement of 
decisive points or sub-objectives in one LOO will be similar, if not 
identical, to conditions created by another LOO. Take the example of 
actions on decisive point marked “A” and circled with a dashed line on 
the physical LOO (“Control Key Routes to Key Cities”) and compare it 
with decisive point “A” circled with a solid line on the logical LOO 
(“Open and Maintain Roads”). Although not identical, a commander, if 
using both these lines of operation, will find a point of intersection at 
those respective decisive points that will require close integration.  
Civilian policy planners, as discussed earlier, draft overarching 
policy goals, major mission elements, and sub-objectives or essential 
task activities, which are articulated as outcomes. Outcome language of 
the proposed U.S. Government Draft Planning Framework stipulates 
the specific condition or consequent effect of actions taken so that 
progress can be measured. The articulation by civilian policy planners 
of various outcomes and effects to be attained as policy goals or major 
mission elements will be stated in a similar manner to those of military 
planners, who articulate the effects or conditions that may be achieved 
as a result of taking intermediate objectives and decisive points. The 
language in these two different planning documents will be so similar 
at some points that it will be evident that the language identifies the 
same condition or effect in each of the documents. Extending the 
example of the military commander, offered earlier, who has identified 
the criticality of “controlling key routes” and “opening main roads” 
(decisive points “A”), intersection with outcomes identified in the 
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization Planning 
Template (figure 3) is apparent. A basic examination of the planning 
template at figure 3 shows clear points of intersection with the military 
commander’s previous analysis of decisive points in designing lines of 
operation. In figure 3, the lettered boxes identified in figure 1 have 
been overlaid onto the whole-of-government planning template. This 
clearly identifies actions that, at some decisive points that a military 
commander may deem appropriate, will affect—if not lead to—
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outcomes identified in a comprehensive policy plan. If the military 
commander achieves actions circled as “A” in figure 1, then it is 
obvious it will affect, if not be essential to, achieving outcomes circled 
and identified as “A” in figure 3, the whole-of-government policy 
planning template. As further depicted by comparing actions identified 
in a military commander’s lines of operation (figure 1) with the 
outcomes identified with the corresponding letters in the whole-of-
government planning template (figure 4), some actions of a military 
commander are associated with sub-objectives or essential task 
activities in more than one major mission element (activities circled 
labeled “A”). Further, some actions identified by the military 
commander in designing a LOO may encompass a complete MME, as 
illustrated by both items labeled “C” and “E” in each of the figures 
(“Restoration of Basic Services . . . ” and “Host Nation Sole 
Provider . . . ”). It is at these points of congruence that military planners 
should identify and recommend what should be a defense lead in a 
whole-government or comprehensive approach plan. By extension, this 
crosscutting technique will not only identify what outcomes should be 
identified as having the military take the lead responsibility but also 
will identify conditions that the military will achieve that will support 
another government agency or department. This technique forces the 
two major parallel planning efforts of the primary players in a whole-
of-government approach policy implementation to intersect. It is at this 
intersection, or the nexus of these two major planning efforts, that 
planners must focus to ensure that efforts across government (or 
international organizations in the case of multinational operations) are 
brought together to establish a coherent application across the spectrum 
of elements of power assembled for any particular contingency. 
Conclusion 
Although the drive for transformation in government has initiated 
some significant innovations in both organization and process, these 
efforts are nascent, and their effects remain unfelt by the majority of the 
vast complex operations planning and execution community. To move 
from the conceptualization of improving comprehensive integration of 
national and international elements of power or influence to 
application, points of intersection must be identified. Overlaying a 
military commander’s operational design, which likely has been 
prescribed in an earlier draft concept or operations plan, with a more 
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recently developed planning template drafted by the strategic-level 
planners, points of intersection can be identified by pairing up the 
military commander’s decisive points and the effects intended to 
achieve those objectives with the MMEs and the sub-objectives or 
essential task activities that are written as outcomes. Activities or 
elements for which the military should take the lead, when identified in 
the language of military effects gained through decisive points in the 
plan’s various LOOs, will be almost identical to the outcome language 
of properly articulated MMEs and essential task activities of the 
interagency implementation plan/planning framework. This is not a call 
to revert to an effects-based approach to operations, but, rather, a 
realization that in executing objectives-based operation plans, military 
commanders will affect conditions needed in achieving the whole-of-
government comprehensive plan, thus demonstrating that military plans 
and comprehensive government plans are “effects-linked.” The 
diplomatic and military communities can no longer afford to conduct 
their respective detailed planning in parallel; they must drive their 
respective efforts to a point of nexus or intersection to mitigate the fog 
of complex operations: “Who’s responsible for what, and who will 
resource which activity?”  
Schools, academies, and training centers should practice this 
intersection of political and military planning, so that theory can be 
taken out of the classroom and applied in the field. Efficiencies of 
proper strategic-level and operational-level planning must be realized. 
The rudiments of a transformed planning process and the basis for 
transformed organizations to exercise this process are present and must 
be used every time exercises are planned or policy is considered for 
implementation. This will require military contingency planning, to 
begin with the end in mind and identify effects or conditions that will 
be required in the later phases of an operation (i.e., stabilization and 
enabling civil authorities). Only after identifying where the plan must 
take them should military planners then design how the earlier phases 
of the plan frame deterrence, seize initiative, and generate dominating 
actions. There should be no detailed planning of dominating activities 
before the stabilization activities and the actions that enable civil 
authorities have been identified and all parties have analyzed how their 
respective plans are “effects-linked.” 
This will not be accomplished without challenges. The timing of 
these respective planning communities is not concurrent. Military 
planners will likely have their rudimentary operational design and 
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concept plan “on the shelf” before the strategic planning team of the 
Country Reconstruction Stabilization Group have even convened. 
Accordingly, civilian planners need to avail themselves of previously 
documented military plans, and defense establishments need to ensure 
permission so that those plans can be shared outside of the defense 
establishment. In addition, those who develop strategic plans that 
include proposed outcomes must be open to input, feedback, and 
proposed adjustments of those who will implement the plan.  
The world community will continue to experience challenges 
created by natural or manmade disasters. Whether they are called 
“complex contingency,” “reconstruction and stabilization,” or 
“stability” operations, multinational and/or national planning efforts 
must become more effective, and thus more efficient. This can be 
advanced significantly if both military and civilian planners seek 
integration at points of intersection of their respective planning efforts 
where they are obviously “effects-linked.”  
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Advantage by Exploiting Change 
By Scott Moreland and Scott Jasper 
 
Abstract 
Information Age organizations are complex and dynamic “living” 
entities that interact with and influence their environments. People 
are the building blocks—creative and intelligent components with a 
latent ability to produce not only stipulated outcomes but also novel 
ideas and achievements. This realization is a dramatic departure 
from the traditional conceptualization of organizations as mindless 
machines that churn out prescribed, formulaic products and 
solutions in an industrial fashion. When visualized and treated as 
living systems, organizations more readily exploit emergent 
technologies, as well as the human potential to innovate and adapt. 
To realize their full potential, adaptive organizations must also be 
capable of managing and even encouraging disruptive change.  
Adaptive organizations possess markedly cooperative characteristics 
that operate on trust, open information flow, and responsiveness to 
technological innovation. They are not based on or hostage to a set 
of inviolate roles, policies, and structures that form the rigid pillars 
for success. Rather, they purposefully reconfigure these important 
organizational components to support each new project or activity. 
Business models are changed as necessary. 
Organizational transformation requires deep understanding of the 
operational environment, ability to shape structure and processes to 
perform optimally, and rapid action to exploit opportunities to exert 
influence and maintain competitive advantage. Actions are followed 
by careful evaluation of outcomes, which in turn leads to new 
understanding and subsequent adaptations. This may be codified into 
a continuous process: understand → shape → act → evaluate. This 
essay will also provide tangible evidence of how this process can 
facilitate rapid organizational assimilation of new technology and 
people innovations. 
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Introduction 
Jingshen is the Mandarin word for spirit and vivacity. It is an 
important word for those who would lead, because above all 
things, spirit and vivacity set effective organizations apart from 
those that will decline and die.1 
odern organizations must be prepared to operate in a 
dynamic, information-saturated environment with 
increasingly porous boundaries. Ideas, creativity, and 
information services are the highly marketable commodities of the 
moment. Whole business entities have vacated their brick and mortar 
confines to float freely in the ether of cyberspace. Perhaps the most 
encouraging trend is the enhanced virtual interaction and collaboration 
among organizations, their people, and the recipients of the 
organization’s product or service. 
Technological innovations such as the Internet and satellite 
communications have fundamentally altered how organizations must 
relate to their stakeholders and the ambient environment in which they 
operate. In the commercial sector, companies like Amazon, Priceline, 
and eBay stake their entire business model on active consumer 
participation and feedback. These cyber-middlemen have resurrected 
barter commerce. They provide powerful tools for collaboration such as 
prominently posted reviews, product blogs and discussion, and 
facilitated correspondence and transactions between vendors and end-
users. Even traditionally autocratic and highly structured defense 
organizations are incrementally implementing fundamental 
organizational changes such as decentralization and network centricity. 
Military organizations are actively seeking innovative solutions from 
academia and industry, along with the pragmatic creativity of junior 
military leaders as they grapple with sophisticated and elusive 
adversaries.  
Despite these changes, organizations remain functionally static. At a 
fundamental level, an organization provides a structured model for its 
constituent entities that establishes purpose, fends off aggressive 
competition, and passes knowledge between contemporaries and from 
generation to generation. Organizations do not fulfill these basic 
                                                     
1 James L. Hayes, Memos for Management: Leadership (New York: 
AMACOM Books, 1983), 51. 
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functions differently today from how they have since early civilization. 
It is the form of the organization that is in a state of constant 
evolution—optimizing its component parts to best respond to the 
environmental conditions of the moment, girding to grapple with new 
and unfamiliar problems, and improving the ability to gather, 
understand, and communicate information. The simple fact that 
organizations are and have always been adaptive has long been a topic 
for popular discussion and philosophical and political debate. For at 
least the past 50 years, it also has been a field of deliberate scientific 
study that sees organizations as complex adaptive systems.  
A complex adaptive system can be defined as an entity that 
“behaves/evolves according to three key principles: order is emergent 
as opposed to predetermined, the system's history is irreversible, and 
the system's future is often unpredictable.”2 Certainly, modern 
organizations neatly fit this definition. Human history drifts between 
periods of alternating stability and disruption, more or less neatly 
bracketed by historians into “eras,” with each era building from its 
predecessor. At this macro-temporal level, organizations tend to evolve 
more radically during the chaotic periods between eras. The 
contemporary era is popularly conceived to be occupying a wildly 
entropic time-space between the end of the Industrial Age and the 
beginning of a new era, which has been more or less accurately 
described as the Information Age. Regardless of the moniker, nations at 
the forefront are exporting Industrial Era productivity to the developing 
world, with important implications for the future. In the lead countries 
that are shaping globalization, the focus has shifted from productivity 
to agility—efficiency is trumped by flexibility, generic mass-
production by service specialization, and compliance by innovation. 
That said, this shift is not unprecedented, as it pertains to the 
consideration of organizations as complex, adaptive systems. The 
fundamental difference between post-Industrialism and previous eras is 
that there is an opportunity to shape change deliberately rather than 
reactively. “Information Age” accurately describes our current 
cognitive space: We are able to develop a “deep” understanding of our 
environment through novel technologies that are already influencing 
changes in the way we think, organize, and interact. In fact, the 
relatively new treatment of organizations as living, evolving entities 
                                                     
2Kevin Dooley, “A Complex Adaptive Systems Model of Organizational 
Change,” Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, & Life Science, 1999;1(1):69–97. 
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may already be passé. Rather than adapting in the random or reactive 
fashion of natural evolution, our potential for “deep understanding” 
may offer us opportunities to transform organizations proactively and 
shape our environment deliberately to maintain competitive advantage. 
Eras of radical change are generally tied to a paradigm-altering 
cognitive breakthrough, either instigated or enabled by technological 
advances. The introduction of agriculture, the preservation of ideas in 
writing, the harnessing of energy to produce electricity, and most 
recently, the creation and occupation of cyberspace have fundamentally 
altered the whole of human civilization. To navigate the disruption 
zones that herald these eras of revolutionary change, organizations 
must rapidly adapt or face obsolescence and ultimate extinction.  
Before the advent of agriculture, human society conformed to a 
natural evolutionary progression; that is, its organizations and their 
adaptations were shaped by the physical environment. Agriculture was 
the first meaningful effort undertaken by humans to fundamentally alter 
their environment in a deliberate fashion, based on a new understanding 
of how things naturally worked and, with a bit of ingenuity and 
technological know-how, could work better to suit human needs. Even 
so, it took thousands of years for hunter–gatherer societies to give way 
to agrarianism, and illiterate civilizations thrived for millennia after the 
first Sumerian marked cuneiform onto clay. These historical 
innovations, which form the very basis of the ultimate complex 
adaptive organization—modern global civilization—occurred over a 
vast expanse of time. In contrast, the last two centuries have known 
almost constant change. The dizzying pace of modern-era 
revolutions—accessible energy and instantaneous communication 
grids, ventures into outer space, the realization of cyberspace—has 
radically and perhaps irrevocably shaped the ambient environment 
through the creation and occupation of previously unreachable or even 
unfathomable domains. Not content with merely changing our 
environment, humans are now exploring ways to shape our very 
essence as human beings as we begin to understand and exploit 
genetics, artificial intelligence, and nanotechnologies.3 
The implications for post-Industrial organizations are profound. The 
pace of radical change is widening the gap between technological 
                                                     
3 U.S. Joint Forces Command, “The Joint Operating Environment 2008: 
Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force.” Available at 
https://us.jfcom.mil/sites/J5/J59/default.aspx. 
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possibilities and the ability of organizations to assimilate technology 
responsibly, purposefully, and ethically. A proactive, nonsequential 
approach to organizational adaptation combines four essential cognitive 
capabilities: 
Understand → Shape → Act → Evaluate 
First, organizations must understand themselves, their competitors, 
and their operational space. To survive and thrive, they must use 
innovation and technological enablers to shape both internal structures 
and fluid environmental conditions to ideally suit an organizational 
purpose. This understanding and preparation of a favorable ambient 
setting enables organizations to act with clear purpose and evaluate the 
outcomes of their actions and to determine both the immediate and 
potential long-term effects that will affect future understanding, form, 
and action, and indeed might either confirm or refute the continued 
relevance of an organization’s purpose.4  
Understand: Attaining “Deep Knowledge” 
Kill our worst ideas before they kill us.5 
The first step in achieving deliberate and desirable organizational 
adaptation is to attain a holistic understanding, or “deep knowledge,”6 
of self, peers and competitors, and the environment. Deep knowledge 
requires a departure from traditional ideas about organizational purpose 
and management.  
The first conceptual hurdle is the notion of replacing control with 
agility. Agility, in fact, is the “critical capability that organizations need 
to meet the challenges of complexity and uncertainty.”7 Deep 
knowledge is based, ironically, on the concession that being able to 
unerringly forecast, much less control, the future operational 
                                                     
4 David C. Gompert, “Heads We Win: The Cognitive Side of Counter-
Insurgency,” RAND Counter-Insurgency Study Paper 1, prepared for the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense by the Rand National Defense Research 
Institute, Santa Monica (2007). 
5 Joseph M. Firestone, “Reducing Risk by Killing Your Worst Ideas,” 
Knowledge Management Consortium International, 2004:6. 
6 Mark W. McElroy, “The New Knowledge Management,” Knowledge & 
Innovation: Journal of the KMCI, 2000;1(1):43–67. 
7 David S. Alberts, “Agility, Focus, and Convergence: The Future of 
Command and Control,” The International C2 Journal, 2007;1(1):3. 
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environment is impossible. This realization does not mean that 
organizations should not bother to build future strategies—quite the 
contrary. For adaptive organizations, future planning simply shifts from 
a focus on control to a posture of careful monitoring and agile response 
based on a range of potential future scenarios. Planning for plausible 
future scenarios, coupled with continuous feedback from environmental 
scanning, can enhance awareness and increase responsiveness in an 
uncertain environment.8  
Over 30 years ago, Shell Oil Company was one of the early 
developers of a “flexible response” approach to operating in an 
uncertain future.9 In the late 1960s, rampant nationalization of global 
oil reserves sparked a disruptive change in the supply-side dynamic. 
When the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
emerged on the global scene in 1960, Shell recognized that this shift in 
the control of oil supplies from private industry to state entities might 
significantly alter the standing set of objectives, incentives, and 
practices that formed the foundation of the enterprise. Shell projects 
that were based on previous industry forecasts were failing, and the 
company’s strategic planners began to recognize that planning future 
projects that were aligned with a single future scenario on the basis of 
past precedent was an unacceptably risky endeavor. They looked to the 
then-groundbreaking work of open-systems theorists Daniel Katz and 
Robert Kahn,10 who asserted that when faced with an uncertain future, 
it is important to first determine which variables remain predictable. 
Then, based on what can be accurately predicted, a few plausible 
scenarios might emerge for future planning.  
After careful consideration of a short list of planning scenarios, 
Shell adapted their business model to accommodate this new-found 
understanding of how to mitigate risk in an uncertain future. Project 
designers considered how their efforts might support a broader range of 
                                                     
8 Kees van der Heijden, Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation, 2d 
ed. (West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 83–85. 
9 “Shell Global Scenarios to 2025,” (The Hague: Royal Dutch Shell, Shell 
Group, 2005), 8. 
10 Daniel Katz and Robert Khan were pioneers of social-systems theory. 
One of their early texts, The Social Psychology of Organizations (West 
Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 1978), first published in 1966 and revised in 
1978, is fundamental reading for social-systems theorists. This observation 
and its influence on the oil industry in the 1970s are found on pages 130–131 
of the 1978 edition. 
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future scenarios, emphasizing agile and responsive capabilities that 
could address not only the most likely futures but also the most 
dangerous scenarios. In the case of scenario development for the 
nationalization of oil supplies, Shell’s planners used global demand as 
their predetermined, or predictable, variable. Because demand was 
unlikely to change, this increased the weight of the supply-side 
variables. Initially, the planning team also considered supply to be 
fairly stable and that the most likely outcome was that state-controlled 
supply points would continue to generate anticipated oil production 
outputs. They also, however, considered a most-dangerous scenario, in 
which a major producer state or collective might alter production for 
national or political purposes not directly related to economic gain. 
Shell planners considered this to be the crisis scenario, and their project 
development efforts were arranged to be responsive to both these and 
other plausible futures. 
After Shell’s project development was aligned to be responsive to 
multiple future scenarios, it became imperative to determine the key 
indicators that a particular future scenario was emerging, which would 
trigger subsequent decisions and resource commitments. For the Shell 
scenarios, one obviously critical indicator was a political event that 
might encourage negative changes in nationalized (mostly Arab) crude 
oil extraction and distribution. The continued expansion of OPEC 
throughout the 1960s and the nationalization of Libyan oil under 
President Muammar Kaddafi in 1969 were significant indicators of the 
increasing potential for a most dangerous scenario outcome. Shell 
braced for the storm just as the Yom Kippur War between Israel and its 
Arab neighbors erupted in 1973. By the time OPEC producers imposed 
their devastating embargoes against Israel’s supporters in the war, Shell 
had already recognized the implications and rapidly reduced its Middle 
East commitments and reliance on OPEC-controlled supply lines. To 
do this, Shell invested heavily in liquefied natural gas, developed 
supertankers to minimize traffic to and from supply chokepoints in the 
Arabian Gulf, began diversifying its energy portfolio to include coal 
and nuclear power, and shifted exploration from the Arabian Peninsula 
to the North Sea.11 Though hardly immune from the effects of the 1973 
embargo, Shell’s responsive shifts ensured that the company would be 
among those that would survive the resultant industry crunch. 
                                                     
11 Royal Dutch Shell, “Shell Global Scenarios,” 22–26, 68–71. 
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At the end of the Cold War two decades later, the United States 
military likewise found itself in a future-planning quandary. A 
European ground war or nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union had 
long been the myopic future planning priority. With the sudden 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the ascension of small and 
nonaligned nations into the nuclear family, not to mention the 
emergence of ideologically motivated transnational terrorist 
organizations on the global scene, future-conflict scenarios began to 
look far more messy and unpredictable.  
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the most devastating 
attack on U.S. soil since Pearl Harbor, highlighted just how uncertain 
the present and future security environment had become. The potential 
list of external threats had dramatically expanded, and it was clear that 
any attempt to focus narrowly on a particular group of adversaries 
would result in catastrophic response capability shortfalls against 
unanticipated challenges. The defense community radically altered the 
threat-focused planning paradigm to be more capabilities-based in an 
effort to prepare agile and responsive forces that would be able to 
effectively counter a broad range of threats. Similar to the Shell 
planning model, capabilities-based planning addresses environmental 
uncertainty by considering a wide range of possible scenarios; it then 
generates capability requirements that are applicable and essential to 
success in all of the scenario conditions.12 
Shape: Adapting Organizations for Uncertain Futures 
Organizational capabilities represent the last truly sustainable 
source of competitive advantage.13 
For the U.S. Department of Defense, the conceptual shift to 
capabilities-based planning and an adaptive, agile posture compelled 
significant organizational changes. The development of a flexible 
capabilities-based force would demand organizations with a broad 
mission set, an inclusive and cooperative mentality, a willingness to 
accept calculated risks, and a painful divorce from platform-centric 
                                                     
12 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Department 
of Defense, 2006), 59. 
13 David Nadler and Michael Tushman, Competing by Design: The Power 
of Organizational Architecture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
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affinities.14 To become more adaptive, the armed forces would have to 
develop unfamiliar and uncomfortable cooperative characteristics 
founded on trust, the open flow of information, and a willingness to 
embrace technological innovation. Time-honored hierarchies would 
have to be deliberately blurred so that creativity could percolate from 
the ground up. Dogmatic doctrine could no longer hold leaders hostage 
to a prescribed set of actions. Still, Vietnam lingered as a painful 
example of the deliberate and wholesale “unlearning” of valuable 
skills, lessons, and traditions. There could be no blank page or clean 
slate; the defense community would have to respect the lessons of 
history as they purposefully reconfigured their still-valuable 
organizational components to support complex operations in a 
multifaceted environment.  
The military knew that it would need to maximize the combined 
potential of the service components and began in 1999 by establishing 
the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) as the agency to 
implement this crucial change. One of USJFCOM’s first challenges 
was to develop a means to rapidly deploy a situation-tailored joint 
command cell with associated joint forces that would be prepared for 
and effective at immediate crisis response. The prototype organizations 
that emerged were a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) for 
crisis planning and readiness and the Joint Task Force (JTF), 
comprising a headquarters (HQ) with assigned service and functional 
components.  
The SJFHQ operates under a high-ranking director and supporting 
Command Group staffed by joint-qualified military and civilian 
personnel. The organization comprises cross-functional teams—
operations, plans, information superiority, and knowledge 
management—that accomplish daily mission requirements. These 
teams operate within a knowledge-based environment that emphasizes 
seamless, cross-functional collaboration between the teams, with the 
regional combatant command staffs and components, and with other 
external agencies.15 In pre-crisis, the SJFHQ serves as a planning staff 
element that identifies likely future crisis scenarios, then establishes 
                                                     
14 Michael Fitzsimmons, “Whither Capabilities-Based Planning,” Joint 
Forces Quarterly, 2007;44:101–105. 
15 Major General Gordon C. Nash, U.S. Marine Corps, “Doctrinal 
Implications of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ),” The Joint 
Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series, Pamphlet 3, June 16, 2003, 7–8.  
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and maintains situational understanding and planning options for 
critical geographic areas designated by a combatant commander.  
When an actual crisis emerges, the operational commander must 
determine whether to build and deploy a JTF. Unlike the SJFHQ, JTFs 
and their headquarters are ad hoc organizations established on a 
geographic area or functional basis when the mission has a specific 
limited objective.16 For events that are limited in duration and scope, 
the commander may opt to designate the SJFHQ as the core of the JTF 
HQ. More commonly, however, essential portions of the SJFHQ 
accelerate the transition of a service operational HQ to a JTF HQ, 
which is equipped with so-called plug-and-play force packages that are 
ready to go and particularly well-suited to the crisis at hand. From 2005 
to 2008, USJFCOM SJFHQ core elements Alpha and Bravo deployed 
domestically to JTF Katrina and supported Multinational Forces Iraq, 
Combined Disaster Assistance Center Pakistan, JTF Lebanon, 
International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan, and the Combined 
JTF Horn of Africa.17 
One of the greatest challenges for every JTF HQ is how to quickly 
grasp the situation in the midst of a crisis response. The staff needs 
time to achieve full situational understanding and become functionally 
effective amid a maelstrom of hasty deployment, unfamiliar players, 
imminent resource demands, and sometimes conflicting or confused 
directives from outside the immediate operational space. Operational 
experience and demand over time demonstrated that a more agile, 
responsive, and tailorable organization than the SJFHQ was required. 
On October 1, 2008, the SJFHQ adapted and transitioned to a new Joint 
Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC).18 
Similar to its predecessor, the “JECC serves as the USJFCOM 
subordinate command responsible for providing forces to newly-
established joint force headquarters that can rapidly enable critical 
                                                     
16 Joint Publication 3-33: "Joint Task Force Headquarters" (February 15, 
2007). Available at I-3. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_33.pdf 
17 “Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element (SJFHQ-CE).” U.S. 
Joint Forces Command. Fact Sheet. (Norfolk, VA: 2005). 
18 Courtney E. Howard, “USJFCOM Transitions Standing Joint Force 
Headquarters,” USNORTHCOM Bulletin Board, September 30, 2008. 
Available at http://community.mae.pennnet.com/group/bulletinboard/forum/ 
topics/2108638:Topic:1845. 
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command and control capabilities.”19 The joint-enabling capabilities 
available to combatant commanders include Joint Deployable Teams 
with capabilities in four critical areas: operations, plans, information 
superiority/knowledge management, and logistics. In addition to these 
core staff teams, the JECC offers enabling capabilities in a Joint 
Communications Support Element, Joint Public Affairs Support 
Element, and Intelligence–Quick Reaction teams.20 The seven types of 
deployable teams can immediately offer joint structure, immediate 
availability, and mission-specific planning and intelligence capabilities, 
which provide the JTF HQ with the means to rapidly determine its 
courses of action and prepare and deploy an effective response.21  
The SJFHQ and JECC organizational innovations have improved 
joint response at the regional and operational level, but their role is 
really to identify, recommend, and augment the requirements needed by 
a service-dependent JTF HQ for effective crisis response. Joint 
combatant commanders, with the exception of Special Operations 
Command, possess very few organic resources and rely almost entirely 
on personnel and assets from their constituent services to manage their 
areas of responsibility. Although all of the services are starting to 
embrace jointness in practice, contemporary pundits question the 
dependence on individual services to provide the capabilities the JTF 
HQs need, decrying it as wasteful, competitive, and redundant. Many 
critics suggest a more centrally controlled process to develop and 
manage joint capabilities—one that emphasizes efficiency and 
interdependence over the current characteristics of service 
specialization, limited organic sustainability, and interoperability.22  
This option, though inarguably more cost-effective and joint-
spirited, is not without its own risks. If the current, service-oriented 
capability packages are to be homogenized through joint capability 
development, over time the unique domain affinities (sea, air, land), 
institutional experiences, cultures, and lessons learned will become 
diluted. Service distinction and competition, as well as cooperation, can 
                                                     
19 Joint Forces Command, “Joint Enabling Capabilities Command.” 
Available at http://www.jfcom.mil/about/com_jecc.html. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Douglas K. Zimmerman, “Understanding the Standing Joint Force 
Headquarters,” Military Review 2004;(July-August):28–29. 
22 Kathleen H. Hicks et al., Transitioning Defense Organizational 
Initiatives: An Assessment of Key 2001-2008 Defense Reforms (Washington, 
DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008), 56–64. 
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spur innovation and produce novel concepts when well-managed. 
Moreover, enforcing joint interdependence over joint interoperability 
risks single-point failures that jeopardize mission success. The long-
term solution may be to promote joint development for universally 
applicable capabilities while retaining those distinct service-specific 
assets that preserve effective institutional roles for the U.S. Army, 
Navy, Air Force, and Marines.  
The JECC and its predecessor provide a cogent example of how 
leadership, composition, structure, and responsibilities can be carefully 
shaped to better respond to the conditions imposed by the operational 
environment. In the commercial sector, Google offers a more profound 
example of shaping, in which the organization not only adapts to 
respond to crises in a rapidly changing competitive environment but 
also strives to incorporate the environmental conditions and its resident 
enterprises into its own organizational architecture. Google’s mission 
“to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible 
and useful”23 is a bold statement of transcendence of the competitive 
state to a space where goals and accomplishment are measured in 
absolute terms and the innovations of peers are viewed as collective 
opportunity. Shared information, and particularly networked 
information, is at the same time Google’s product, mantra, and 
operational domain.  
Google’s organizational structure is an amazingly simple hub-and-
spoke construct, with Google as the self-described information 
“keystone” that connects information suppliers (media, academia, 
industry, and individuals) with consumers, advertisers, and innovators 
to populate an “innovation ecosystem.” When a non-Google innovator 
creates a new information product or platform, rather than attempting to 
thwart the “competitor,” Google attempts to incorporate the new 
contributor into the network. Given the incentives—access to Google’s 
information tools, marketing data, and revenue-sharing, among 
others—few would-be competitors can resist Google’s magnetism. In 
fact, in Google’s flourishing innovation ecosystem, competition has 
become passé, replaced by a “mash-up” of diverse information 
products and services that pass fluidly through traditional 
organizational boundaries to the mutual benefit of all stakeholders.24  
                                                     
23 http://www.google.com/enterprise/whygoogle.html 
24 Bala Iyer and Thomas H. Davenport, “Reverse Engineering Google’s 
Innovation Machine,” Harvard Business Review 2008;86(4):59–68. 
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Google is now hosting the Android software platform as one 
emerging means to offer a diverse array of information-based 
capabilities in one convenient consumer tool. Android is an open-
standards telecommunication platform that not only offers free Google 
products but also combines the capabilities of a range of available tools 
to create a consumer-responsive experience. For example, Android can 
combine the information in the user network’s “contact” database, GPS 
applications, and Google Maps to allow Android users to locate friends 
in the Android network or automatically send alerts when an Android 
contact is within a designated geographical range. Without much 
imagination, the potential uses for this application could extend well 
beyond social networking to provide parents the ability to monitor 
children, allow victims of violent crime to avoid paroled offenders, or 
assist first responders in arriving quickly to a medical emergency. 
Though some of these technologies are available today, they are 
prohibitively expensive for broad public use. Android offers these and 
many other capabilities as a free feature, while simultaneously using its 
“open standards” status to encourage future Android-supported 
innovation.25 
Act: Exploiting the Time-Information Advantage 
The habit of control must yield to the power of networking.26 
In today’s information-rich environment, organizational shaping 
must work with informed reasoning to facilitate effective planning and 
action. Global information networks provide unprecedented 
opportunities to meld intuition and reasoning for rapid and adaptive 
decision-making. To benefit fully from this opportunity, however, 
organizations must be collaborative, decentralized, and pliable. In a 
diffuse and fluid competitive environment, centralized decision-making 
may be fatally unresponsive; in contrast, a “need-to-share” 
organizational mindset, supported by a distributed information network, 
can give leaders and managers in the field unobstructed access to 
information, the authority to act, and opportunities for collaboration, 
helping them gain a time-information advantage over their opponents.  
There are four essential cognitive capabilities that must be 
functioning harmoniously to realize the time-information advantage: 
                                                     
25 http://www.android.com 
26 Gompert, “Heads We Win,” xi–xii. 
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anticipation, opportunism, decision speed, and learning in action.27 
Intuition provides initial direction, creating the opportunity to gather 
information and reason rapidly via networks to anticipate future 
conditions. Accurate anticipation sustains ownership of the initiative so 
that fleeting opportunities can be exploited through rapid-adaptive 
decisions. Through information-enabled anticipation, opportunism, and 
rapid-adaptive decision-making, organizations can gain a potentially 
decisive time-information advantage over competitors. Time saved 
through anticipation is used to gain information; then superior 
information is exploited to gain more time. Meanwhile, learning and 
adapting “on the fly” ensures that organizations do not fall into 
complacency or predictable actions. 
The Federal Aviation Administration’s collaborative decision-
making project shows how decisions reached through well-informed 
teamwork can lead to effective action. Begun in 1990, the collaborative 
decision-making initiative is an effort to improve air traffic 
management through information sharing between industry 
stakeholders in “government, general aviation, airlines, private industry 
and academia who are working together to create technological and 
procedural solutions to traffic flow problems that face the National 
Airspace System (NAS).”28  
Collaborative decision-making participants cooperate and share 
information to increase their situational awareness, and thus their 
capacity for collective decision-making. Through an actively 
maintained and user-updated Intranet, all of an airport’s partners share 
the same operational picture, which in turn dramatically improves the 
timely anticipation and mitigation of potential scheduling conflicts, 
smoothes passenger flow between terminals, and alerts the entire 
aviation network to potential hazards. This network also serves as an 
invaluable data repository and analysis tool that automatically collects 
and processes information to streamline airspace flow and flight 
scheduling. Automated information management has compressed 90 
days’ worth of data analysis into as little 30 minutes.29 By sharing what 
                                                     
27 Ibid, xi. 
28 Federal Aviation Administration, “Collaborative Decision-Making 
Leadership Guide” (January 6, 2009). Available at http://cdm.fly.faa.gov/ 
whatscdm/cdmdocs.html [Accessed March 10, 2009]. 
29 Terence R. Thompson et al., "Terminal-Area Throughput: Measuring 
Capacity and Robustness,” Eurocontrol ATM R&D Symposium white paper, 
Budapest, June 2003. 
  
Adaptive Organizations  •  263 
 
had long been considered proprietary industry data via an inclusive 
information network, the entire aviation community has benefited from 
enhanced awareness, efficiency, and cost savings, and passengers have 
been spared an estimated 50,000 hours of air delays since the 
program’s inception.30  
A similar catharsis has occurred in the defense sector. The current 
conflict in Afghanistan demonstrates how a technologically enabled 
time-information advantage has helped shape rigid military 
organizational structures to be more agile and responsive at the 
operational level. Following successful major combat operations in 
2002, U.S. operational tasks shifted to nation-building—an unfamiliar 
and daunting task. Because the security environment was still deadly 
and domestic capacity nonexistent, it fell largely on an ill-suited 
military occupation force to rebuild an Afghan central government that 
could establish and maintain rule of law and good governance. The 
capability requirements for this extremely complex task were extensive, 
dynamic, and unfamiliar to military planners and leaders. Numerous 
environmental uncertainties, and especially the influence of key figures 
such as President Hamid Karzai and Taliban leader Mullah Omar, 
loomed large and even appeared to hold success or failure in the 
balance.31 
The complexities associated with propping up a viable central 
government in Afghanistan while maintaining interim stability through 
a rotating assortment of multinational and interagency players has since 
been addressed in large part by the U.S. creation of a new operational-
level organization: the provincial reconstruction team (PRT).32 A 
radical departure for the military, a PRT is designed as a more or less 
“flat” organization, wherein military representatives comingle with 
peer-level civilian officials from the U.S. departments of State, 
Agriculture, and Treasury as they cooperate closely with Afghan 
agencies and nongovernmental and international aid organizations. The 
exact organizational compositions, hierarchies, coverage areas, and 
tasks vary widely among a few dozen of these malleable “people-
                                                     
30 Ibid. 
31 Kathleen Hicks and Eric Ridge, “Planning for Stability Operations: The 
Use of Capabilities-Based Approaches,” a report of the International Security 
Program (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
2007), 16–22. 
32 James Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From 
Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 136. 
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centric” networks, according to each military commander’s 
comprehensive needs assessment, the PRT’s primary regional 
challenges, and even the personal relationships and interactions of its 
stakeholders.  
Multinational partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 
International Security Assistance Force have since adopted their own 
renditions of the PRT model and further emphasized the diverse 
organizational possibilities inherent to the construct. As the 
Netherlands Defence Staff eloquently observed, “Working in PRTs is a 
complex and demanding task, which makes detailed understanding of 
the mission, the environmental conditions and the formal and informal 
influential actors essential. PRTs are not based on a rigid doctrinal 
concept and the concepts behind reconstruction and the military 
contribution to it are in a state of rapid development. Concepts related 
to PRTs are therefore also evolving constantly.”33 Despite or perhaps 
because of these ever-shifting requirements, the PRT model continues 
to endure and evolve in one of the globe’s most intractable disruption 
zones, ever striving to improve agility and unified responsiveness in the 
face of uncertainty, austerity, and hostility. 
Evaluate: Defining, Determining, and Enhancing 
Success 
The understanding of instability is . . . derived from analysis fed from 
many sources . . . information that feeds these plans is vulnerable to 
subjectivity, is rarely quantifiable, is difficult to measure and is 
infrequently reviewed.34 
PRTs offer invaluable insights into the importance of a regular 
evaluation of environmental conditions, shaping efforts, and action 
outcomes. The joint force commander must expect that, however 
carefully conceived, his initial operational design might prove 
inadequate. The PRT plan must incorporate means of continuously 
assessing the results of operations in relation to expectations and be 
                                                     
33 Joint Doctrine Bulletin 2008/01, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams’ 
deployment in Afghanistan,” Netherlands Defence Staff, Defence 
Staff/DOBBP/Doctrine Division, The Hague (2008): iii. Available at 
http://www.yourdefence.nl/file.php/1/moddata/forum/2/247/JDB_0801_PRT_
OPS_English_version.pdf.  
34 T. R. Brewer, “Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework: Trial Report” 
(TF Helmand, NATO International Security Assistance Force, 2008), iii. 
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prepared to modify operations when the two diverge. By probing the 
situation, operations themselves become a way of testing early 
assumptions and expectations.35  
In Afghanistan, the United Kingdom is part of the International 
Security and Assistance Force, with a charter to stabilize Afghanistan 
and “set it on a path toward economic development and increased 
political freedoms.”36 Britain’s Afghanistan PRT, located in Helmand 
province, comprises representatives and resource contributions from its 
Ministry of Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and 
Department for International Development. The British PRT’s 
activities in Helmand are driven by the Helmand Road Map, a 2-year 
plan under annual evaluation. According to the plan, civil and military 
activities center on five main geographical areas, controlled by a 
politically led counterinsurgency campaign. This approach depends on 
the consent of the population and its support for the government at least 
as much as on holding ground or eliminating the Taliban. For this 
reason, military tasks are designed with a “civilian effects” purpose.37  
The complexity of Afghan social networks adds an additional 
wrinkle to the achievement of a time-information advantage. The civil 
environment is characterized by an innate mistrust of government, 
strong tribal loyalties and bitter clan rivalries, and a commercial 
exchange system that is so foreign as to be anathema to Westerners. 
Western, and particularly military, organizations are notoriously action-
oriented, and leaders feel compelled to move quickly—even 
prematurely—based on initial impressions of need. In Helmand, leaders 
soon learned that this well-intentioned desire for rapid assistance had to 
be tempered with exhaustive, highly formalized discussions with 
trusted local Afghani leaders. For instance, the perceived need to 
restore reliable irrigation to the agriculture-dependent province had to 
take into consideration the near-exclusive cultivation of opium poppies 
as the primary cash crop. If restoration of the irrigation system were not 
                                                     
35 Admiral M. G. Mullen, “Capstone Concept for Joint Operations,” 
version 3.0 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009), 14. Available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare. 
36 Robert Perito et al., Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and 
Recommendations (Princeton, NJ: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and 
International Affairs, Princeton University, 2008), 42–46. 
37 Peter Dahl Thruelson, “Counterinsurgency and a Comprehensive 
Approach: Helmand Province, Afghanistan,” Small Wars Journal, 2008;7. 
Available at http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/100-thruelsen.pdf. 
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accompanied by incentives for legitimate farming and poppy 
eradication, assistance efforts would inadvertently fuel opium 
production. Similarly, the intuitive move to establish a powerful 
military presence proved counterproductive because it fueled 
antioccupation sympathies and Taliban recruitment. Clearly, the 
challenge was not simply to take action quickly but to exploit 
information to take the correct actions.38  
To synchronize actions to be both rapid and effective, the Road Map 
demands close cooperation between civil and military stakeholders and 
frequent interaction with local Afghan leaders. The Road Map further 
describes eight steps of integrated action. 
Step 1: Begin a civilian-led effort to prioritize the various 
actors’ goals.  
Step 2: Identify those collective actions necessary to achieve 
desired effects.  
Step 3: Synchronize roles and responsibilities for all 
participants.  
Step 4: Analyze and approve available resources.  
Step 5: Develop an integrated resource plan.  
Step 6: Carry out preparations and tactical planning.  
Step 7: Execute integrated civil–military operations.  
Step 8: Consolidate and evaluate desired effects.39  
Priorities will often originate from discussions with trusted Afghan 
tribal leaders. Close daily interaction between the top civilian and 
military leaders ensures they share a common understanding of the 
immediate situation and assists the civilian PRT chief in assigning 
weights and directing focus. This cooperative feedback and immediate-
decision capability may lead to rapid adjustments in the delivery of 
civilian services and security without necessitating a formal planning 
                                                     
38 Rene L. Cote, “Data-Driven Stabilization: The Process of Selecting 
Reconstruction and Development Efforts,” 4th Civil Affairs Group, U.S. 
Marine Corps, Anacostia Annex, Washington, DC, July 13, 2007, 2–3. 
Available at http://www.civilaffairsassoc.org/Data-
Driven%20Stabilization.pdf [Accessed March 5, 2009]. 
39 Thruelson, “Counterinsurgency,” 8. 
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process. Similarly, in hostile environments where security is the 
overriding priority, civilian actors may have little or no involvement in 
the planning and delivery of security services, which lie almost 
exclusively under military purview. 
In tandem with this internal synchronization, TF Helmand adopted a 
structured approach to collecting information that could first identify 
the root causes of instability or conflict, then determine whether the 
actions taken by the PRT were achieving their intended effects. The 
PRT opted to adopt an assessment tool developed by the U.S. Agency 
for International Development: the Tactical Conflict Assessment 
Framework (TCAF). The agency describes the TCAF as “a 
standardized diagnostic tool designed for use by both military and 
civilian personnel. It is employed to gather information from local 
inhabitants to identify the causes of instability or conflict in tactical 
areas of operation. This information helps identify, prioritize, monitor, 
evaluate, and adjust civil–military programming targeted at diminishing 
the causes of instability or conflict.”40 British leaders on the ground in 
Helmand confirm that this description fits their experience. According 
to Lieutenant Colonel Richard Wardlaw, commander of the Task 
Force’s 52 Brigade Engineers, "TCAF does more than just enable us to 
establish what the main problems are that cause instability. If you then 
keep asking those questions, over time you also get measurement of 
effect."41 
The task force began with a core assessment. Using military foot 
patrols that had already established trust with the local population, the 
TCAF assessment gathered essential information using four basic 
questions:  
1. Have there been any changes in the village population in 
the last year? Why?  
2. What is the most important problem facing the village? 
3. Who do you believe can solve your problems?  
                                                     
40 “Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework,” USAID Military Affairs 
Web site. Available at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/ 
ma/tcaf.html. 
41 As quoted by James Holland in “I Have Seen the Way Open for Hope in 




268  •  Moreland and Jaspers
 
4. What should be done first to help the village?42  
The open-ended nature of the questions encouraged dialogue and 
opportunities for locals to air grievances and concerns and, perhaps 
most important, capture their notions for a brighter future. These 
carefully framed questions also provided important insights about 
perceptions of the PRT’s mission and presence, and where local trust 
and loyalty resided. The same questions were repeated regularly over 
an extended period, so that effects from initial actions could be 
validated, fine-tuned, supplemented, or replaced by subsequent actions. 
Over time, the survey results identified and confirmed root causes and 
greatly facilitated the tracking of quantifiable trends and outcomes.  
TCAF is already producing results in Helmand. Results from data 
gathered in both Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital, and the city of 
Sangin using the TCAF evaluation tool indicated that earlier 
assumptions about each city’s grievances and needs had been quite 
wrong. Moreover, results in the two places were very different, 
showing how wide local differences can be. Based on this evaluation 
and new understanding, the Helmand PRT is reshaping reconstruction 
and development initiatives in these two cities so that actions will be 
more effective. Like all complex adaptive organizations, the Helmand 
PRT will continue to evolve. Based on the lessons learned in Helmand, 
military–political analysts are already suggesting two new 
organizational innovations for future PRT deployments: “mobile 
PRTs” that could follow troops immediately after combat operations, 
and “indigenous PRTs” led and populated by local civilians and 
augmented with foreign capacity-building and support.43 
The U.N.’s World Bank is also exploring more meaningful metrics 
that might reveal more effective approaches for combating poverty. 
World Bank concept leaders have made a remarkable departure from 
traditional poverty assessment. World Bank is now experimenting with 
a capabilities-based assessment model that is based on a comprehensive 
quality-of-life evaluation in place of a purely income-based “poverty-
line” metric. The central contention is that poverty is defined more 
succinctly as a “deprivation of basic capabilities rather than merely a 
lowness of incomes.”44  
                                                     
42 Cote, “Data-Driven Stabilization,” 3. 
43 Perito, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” 46. 
44 Sanjay Reddy et al., “Inter-Country Comparisons of Poverty Based on a 
Capability Approach: An Empirical Exercise,” Q-Squared working paper 28. 
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The traditional infusions of money into the national coffers of 
poverty-stricken nations based on purely monetary metrics have too 
often yielded unexpected and even counterproductive results: inflation, 
corruption, and cultures of dependency. Recognizing this, in 2006, the 
World Bank initiated a limited-scope experiment to determine whether 
capabilities-based metrics might produce better solutions. 
Acknowledging that a number of factors contributed to the condition of 
poverty (e.g., availability of food, shelter, and security), the experiment 
focused on one indisputable capability requirement, “the capability to 
be adequately nourished” to establish one potential new poverty metric 
for comparison with the traditional income-based poverty line, using 
statistical data from Nicaragua, Tanzania, and Vietnam. The measure, 
caloric intake, was assumed to have a fixed criterion for adequate 
nourishment, set at 2,100 kilocalories, which established a sort of “food 
poverty line.” The experiment measured caloric intake in each of the 
three countries, taking into account, to the extent possible, the 
comparative nutritional values of each country’s typical diet. 
The results of the experiment revealed a notable divergence in these 
countries’ global poverty rankings with the application of the “food 
poverty” measures when contrasted against the “income poverty” line. 
In Vietnam, “nutritional” poverty was 84% higher than its comparable 
monetary indicator, whereas Tanzania enjoyed a 45% decrease in 
poverty with the application of the “food poverty” line.45 
This experiment is important primarily in that it illustrates the need 
to determine root causal relationships for effective evaluation. The 
World Bank experimentation team acknowledged that adequate 
sustenance was only one of many true poverty indicators, but that, in 
general, “the possession of elementary capabilities provides an 
approach to international poverty comparison and aggregation that is 
both coherent and meaningful, unlike existing money-metric 
approaches.” The radical, but retrospectively obvious, conclusion that 
access to money is only one contributor to a holistic set of basic 
“capabilities gaps” that define poverty should lead to more effective 
World Bank approaches. The results from this experiment and future 
capabilities-based evaluations will contribute to a more comprehensive 
                                                                                                                    
Toronto: Center for International Studies, 2006, 1. Available at 
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0002281/index.php. 
45 Ibid., 3-4, 16–18.  
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understanding of poverty, which should lead to more effective shaping 
of conditions to enhance poverty eradication actions. 
Conclusion 
Information Age organizations are complex and dynamic “living” 
entities that interact with and influence their environments. People are 
the building blocks: creative and intelligent components with a latent 
ability to produce not only stipulated outcomes but also novel ideas and 
achievements. When visualized and treated as complex adaptive 
systems, organizations more readily take advantage of emergent 
technologies, as well as the human potential to innovate and adapt. To 
realize their full potential, complex adaptive organizations must also be 
capable of managing and even encouraging change.  
Adaptive organizations possess markedly cooperative characteristics 
that operate on trust, the open flow of information, and a readiness to 
incorporate technological innovation. They are not based on or hostage 
to a set of inviolate roles, policies, and structures that form the rigid 
pillars for success. Rather, they purposefully reconfigure these 
important organizational components to support new projects or 
activities. Deliberate adaptation demands an improved ability to 
understand the operating environment and underlying causal 
relationships, to shape the organization and its contextual conditions for 
optimal performance, to act effectively to exploit opportunities to exert 
influence, and to evaluate outcomes to sustain competitive advantage. 
Actions are followed by a careful assessment of results in relation to 
expectations, which enhances understanding and leads to subsequent 
adaptations. 
In the Information Age, intuition must be integrated with reasoning 
for optimal decision-making ability. Intuition alone may not be reliable 
in unfamiliar situations, whereas reasoning can be aided tremendously 
by networked information. Four cognitive abilities are particularly 
important in organizational adaptation: understand → shape → act → 
evaluate. These cognitive abilities must not be concentrated among the 
few at the organizational core but, instead, distributed across the many 
in the field, who must in turn be trusted with unfettered access to the 
information network, authority to act, and opportunities to collaborate 
horizontally without deference to a higher authority. In complex 
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